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The publication of microdata poses a privacy threat: anonymous personal records
can be re-identified using third party data. Past research partitions data into
equivalence classes (ECs), i.e., groups of records indistinguishable on Quasi-
identifier values, and has striven to define the privacy guarantee that publish-
able ECs should satisfy, culminating in the notion of 푡-closeness. Despite this
progress, no algorithm tailored for 푡-closeness has been proposed so far. To fill
this gap, we present SABRE, a Sensitive Attribute Bucketization and REdistri-
bution framework for 푡-closeness. It first greedily partitions a table into buckets
of similar sensitive attribute (풮풜) values, and then redistributes the tuples of
each bucket into dynamically determined ECs. Nevertheless, 푡-closeness, as the
state of the art, still fails to translate 푡, the privacy threshold, into any intelligible
privacy guarantee. To address this limitation, we propose 훽-likeness, a novel ro-
bust model for microdata anonymization, which postulates that each EC should
satisfy a threshold on the positive relative difference between each 풮풜 value’s
frequency in the EC and that in the overall anonymized table. Thus, it clearly
quantifies the extra information that an adversary is allowed to gain after seeing
a published EC.
Most of privacy preserving techniques, including SABRE and 훽-likeness,
are designed for static data sets. However, in some application environments,
data appear in a sequence (stream) of append-only tuples, which are contin-
uous, transient, and usually unbounded. As such, traditional anonymization
schemes cannot be applied on them directly. Moreover, in streaming applica-
tions, there is a need to offer strong guarantees on the maximum allowed de-
lay between incoming data and the corresponding anonymized output. To cope
vii
with these requirements, we first present CASTLE (Continuously Anonymizing
STreaming data via adaptive cLustEring), a cluster-based scheme that continu-
ously anonymizes data streams and, at the same time, ensures the freshness of
the anonymized data by satisfying specified delay constraints. We further show
how CASTLE can be easily extended to handle ℓ-diversity. To better protect
the privacy of streaming data, we have also revised 푡-closeness and applied it
to data streams. We propose (휔, 푡)-closeness, which requires that for any EC,
there exists a window, which has a size of 휔 and contains the EC, so that the
difference of 풮풜 distribution between the EC and the window is no more than 푡.
Thus, the closeness constraints are restricted in windows instead of a whole un-
bounded stream, complying with the general requirement that streaming tuples
are processed in windows.
We have implemented all the proposed schemes and conducted performance
evaluation on them. The extensive experimental results show that our schemes
achieve information quality superior to existing schemes, and can be faster as
well.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Organizations such as government agencies or hospitals collect microdata (e.g.,
medical reports, financial transactions, and residence records), and regularly re-
lease them to serve the purposes of research and public benefits. For example,
a predication model (e.g., a decision tree) built on medical reports can help
clinicians determine the most appropriate care for newly diagnosed cases of dis-
eases. However, such data contain sensitive personal information, and improper
disclosure of them puts the privacy of individuals at risk. Consider again the
medical reports. The disclosure that someone suffers from diabetes has a nega-
tive impact on his/her employment and the coverage of insurance. Therefore, a
conflict exists between perceived benefits and the sacrifice of individual privacy
in data dissemination.
There are two extremes in handling the conflict: one is disseminating data
without any change, thus achieving full data utility at the expense of privacy;
the other is withholding the publication, hence sacrificing utility for full pri-
vacy. Obviously, neither of these is practical and useful. In this thesis, we adopt
an alternative approach by finding a balanced point between privacy and data
utility, using available privacy models and our newly developed ones.
Data publication takes place in both static and dynamic settings. In static set-
tings, data are collected, anonymized, and then published only once. In dynamic
2circumstances, data arrive continuously, and are anonymized/published in a se-
quence of times; in some cases a tuple can even appear in multiple anonymiza-
tions. Our study involves static data sets, and data streams, a common and
important case of dynamic setting.
1.1 Privacy protection for static data sets
In static settings, the privacy of data is guaranteed by the algorithms designed
according to different privacy models proposed so far [31, 76]. Each model
has its own requirements on the form that the data should follow before the
publication. The research of privacy protection on static data sets can be seen
as a history of progressively more sophisticated models. In the following we
briefly present these models related to our thesis in the chronological order, and
discuss their functions and limitations.
Age Sex Zipcode Disease
26 Male 53711 Bronchitis
27 Male 53710 Broken arm
27 Male 53712 AIDS
25 Male 53711 Hepatitis
25 Female 53712 Hepatitis
28 Female 53711 Hepatitis
Table 1.1: Microdata about patients
Name Age Sex Zipcode
Bob 26 Male 53711
Mike 27 Male 53710
John 27 Male 53712
Jack 25 Male 53711
Kate 25 Female 53712
Jane 28 Female 53711
Table 1.2: Voter registration list
1.1.1 푘-anonymity
The pioneering work for privacy preserving data publication is the concept of
푘-anonymity [66,67] proposed by Samarati and Sweeney. They discovered that
microdata with identity information (e.g., social security number, name, and
telephone number) removed, may still be vulnerable to linking attack. Consider
patient records in Table 1.1 and voter registration list in Table 1.2. Although all
3the records in Table 1.1 have their identity information removed, they can still
be re-identified by joining Table 1.1 with Table 1.2 on their shared attributes—
Age, Sex, and Zipcode. For example, after the join, we can infer that Bob suffers
from Bronchitis.
The set of attributes that can be exploited to re-identify individuals by join-
ing/matching them with external databases is called quasi-identifier (QI). In the
above example, {Age, Sex, Zipcode} is the QI. An attribute whose disclosure
puts the individual privacy at risk is known as the sensitive attribute (풮풜). Dis-
ease in Table 1.1 is such an 풮풜. Under 푘-anonymity, records of the dataset
are partitioned into groups, each with a size of at least 푘, and the QI values
in a same group are replaced by a single generalized value. A group of tuples
with the same QI value is an equivalence class (EC). In this way, all the records
in the same group/EC are indistinguishable from each other with regard to QI.
Hence, 푘-anonymity successfully protects against identity disclosure, by hiding
one person in a crowd of at least 푘 − 1 other persons. Let us go on with the
running example. Table 1.1 is 3-anonymized to Table 1.3 with two ECs of size
3 each. Consider the first record in Table 1.3. At present, Bob, Mike, and John
are all equally linkable to it. Thus, Bob is hidden in the crowd of {Bob, Mike,
John}.
EC Age Sex Zipcode Disease
[26-27] Male [53710-53712] Bronchitis
1 [26-27] Male [53710-53712] Broken arm
[26-27] Male [53710-53712] AIDS
[25-28] Person [53711-53712] Hepatitis
2 [25-28] Person [53711-53712] Hepatitis
[25-28] Person [53711-53712] Hepatitis
Table 1.3: A 3-anonymous table
4Although 푘-anonymity successfully protects against identity disclosure, it
suffers from homogeneous attack due to neglecting non-QI sensitive attribute.
When the distribution of sensitive attribute (풮풜) values in an EC is highly
skewed, an attacker may infer the sensitive value of an individual with a high
confidence. For instance, equivalence class 2 in Table 1.3 contains all tuples
with Hepatitis as 풮풜 value. Hence, an attacker can infer with 100% confidence
that all persons referred by EC 2 have hepatitis, i.e., Jack, Kate, and Jane all
have this disease.
1.1.2 ℓ-diversity
To address the limitation of 푘-anonymity, Machanavajjhala et al. [57] put for-
ward the principle of ℓ-diversity, which postulates that each EC should contain
at least ℓ distinct “well represented” 풮풜 values. The intuition behind ℓ-diversity
is that each person is linkable to ℓ distinct 풮풜 values, thus the association be-
tween the person and his/her specific 풮풜 value is blurred. Since the requirement
that values be “well represented” can be explained in multiple ways, there are
different instantiations of ℓ-diversity. Please refer to Section 2.1.2 for a survey.
Name Weight Age Disease
Mike 60 40 SARS
Alice 70 50 intestinal cancer
John 60 60 pneumonia
Bob 50 50 bronchitis
Beth 80 50 gastric flu
Carol 70 70 gastric ulcer
Table 1.4: Patient records
EC Weight Age Disease
[50-60] [40-60] SARS
1 [50-60] [40-60] pneumonia
[50-60] [40-60] bronchitis
[70-80] [50-70] intestinal cancer
2 [70-80] [50-70] gastric flu
[70-80] [50-70] gastric ulcer
Table 1.5: 3-diverse published table
Still, ℓ-diversity fails to protect against attacks by an adversary’s unavoidable
knowledge of the overall 풮풜 distribution in a released table [52]. In particular,
a similarity attack occurs when the 풮풜 values in an EC are semantically similar.
For example, Table 1.4 has {Weight, Age} as QI and Disease as 풮풜. Attribute
5Name has been deleted from the Table; we put it outside the table only for
reference. Table 1.5 is a 3-diverse version of Table 1.4, nevertheless all tuples
in EC 1 indicate a respiratory problem.
Furthermore, a skewness attack may take place when the 풮풜 distribution
in an EC differs substantially from that in the published table as a whole. For
example, assume a 10-diverse form 풯 ′ of a medical records table 풯 , in which
0.1% persons are infected with HIV, and an EC 풢 ∈ 풯 ′ containing 10 distinct
풮풜 values, with one occurrence of HIV among them. Then the probability of
HIV in 풢 is 10%, while in 풯 it is 0.1%. This 100-fold increase creates a big
undesirable leak of information.
1.1.3 푡-closeness
The 푡-closeness guarantee [52] is conceived to address the limitations of ℓ-
diversity. It requires that the distance between the local 풮풜 distribution in any
EC and the global 풮풜 distribution in the whole table be at most 푡, a threshold.
푡-closeness modeling takes the global 풮풜 distribution as the public knowledge,
and considers the difference between the two distributions as the additional in-
formation that an attacker gains. Intuitively, a smaller 푡 indicates that the two
distributions are more similar, thus the information gain is smaller. 푡-closeness
directly protects against skewness attack, while it also provides defence against
similarity attack, depending on the extent to which semantic similarity exists
among 풮풜 values in the whole table.
So far, 푡-closeness schemes [52,53] are built on 푘-anonymity instantiations;
they extend either Incognito [48] or Mondrian [49] by adding an extra condition:
the produced ECs satisfy 푡-closeness. However, 푘-anonymity and 푡-closeness
are very different privacy models—the former focuses on the EC sizes, requiring
6the number of tuples in each EC to be no less than 푘; the latter focuses on the
풮풜 distributions, constraining the similarity between 풮풜 distribution in any EC
and its global distribution. With such distinct requirements on created ECs, as
expected, a good 푡-closeness-complying scheme may not be derived from 푘-
anonymity schemes. Therefore, the question of designing a scheme tailored for
푡-closeness remains open.
1.2 Privacy protection for data streams
Data streams are common to many application environments, such as, telecom-
munication, market-basket analysis, network monitoring, and sensor networks.
Mining these continuous data streams [36, 56, 85] helps companies (the owner
of data streams) to learn the behavior of their customers, thus bringing unique
opportunities. Many companies do not have the in-house expertise of data min-
ing, so it is beneficial to outsource the mining to a professional third party [62].
However, data streams may contain much private information that must be care-
fully protected. Consider Amazon.com. In a single day, it records hundreds of
thousands of online sales transactions, which are received in the form of stream-
ing data. Suppose that the sales transaction stream has the schema 푆(푡푖푑, 푐푖푑,
푔표표푑푠), where 푡푖푑 is transaction identifier, 푐푖푑 is customer identifier, and 푔표표푑푠
is a list of items bought by the corresponding customer. Suppose that a relation
퐶 containing the information about Amazon customers is stored on disk, with
schema 퐶(푐푖푑, 푛푎푚푒, 푠푒푥, 푎푔푒, 푧푖푝푐표푑푒, 푎푑푑푟푒푠푠, 푡푒푙푒푝ℎ표푛푒). Let 푆퐶1 be the
stream generated by joining 푆 with 퐶 on 푐푖푑. Suppose moreover that, to analyze
1In real stream systems, typically customer information does not appear in the stream to
reduce redundancy. Mining, which needs customer information, requires joining the data stream
with local customer databases. In what follows, we consider mining and anonymization on joint
streams.
7customers’ buying behavior (e.g., building a decision tree), the mining is on 푆퐶,
and Amazon.com outsources it to a professional third-party. To protect the pri-
vacy of customers, attributes that explicitly identify customers (such as 푛푎푚푒,
푎푑푑푟푒푠푠 and 푡푒푙푒푝ℎ표푛푒) are projected out of 푆퐶. However, as pointed out in
Section 1.1.1, the remaining data in 푆퐶 may still be re-identified by joining QI
attributes (e.g., 푠푒푥, 푎푔푒 and 푧푖푝푐표푑푒) with external public databases (e.g., a
voter registration table). Therefore, the streaming transactions in 푆퐶 need to be
carefully anonymized before they are passed to the third-party.
Most of the previous anonymization algorithms are designed specifically for
static data sets. They cannot be directly applied on streaming data for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, these techniques typically assume that each record in a
data set is associated with a different person, that is, each person appears in the
data set only once. Although this assumption is reasonable in a static setting,
it is not realistic for streaming data. Second, due to the constraints of perfor-
mance and storage, backtracking over streaming data is not allowed. However,
traditional anonymization schemes scan a data set multiple times, contrary to
the one-pass requirement imposed on algorithms for data streams. Furthermore,
streaming tuples have a temporal dimension. They arrive at a certain rate, they
are dynamically processed, and the result is output with a certain delay. In some
applications, the output data are immediately used to trigger appropriate pro-
cedures. For example, in a sensor network application the output stream can
be used to react in real time to some anomalous situations, thus the time to
react is very crucial. Therefore, a data stream anonymization scheme should
ensure strong guarantees on the maximum delay between the input of data and
their output. Finally, some privacy models are not directly applicable to data
8streams. Models such as 푡-closeness assume the existence of a global 풮풜 dis-
tribution. However, data streams are unbounded, and such a global distribution
is unavailable. Therefore, these models themselves need to be modified before
being adopted for streaming tuples. As a consequence, all previous anonymi-
zation algorithms designed according to their constraints cannot be applied on
data streams.
Based on the above analysis, we can safely conclude that we need to specif-
ically design new algorithms for anonymizing stream data rather than simply
applying existing ones.
1.3 The thesis contributions
Our contributions are divided into two portions. In the first part, we propose
novel privacy models as well as sophisticated algorithms to anonymize static
data sets. In the second part, we customize privacy models to meet the unique re-
quirements of data streams, and develop new solutions to continuously anonymize
streaming data.
1.3.1 The models and algorithms in static setting
SABRE: A tailored 푡-closeness framework
The past research on privacy models culminates in 푡-closeness. Despite this
progress, there is no anonymization algorithm tailored for it. Therefore, our
first contribution is to fill this gap with SABRE, a Sensitive Attribute Bucketi-
zation and REdistribution framework for 푡-closeness. SABRE operates in two
phases. First, it partitions a table into buckets of similar 풮풜 values in a greedy
fashion. Then, it redistributes tuples from each bucket into dynamically config-
ured ECs. Following [52, 53], we employ the Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD)
9as a measure of closeness between distributions, and utilize a property of this
measure to facilitate our approach. Namely, a tight upper bound for the EMD
of the distribution in an EC from the overall distribution can be derived as a
function of localized upper bounds for each bucket, provided that the tuples in
the EC are picked proportionally to the sizes of the buckets they hail from. Fur-
thermore, we prove that if the bucket partitioning obeys 푡-closeness, then the
derived ECs also abide to 푡-closeness. We develop two SABRE instantiations.
The former, SABRE-AK focuses on efficiency. The latter, SABRE-KNN trades
some efficiency for information quality. Our extensive experimental evalua-
tion demonstrates that both instantiations achieve information quality superior
to schemes that extend algorithms customized for 푘-anonymity to 푡-closeness,
while SABRE-AK is much faster than them as well.
훽-likeness: an enhanced model and its algorithm
Although 푡-closeness takes a big step forward in privacy preservation than its
predecessors, i.e., 푘-anonymity and ℓ-diversity, it still has its drawbacks. It cal-
culates the distance between two 풮풜 distributions in a cumulative way, without
any guarantee on the relative distance of a single 풮풜 value frequency between
an EC and the whole table. Let 풱 = {푣1, 푣2, . . . , 푣푚} be the domain of sensitive
attribute 풮풜 in a table 풟ℬ, and 풫 = (푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝푚) and 풬 = (푞1, 푞2, . . . , 푞푚)
be the 풮풜 distributions in 풟ℬ and an EC, respectively. 푡-closeness does not
provide any guarantee on the relative distance between 푝푖 and 푞푖 for single 풮풜
value 푣푖 ∈ 풱 , 푖 = 1, 2, . . . ,푚. Thus, it fails to provide the privacy on individual
풮풜 values.
Based on the above observation, we introduce the concept of 훽-likeness, a
novel, robust model for microdata anonymization that eschews the drawbacks
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(see Section 4.1 for details) of 푡-closeness. In 훽-likeness, a threshold is imposed
on the relative difference of each 풮풜 value frequency between an EC and the
overall table. Thereby, 훽-likeness provides a clear and comprehensible privacy
guarantee that limits the information gain an adversary is allowed to obtain with
respect to any 풮풜 value of interest. Moreover, we design BUREL, an anony-
mization algorithm tailored for the particular requirements of 훽-likeness. BU-
REL borrows ideas from SABRE; it first BUcketizes tuples into buckets, then
REdistributes tuples from buckets to ECs to attain 훽-likeness. Our extensive ex-
perimental study demonstrates that our 훽-likeness model and algorithm achieve
a better trade-off between information and privacy than the state-of-the-art 푡-
closeness schemes, even if privacy is measured by the criterion of 푡-closeness;
in addition, it is more effective and efficient in its task than an alternative task
extended from a 푘-anonymization algorithm.
1.3.2 The models and algorithms in data streams
푘-anonymity of data streams and its scheme CASTLE
Our work on anonymizing streaming data starts with simple privacy model, i.e.,
푘-anonymity, then goes on with more sophisticated ones, such as ℓ-diversity
and 푡-closeness. We customize 푘-anonymity for the unique requirements of
data streams (see Section 1.2). Then we present CASTLE, a scheme that Con-
tinuously 푘-Anonymizes STreaming data via adaptive cLustEring. CASTLE
exploits quasi-identifier attributes to define a metric space: tuples are modeled
as points in this space. Incoming tuples are grouped into clusters and all tuples
belonging to the same cluster are released with the same generalization. Clus-
tering of tuples is further constrained by the freshness of the output data—the
delay between a tuple’s input and its output is at most equal to a given parameter
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훿.
CASTLE is extended to support ℓ-diversity on data streams in a straightfor-
ward manner by a cluster merge process. For each expiring tuple, i.e., tuple that
will violate the freshness constraint soon, we check the cluster holding it. If
the whole cluster as a single EC satisfies the diversity requirement, we simply
output all its tuples by its generalization. Otherwise, we merge the cluster with
its nearest neighbors, until such requirement is satisfied.
(휔,푡)-closeness and its algorithm SABREW
Besides 푘-anonymity and ℓ-diversity, we have also adopted 푡-closeness in data
streams. The 푡-closeness model [52] assumes the presence of a global 풮풜 dis-
tribution, and takes it as the baseline of prior knowledge. However, data streams
are continuous and unbounded, thus such a global distribution is unavailable.
Thereby, we revise the definition of 푡-closeness, by restricting closeness con-
straint only in each window instead of the whole data set. We propose (휔,
푡)-closeness: given any EC, and a window that has a size of 휔 and contains
the EC, the difference of their 풮풜 distributions is no more than 푡, a thresh-
old. Based on our static 푡-closeness framework SABRE, we accompany (휔,
푡)-closeness with a customized algorithm SABREW, whose soundness is sup-
ported by a solid theory foundation. Furthermore, we evaluate by experiments
SABREW and schemes extended from 푘-anonymity algorithms; the results show
that SABREW is superior to them with respect to both information quality and
elapsed time.
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1.4 The organization of the thesis
Just like our contributions, the thesis consists of two parts—one part for static
setting; the other for data streams. Before the formal introduction of specific
work, we will first provide some background knowledge in Chapter 2. It in-
cludes a survey on such popular privacy models as 푘-anonymity, ℓ-diversity, and
푡-closeness; important algorithms proposed so far according to these models are
reviewed by discussing their contributions and limitations. After the survey on
related work, in the same chapter we briefly discuss about data streams, their
applications, unique characteristics, and underlying supporting engines. In ad-
dition, we also present information loss metrics that will be used throughout the
thesis to measure the information quality of anonymized data.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are set apart for static data set. We put forward a
sophisticated 푡-closeness framework SABRE in Chapter 3. Specific 푡-closeness
algorithms can be instantiated from it based on user defined applications. We
provide two instantiations of SABRE, assuming that the anonymized data set is
for multiple purposes. The experiment results show that they are superior to ex-
isting algorithms with regard to information quality, while one of them is much
faster. Chapter 4 presents 훽-likeness, an enhanced privacy model compared with
푡-closeness. 훽-likeness measures the relative difference on each single 풮풜 value
between an EC and the whole data set. Thus, it provides a clear relationship be-
tween parameter 훽 and the privacy it affords. An algorithm BUREL customized
for 훽-likeness is proposed.
We devote Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 to data streams. Chapter 5 presents
CASTLE, a cluster-based scheme that continuously anonymizes streaming tu-
ples, meanwhile, ensuring the freshness of output data. Although CASTLE is
initially proposed for 푘-anonymity, it can be extended to support ℓ-diversity in
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a straightforward way. Chapter 6 introduces a 푡-closeness-resembling privacy
model for streaming data. It confines 풮풜 closeness constraint within each win-
dow instead of the whole unbounded data stream; it requires streaming tuples
to be anonymized and output once they are expiring. In addition, a customized
algorithm conforming to the privacy model has been designed.
At the end of the thesis, in Chapter 7 we conclude our works and discuss
interesting items in our agenda for future research.
Research in the thesis has been partially published in international journals
and conferences. Chapter 3 and Chapter 6 are from our work [27] accepted by
VLDB Journal. The work in Chapter 5 has been accepted as a poster [24] in
ICDE 2008 and will appear in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure




Before the formal introduction of our sophisticated anonymization schemes and
novel privacy models, we first discuss the background knowledge that is closely
related to our thesis. At the beginning, we review works on microdata anonymi-
zation; in particular, we will focus on 푘-anonymity, ℓ-diversity, and 푡-closeness,
since they are representative models. After that, we briefly introduce data streams,
discussing their unique characteristics, applications, and supporting engines. Fi-
nally, we present the information loss metrics that will be used throughout this
thesis as a guide/heuristic for anonymization.
2.1 A survey on microdata anonymization
This section starts with two definitions: Quasi-identifier and Equivalence Class.
They are fundamental concepts and widely used in privacy preservation data
publication. Next, we will study the privacy models together with approaches
designed according to their specific requirements.
Definition 2.1 (Quasi-identifier). Consider a database table 풟ℬ(퐴1, 퐴2, . . .,
퐴푛). The quasi-identifier (푄퐼) of 풟ℬ is a subset of its attributes, {퐴1, 퐴2, . . .,
퐴푑}⊆{퐴1, 퐴2,. . ., 퐴푛} that can, joined with an external database, reveal the
identities of the tuples involved.
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Definition 2.2 (Equivalence Class). An equivalence class (EC) is a group of
published tuples that have the same (generalized) 푄퐼 values.
2.1.1 푘-anonymity
The first privacy preserving model that anonymizes data while preserving their
integrity was the 푘-anonymity model [67]. Under 푘-anonymity, tuples are grouped
into ECs of no less than 푘 tuples, with indistinguishable 푄퐼 values. Still, the
problem of optimal (i.e., minimal-information-loss) 푘-anonymization is NP-
hard [12, 58] for 푘 ≥ 3 and more than one 푄퐼 attribute. Thus, past research
has proposed several heuristics for 푘-anonymization. Such schemes transform
the data by generalization and/or suppression. A generalization replaces, or re-
codes, all values of a 푄퐼 attribute in an EC by a single range that contains them.
For example, 푄퐼 gender with values male and female can be generalized to
person, and 푄퐼 age with values 20, 25 and 32 can be generalized to [20, 32].
Suppression is an extreme case of generalization that deletes some 푄퐼 values or
even tuples from the released table. Generalization for a categorical attribute is
typically facilitated by a hierarchy over its values.
Generalization recodings can be classified as follows: A global recoding
[19, 39, 43, 48, 67] maps all tuples with the same 푄퐼 values to the same EC1.
On the other hand, a local recoding [11, 24, 40, 83] allows tuples of the same
푄퐼 values to be mapped to different generalized values (i.e., different ECs).
Intuitively, ECs generated by a local recoding may, but those generated by a
global recoding may not, overlap each other. The flexibility of local recoding
1Each tuple is one point in the metric space defined by considering each QI-attribute as one
dimension. Thus, an EC can be seen as the minimum bounding box that covers all the points in
it.
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allows for anonymizations of higher information quality [40, 48, 49]. Further-
more, a single-dimensional recoding considers the domain of each 푄퐼 attribute
independently of the others [48] (hence forms a grid over the combined 푄퐼 do-
mains); on the other hand, a multidimensional recoding freely defines ECs over
the combined domains of all 푄퐼 attributes [49].
Recently, 푘-anonymity has been extended in multiple directions. Privacy
protection towards predefined workloads has been introduced— [39] is designed
specifically for classification by considering the information gain in splitting
ECs; [50] caters for selected mining tasks besides classification, thus more gen-
eral. However, both schemes are limited, once the workloads are unknown at the
moment of data publication. In addition, 푘-anonymity has also been explored in
dynamic settings. Wang and Fung [74] anonymize sequentially released views
of the same underlying table. Schemes [38, 61] enable multiple releases of a
table that has been incrementally updated.
2.1.2 ℓ-diversity
The 푘-anonymity model suffers from a critical limitation. While the objective
of anonymization is to conceal sensitive information about the subject involved,
푘-anonymity pays no attention to non-푄퐼 sensitive attributes (풮풜s). Thus, a 푘-
anonymized table may contain ECs with so skewed a distribution of 풮풜 values,
that an adversary can still infer the 풮풜 value of a record with high confidence.
To address this limitation, Machanavajjhala et al. extended 푘-anonymity to the
ℓ-diversity model, which postulates that each EC contain at least ℓ “well rep-
resented” 풮풜 values [57]. The requirement that values be “well represented”
can be defined in diverse ways. Thus, by entropy ℓ-diversity, the entropy of 풮풜
values in each EC should be at least log ℓ; by recursive (푐, ℓ)-diversity, it should
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hold that 푟1 < 푐(푟ℓ + 푟ℓ+1 + . . .+ 푟푚), where 푟푖 is the number of occurrences of
the 푖th most frequent 풮풜 value in a given EC, 푐 a constant, and 푚 the number of
distinct sensitive values in that EC. Xiao and Tao propose a third instantiation
of ℓ-diversity, which requires that the most frequent sensitive value in any EC
occur in at most 1/ℓ of its records [80]. This special interpretation is similar to
(훼, 푘)-Anonymity [78] once setting 훼 = 1/ℓ.
The proposal of the ℓ-diversity model was not accompanied by an anonymi-
zation algorithm tailored for it. In response to this need, Ghinita et al. [40, 41]
provide a local-recoding ℓ-diversification framework that resolves the arising
high-dimensional partitioning problem via a space-filling curve, such as the
Hilbert curve [59]. Furthermore, Byun et al. [23] propose diversity-aware data
re-publication in the case of tuple insertion only. 푚-invariance [81] enhances
the re-publication by supporting both tuple insertion and deletion. Bu et al. [22]
make a further improvement by considering tuple update, i.e., the 풮풜 value of
an individual may change over time.
The ℓ-diversity model is designed with a categorical 풮풜 in mind; it does not
directly apply to the case of a numerical 풮풜. Namely, a diversity of numerical
풮풜 values does not guarantee privacy when their range in an EC is narrow (i.e.,
the values are close to each other); such a narrow range can provide accurate
enough information to an adversary. To address this deficiency, Zhang et al. [86]
propose a model that requires the range of a numerical 풮풜’s values in an EC to
be wider than a threshold. However, an adversary may still be able to infer a
numerical 풮풜 value with high confidence, if most numerical 풮풜 values in an
EC are close, no matter how wide their total range is (i.e., the EC may simply
contain a few outliers). Thus, Li et al. [51] propose a scheme requiring that
∣푔푐∣
∣풢∣ ≤ 1/푚, where 풢 is a given EC, 푔푐 any group of close tuples in 풢, and 푚 a
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parameter.
The deficiency of ℓ-diversity outlined above is most conspicuous with nu-
merical 풮풜s, but not restricted to them only. It can also apply to semantically
similar values of categorical 풮풜. In general, ℓ-diversity fails to guarantee pri-
vacy whenever the distribution of 풮풜 values within an EC differs substantially
from their overall distribution in the released table, allowing skewness and sim-
ilarity attacks.
2.1.3 푡-closeness
Li et al. propose the 푡-closeness model, which requires that the difference, mea-
sured by an appropriate metric, of the 풮풜 distribution within any EC from the
overall distribution of that 풮풜 be no more than a given threshold 푡 [52]. Accord-
ing to the 푡-closeness model, an adversary who knows the overall 풮풜 distribu-
tion in the published table gains only limited more information about an EC by
seeing the 풮풜 distribution in it.
To our knowledge, three 푡-closeness-attaining techniques have been pro-
posed to date. The first of them [52] extends the Incognito method for 푘-
anonymization [48]. It operates in an iterative manner, employing a predefined
generalization hierarchy over the domain of each푄퐼 attribute. In the first round,
it determines the level in the generalization hierarchy of each single푄퐼 attribute
above which 푡-closeness is met. In the second round, it uses the findings of the
first round to establish those combinations of two 푄퐼 attributes, generalized
at different levels over their respective hierarchies, that achieve 푡-closeness (a
lattice structure represents such combinations). The scheme proceeds in this
manner, examining subsets of 푄퐼 attributes of size increased by one at each it-
eration, until it establishes the valid generalizations over all 푄퐼 attributes that
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satisfy 푡-closeness, and selects the best of those. Unfortunately, this approach
shares the drawbacks of Incognito as an algorithm for 푘-anonymization: it is
limited to single-dimensional global recoding. Thus, it achieves low informa-
tion quality, while its worst-case time complexity is exponential in the number
of 푄퐼 attributes.
Likewise, the second 푡-closeness-obtaining scheme [53] extends the Mon-
drian 푘-anonymization method [49]. Mondrian recursively partitions the com-
bined domain of all 푄퐼 attributes, carrying out a split only if the resultant parti-
tions have sizes of at least 푘. It is extended to 푡-closeness with an extra condi-
tion: a splitting is allowed only if the resultant partitions also obey 푡-closeness
with respect to the overall distribution. While this method is more efficient than
the Incognito-based one, it still fails in terms of information quality, as it does
not cater to special features of 푡-closeness.
Recently, a scheme for 푡-closeness-like anonymization has been proposed
[63]. Still, it uses perturbation (i.e., postrandomization [45]) and adds noise to
anonymize the data; thus, it does not guarantee the integrity of the data, which
is a basic common feature of the generalization-based techniques we examine
in this thesis. Furthermore, [63] does not enforce the 푡 threshold as a maximum
difference constraint, but only as an average distance metric; it compares distri-
butions measured over perturbed 푄퐼 values (not over ECs) to that of the overall
table; and it employs KL-divergence instead of EMD as a distance metric. Thus,
the model of [63] does not provide the same worst-case privacy guarantees as
푡-closeness.
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2.1.4 Other privacy models
Evfimievski et al. [37] introduce 휌1-to-휌2 privacy principle, which imposes a
bound 휌2 on the posterior probability (i.e., probability after release) of certain
properties in the data, given a bound 휌1 on the prior probability (i.e., before
data release). This model is modified in [72], where the posterior confidence
should simply not exceed the prior one by more than Δ. Still, both these mod-
els measure the absolute confidence gain (i.e., information leak), hence do not
sufficiently protect the privacy of infrequent values either. For example, both
these schemes treat a probability increase from 60% to 80% as tantamount to an
increase from 1% to 21%, even though the latter is an increase by 2000% and
the former by only 33%. Besides, these schemes apply perturbation on the data,
hence impair their integrity.
A newly proposed privacy model, 훿-disclosure [21], requires that for any
풮풜 value 푣푖 with frequency 푝푖 in the original table, its frequency in any EC,
푞푖, should be such that ∣ log( 푞푖푝푖 )∣ < 훿. However, 훿-disclosure does not distin-
guish between an increase and a decrease in the adversary’s confidence on an
풮풜 value. Moreover, log(푞푖) is defined only for 푞푖 > 0; in effect, 훿-disclosure
strictly requires that each 풮풜 value in the original table should appear in ev-
ery single EC. This requirement renders the 훿-disclosure an exceedingly rigid
and overprotective model. Besides, [21] does not propose an anonymization
algorithm tailored for the 훿-disclosure model; it only points out that the 푘-
anonymization algorithm in [50], applied on the models of ℓ-diversity, 푡-closeness,
and 훿-disclosure, yields anonymizations poor in terms of information loss; it
is inappropriate for [21] to directly compare the privacy gain with the utility
gain [54]. Furthermore, [21] also questions the basic assumption that each tuple
should be associated with a unique, homogeneous EC, as opposed to multiple,
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heterogeneous ones. This question is revisited in [79] with a methodology for
heterogeneous generalization, which can also be used on top of homogeneous
anonymizations to improve their utility.
Recently, [46] suggested a methodology for transforming a group of 풮풜
values to follow a specified distribution, by permuting existing 풮풜 values and
adding fake ones. Still, this technique damages the integrity of the data too. [75]
suggested FF-anonymity, a privacy model that distinguishes between sensitive
and non-sensitive information only at the value level; an attribute may con-
tain both sensitive and non-sensitive values. Besides, [75] assumes that only
non-sensitive information is observable by an adversary, and that generalizing
a sensitive value to a non-sensitive hierarchy level conceals its sensitivity. Yet
such a generalization reveals that sensitivity is hidden behind it. For example,
the very act of generalizing AIDS to virus suggests that a sensitive value ex-
ists behind the generalized one. This argument is akin to that made by [77] in
another context.
2.2 Data streams
In the past few years, databases of some companies such as Amazon.com grow
at a rate of millions of records each day. Typically these data appear as a
sequence (stream) of append-only tuples. They arrive at high-speed continu-
ously and are unbounded. There is no control over their arriving order. Online
processing of such data brings unique commercial opportunities to the com-
panies, thus it is becoming an indispensable part of business operations. To
efficiently manage data streams, quite a few engines are designed. Borealis [5]
is a distributed stream processing system, which is based on Aurora [6] and
Medusa [84]. STREAM [15] is a “general-purpose” data stream management
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system (DSMS). TelegraphCQ [30] is specially designed to process adaptive
data flow with an extension to support shared continuous queries. Other exam-
ples are Alert [69], Tribeca [70], OpenCQ [55], NiagaraCQ [32], CAPE [87],
and so on.
Data streams have a wide range of applications. Examples include but are
not limited to network traffic analysis (e.g., click streams and network secu-
rity), sensor network, transaction log analysis, and financial analysis. Data
streams have special processing requirements, due to its unique characteris-
tics compared with traditional databases. It is impossible to store a complete
unbounded stream, so registered queries are imposed over summary structures
(e.g., synopses [15]), thus the returned query answers are approximate. Because
of the limitations on storage and performance, backtracking over streaming data
is not allowed, and online algorithms are restricted to making only one pass
over streaming data. Till now, a large amount of works have investigated these
newly raised research issues. Some of them are related to models and languages
(see [47] for a survey), some focus on continuous query processing problems,
e.g., load shedding, join problems and efficient window-based operators [17],
and many concentrate on data stream mining [36, 56, 85], and so on.
2.3 Information loss metrics
The anonymization problem calls for the enforcement of privacy principle (e.g.,
푘-anonymity, ℓ-diversity, and 푡-closeness) on a data set, while sacrificing as lit-
tle of the information in the data as possible. To quantify the information quality
compromised for the sake of privacy, we need an appropriate information loss
metric. Past literature has proposed various metrics, such as the Classification
Metric [43] and the Discernibility Metric [19]. The best metric to use depends
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on the intended use of the data. We assume that the anonymized data is to be
used for multiple purposes, which may not be known in advance; hence we
adopt a General Loss Metric (GLM) [26, 40, 43, 83].
Let 푄퐼 = {퐴1, 퐴2, . . . , 퐴푑} and 풢 be an EC. For a numerical attribute
푁퐴 ∈ 푄퐼 , let [ℒ푁퐴,풰푁퐴] be its domain range and [푙풢푁퐴, 푢풢푁퐴] the minimum
sub-range containing all its values in 풢; then the information loss with respect













Figure 2.1: Domain generalization hierarchy of education
For a categorical attribute 퐶퐴, we assume a generalization hierarchy ℋ퐶퐴
over its domain. Figure 2.1 illustrates such an example, where the leaves repre-
sent the specific values in the domain of attribute education, and each inter-
nal node represents a generalized value of all its descendants. If 푎 is the lowest
common ancestor in ℋ퐶퐴 of all 퐶퐴 values in 풢, then the information loss with
respect to 퐶퐴 in 풢 is defined as:
ℐℒ퐶퐴(풢) =
⎧⎨⎩ 0, ∣Leaves(푎)∣ = 1∣Leaves(푎)∣
∣Leaves(ℋ퐶퐴)∣ , otherwise
where Leaves(푎) is the set of leaves under the subtree of ℋ퐶퐴 rooted at 푎, and
Leaves(ℋ퐶퐴) is the total set of leaves in ℋ퐶퐴. The total information loss of 풢
is then:
ℐℒ(풢) = ∑푑푖=1푤푖 × ℐℒ퐴푖(풢)
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where 푤푖 is the weight of퐴푖 and
∑푑
푖=1푤푖 = 1. In our experiments, we treat each
퐴푖 as equally important, hence assign 푤푖 = 1/푑. The total information loss on
a database table 풟ℬ, partitioned into a set 푆풢 of ECs, is defined as:
풜ℐℒ(푆풢) =
∑
풢∈푆풢 ∣풢∣ × ℐℒ(풢)
∣풟ℬ∣
2.4 Summary
This chapter studies related anonymization methods, briefly discusses the data
streams, and introduces the information loss measure. These form the back-







Organizations such as ministries or hospitals regularly release microdata (e.g.,
census data or medical records) to serve the public benefits. However, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 1, such data are vulnerable to linking attack. Past research
has striven to define the privacy principle to limit it. The main highlights of the
efforts consist of the 푘-anonymity [66, 67], ℓ-diversity [57], and, most recently,
the t-closeness [52] models. 푘-anonymity successfully protects against identity
disclosure, but suffers from homogeneous attack (see Section 1.1.1). While ℓ-
diversity [57] has addressed the limitation existing in 푘-anonymity, it is still vul-
nerable to skewness and similarity attacks (see Section 1.1.2). The 푡-closeness
model takes a step forward in privacy enforcement than its predecessors. In
spite of that, all the existing 푡-closeness schemes are straightforwardly extended
from 푘-anonymity instantiations, lacking a customization towards the specific
features of the 푡-closeness model. To fill this gap, in this chapter we propose




The 푡-closeness model aims to forestall the type of attacks against ℓ-diversity
(i.e., skewness and similarity attacks), by requiring that the 풮풜 distribution in
any EC differs from its overall distribution by at most a given threshold 푡, ac-
cording to an appropriate distance metric. The value of 푡 constrains the addi-
tional information an adversary gains after seeing a single EC, measured with
respect to the information provided by the full released table. The 푡-closeness
guarantee directly protects against a skewness attack, while it also provides de-
fense against a similarity attack, depending on the extent to which semantic
similarity exists among the 풮풜 values in the whole table [52].
The 푡-closeness model poses the problem of bringing a microdata table to a
form that complies with it while degrading data quality as little as possible. This
problem is distinct from those posed by other privacy models. Each model poses
a particular tradeoff between privacy and information quality, which needs to be
resolved in an effective and efficient manner. However, the two extant schemes
for 푡-closeness [52, 53] are extensions of algorithms designed for 푘-anonymity;
they employ either the Incognito [48] or the Mondrian [49] technique for 푘-
anonymization, merely adding to them the extra condition that the produced
ECs should satisfy 푡-closeness. Still, a good 푡-closeness anonymization does
not1 necessarily derive from a good 푘-anonymization. Thus, unfortunately, the
techniques in [52, 53] limit the effectiveness of achieving 푡-closeness by build-
ing themselves on top of 푘-anonymizations, and fail in terms of efficiency by
performing too many brute-force 푡-closeness satisfaction checks. The question
of an algorithm tailored for 푡-closeness-abiding anonymization remains open.
1An analogous observation was made with respect to the particular problem posed by ℓ-
diversity in [41].
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Therefore, we provide SABRE, a Sensitive Attribute Bucketization and RE-
distribution framework for 푡-closeness. SABRE operates in two phases. First, it
partitions a table into buckets of similar 풮풜 values in a greedy fashion. Then,
it redistributes tuples from each bucket into dynamically configured ECs. Fol-
lowing [52, 53], we employ the Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) as a measure of
closeness between distributions, and utilize a property of this measure to facili-
tate our approach. Namely, a tight upper bound for the EMD of the distribution
in an EC from the overall distribution can be derived as a function of localized
upper bounds for each bucket, provided that the tuples in the EC are picked pro-
portionally to the sizes of the buckets they hail from. Furthermore, we prove
that if the bucket partitioning obeys 푡-closeness, then the derived ECs also abide
to 푡-closeness. We develop two SABRE instantiations. The former, SABRE-AK
focuses on efficiency. The latter, SABRE-KNN trades some efficiency for infor-
mation quality. Our extensive experimental evaluation demonstrates that both
instantiations achieve information quality superior to schemes that extend algo-
rithms customized for 푘-anonymity to 푡-closeness, while SABRE-AK is much
faster than them as well.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we dis-
cuss the Earth Mover’s Distance. Section 3.3 introduces an observation from
which SABRE is derived. We propose SABRE framework and outline its two
instantiations in Section 3.4. In section 3.5, we present the results of an exten-
sive performance study. We discuss our findings in Section 3.6 and conclude
this chapter in Section 3.7.
3.2 The earth mover’s distance metric
푡-closeness model postulates that the 풮풜 distribution in any EC differ from that
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in the whole table by no more than a threshold 푡. Neither the Kullback-Leibler
(KL) nor the variational distance is appropriate for evaluating the difference of
two distributions, as they do not consider semantic relationships of 풮풜 values
[52]. Here, we adopt the same metric as [52]—Earth Mover’s Distance [65], to
measure the difference between two distributions.
The Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) is suggested as a metric for quantifying
the difference between distributions. Intuitively, it views one distribution as a
mass of earth piles spread over a space, and the other as a collection of holes, in
which the mass fits, over the same space. The EMD between the two is defined
as the minimum work needed to fill the holes with earth, thereby transforming
one distribution to the other.
Let풫 = (푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝푚) be the distribution of “holes”,풬 = (푞1, 푞2, . . . , 푞푚)
that of “earth”, 푑푖푗 the ground distance of 푞푖 from 푝푗 , and 퐹 = [푓푖푗], 푓푖푗 ≥ 0 a
flow of mass of earth moved from element 푞푖 to 푝푗 , 1 ≤ 푖, 푗 ≤ 푚. The EMD is
the minimum value of the work required to transform 풬 to 풫 by 퐹 :
푊푂푅퐾(풫 ,풬, 퐹 ) = ∑푚푖=1∑푚푗=1 푑푖푗 × 푓푖푗
For the chapter to be self-contained, in the following, we present the EMD
formulas given in [52].
In case of a numerical 풮풜, let its ordered domain be {푣1, 푣2, . . . , 푣푚}, where
푣푖 is the 푖푡ℎ smallest value (풫 and 풬 are distributions over these values). The
distance between two values 푣푖, 푣푗 in this domain is defined by the number
of values between them in the total order, as ∣푖−푗∣
푚−1 . Then the minimal work for
transforming풬 to풫 can be calculated by sequentially satisfying the earth needs
of each hole element, moving earth from/to its immediate neighbor pile [52].
Thus, the EMD between 풫 and 풬 is defined as:






In case of a categorical 풮풜, we assume a generalization hierarchy ℋ over
its domain. For example, Figure 3.1 depicts a hierarchy of respiratory and di-
gestive diseases. The distance between two (leaf) values 푣푖 and 푣푗 is defined as
ℎ(푣푖,푣푗)
ℎ(ℋ) , where ℎ(ℋ) is the height ofℋ, and ℎ(푣푖, 푣푗) that of the lowest common
ancestor of 푣푖 and 푣푗 in ℋ. To define EMD, we first define the following recur-
sive function of the collective extra earth residing among the leaves under node
푛 inℋ.
푒푥푡푟푎(푛) =








Pneumonia BronchitisSARS Gastric flu Gastric ulcer
Intestinal 
cancer
Figure 3.1: The hierarchy for disease
The value of 푒푥푡푟푎(푛) denotes the exact amount of earth that should be
moved in/out of node 푛. Furthermore, we define the accumulated amount of









Then the minimum of the above quantities signifies the cost of all pending earth
movements among the leaves under node 푛, after their cumulative earth ex-




Where ℎ(푛) is the height of node 푛 in the hierarchy of ℋ. Then, the total EMD
between 풫 and 풬 is:
퐸푀퐷(풫 ,풬) = ∑푛 푐표푠푡(푛)
where 푛 is a non-leaf node inℋ.
Name Weight Age Disease
Mike 60 40 SARS
Alice 70 50 intestinal cancer
John 60 60 pneumonia
Bob 50 50 bronchitis
Beth 80 50 gastric flu
Carol 70 70 gastric ulcer
Table 3.1: Patient records
EC Weight Age Disease
[50-60] [40-60] SARS
1 [50-60] [40-60] pneumonia
[50-60] [40-60] bronchitis
[70-80] [50-70] intestinal cancer
2 [70-80] [50-70] gastric flu
[70-80] [50-70] gastric ulcer
Table 3.2: 3-diverse published table
Example 3.1. Assume Table 3.1 is the input table, {weight, age} the 푄퐼 ,
disease the 풮풜, and Table 3.2 the published table. Let 푅, 퐷 and 푅퐷 rep-
resent respiratory diseases, digestive diseases, and respiratory and digestive
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, 0, 0, 0). Then 푒푥푡푟푎(푆퐴푅푆) =
푒푥푡푟푎(푝푛푒푢푚표푛푖푎) = 푒푥푡푟푎(푏푟표푛푐ℎ푖푡푖푠) = 1
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, and 푛푒푔푒(푅퐷) = 0, hence 푐표푠푡(푅) = 0. Likewise, 푒푥푡푟푎(퐷) = −12 and
푐표푠푡(퐷) = 0. In effect, 푒푥푡푟푎(푅퐷) = 0, and 푝표푠푒(푅퐷) = 푛푒푔푒(푅퐷) = 12 .
Therefore, 푐표푠푡(푅퐷) = 1×min(푝표푠푒(푅퐷), 푛푒푔푒(푅퐷)) = 12 , and퐸푀퐷(풫 ,풬) =
푐표푠푡(푅) + 푐표푠푡(퐷) + 푐표푠푡(푅퐷) = 0.5.
3.3 Observations and challenges
This section describes the observations, from which our SABRE framework is




풟ℬ A microdata table (original table)
풮풜 The sensitive attribute in 풟ℬ
풱 = {푣1, 푣2, . . . , 푣푚} The domain of 풮풜
푁푖 The number of tuples with 푣푖 in 풟ℬ
푝푖 = 푁푖/∣풟ℬ∣ The distribution of value 푣푖 in 풟ℬ
풫 = (푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝푚) Overall distribution of 풮풜 in 풟ℬ
풢 An equivalence class
풬 = (푞1, 푞2, . . . , 푞푚) The distribution of 풮풜 in 풢
Table 3.3: Employed notations
SABRE consists of two phases. In the first one, bucketization, it partitions
풟ℬ into a set of buckets, so that each 풮풜 value appears in only one bucket,
defined as follows.
Definition 3.1 (bucket partition). Given a table 풟ℬ, sensitive attribute 풮풜, we
say that a set of buckets 휑 forms a bucket partition of풟ℬ if and only if ∪
∀ℬ∈휑
ℬ =
풟ℬ and each 풮풜 value appears in exactly one bucket.
In the second phase, redistribution, SABRE reallocates tuples from buckets
to ECs. For the sake of exposition, we first consider the requirement that the
number of tuples assigned to an EC from a certain bucket is proportional to that
bucket’s size. This proportionality requirement is defined as follows.
Definition 3.2 (proportionality requirement). Given a table 풟ℬ and a bucket
partition thereof 휑, assume that an EC, 풢, is formed with a subset of tuples 푥푖
from bucket ℬ푖 ∈ 휑, 푖 = 1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣. 풢 abides to the proportionality require-
ment with respect to 휑, if and only if the sizes of 푥푖 are proportional to those of
ℬ푖, i.e., ∣푥1∣ : ∣푥2∣ : . . . : ∣푥∣휑∣∣ = ∣ℬ1∣ : ∣ℬ2∣ : . . . : ∣ℬ∣휑∣∣.
Assume we create a partitioning 휑′ = {푏1, 푏2, . . . , 푏푚}, in which bucket 푏푖
includes those and only those tuples in 풟ℬ that have 풮풜 value 푣푖. Then we
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select 푥푖 tuples from bucket 푏푖, 푖 = 1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣, to form an EC 풢. In this case,
if 풢 follows the proportional requirement with respect to 휑′, then it also holds
that ∣푥1∣ : ∣푥2∣ : . . . : ∣푥푚∣ = 푁1 : 푁2 : . . . : 푁푚, where 푁푖 = ∣푏푖∣ is the
number of tuples with 풮풜 value 푣푖 in풟ℬ. In effect, 풢 is 0-close to풟ℬ; thus, an
adversary gains no extra information by seeing 풢. Still, a complete enforcement
of 0-closeness for all ECs would severely degrade information quality. This is
not what we aim for; we wish to allow for some loss of privacy, delimited by the
푡-closeness constraint, in order to preserve more in terms of information quality.
Thus, we need to opt for a more flexible arrangement in our scheme.
To that end, we can start out with buckets of more than one distinct 풮풜
value. We slice 풟ℬ into an alternative bucket partition 휑 = {ℬ1,ℬ2, . . . ,ℬ∣휑∣},
in which each bucket ℬ푖 may contain multiple semantically close 풮풜 values. In
this case, an EC 풢 that satisfies the proportionality requirement with respect to
the buckets in 휑 does not necessarily obey the relationship ∣푧1∣ : ∣푧2∣ : . . . :
∣푧푚∣ = 푁1 : 푁2 : . . . : 푁푚, where 푧푖 is the set of tuples with 풮풜 value 푣푖 in
풢, 푖 = 1, 2, . . . ,푚. After all, when we pick tuples from a bucket ℬ푖 to form
풢, we do not discriminate between different 풮풜 values. The following example
illustrates the two EC compositions described above.
Age

















Figure 3.2: Information quality under SABRE
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Example 3.2. Consider Table 3.1, where {weight, age} is the QI, and
disease is the 풮풜. Figure 3.2 shows the QI-space and the distribution of
tuples from Table 3.1 (each QI attribute corresponds to a dimension). A bucket
partition휑′ of this table could consist of six buckets of one tuple each, 푏1, 푏2, . . . , 푏6,
with 풮풜 values SARS, pneumonia, bronchitis, intestinal cancer, gastric flu, and
gastric ulcer, respectively. Taking one tuple from each of these buckets, we could
build a single EC of 0-close privacy. Still, such an EC covers the entire QI-
space, incurring high information loss. Another bucket partition could consist
of two buckets of three semantically similar tuples each, 휑 = {ℬ1,ℬ2}, with
SARS, pneumonia, and bronchitis in bucket ℬ1 and the rest in ℬ2. We can then
build three ECs, by taking one tuple from each of these buckets, as shown in
Figure 3.2. Tuples in the same EC are labeled by the same number in the fig-
ure. This EC partitioning achieves better information quality, as the minimum
bounding boxes of ECs in QI-space are smaller.
An equivalence class 풢 constructed from a looser bucket partition achieves
higher information quality, but is no longer 0-close. Still, it suffices to construct
it in a manner that obeys 푡-closeness for a given 푡. In Example 3.2, all three
ECs generated from 휑 are 1
3
-close with respect to the distribution of disease
in Table 3.1, hence satisfying 푡-closeness for 푡 ≥ 1
3
.
Following the above observations, SABRE first partitions tuples according
to their 풮풜 values, and then redistributes the tuples to ECs. In order to en-
sure 푡-closeness and good information quality, we need to address the following
questions:
1. How should we partition 풮풜 values into buckets? How many buckets
should we generate to ensure 푡-closeness?
2. How many ECs should we generate? How should we choose tuples from
34
each bucket to form an EC?
Next we present our approaches to these questions.
3.4 The SABRE framework
The SABRE framework consists of two phases: first, a bucketization phase par-
titions the microdata into a set of buckets of similar 풮풜 values (Section 3.4.1),
then a redistribution phase dynamically determines EC sizes (Section 3.4.2).
Section 3.4.3 puts the above phases together and summarizes the SABRE frame-
work.
3.4.1 SABRE’s bucketization scheme
We commence the presentation of our bucketization scheme with a property of
the proportionality requirement.
Consider a categorical 풮풜 with the domain hierarchy in Figure 3.1. Assume
that a table풟ℬ contains 50 tuples with SARS, 30 with Pneumonia, 20 with Bron-
chitis, 40 with Gastric flu, 20 with Gastric ulcer, and 20 with Intestinal cancer.
Suppose a bucket partition 휑 = {ℬ1,ℬ2} of 풟ℬ, where ℬ1 contains all tuples
with SARS, Pneumonia and Bronchitis, and ℬ2 includes tuples with the remain-
















Then an EC, 풢, with 10 tuples from ℬ1 and 8 tuples from ℬ2 satisfies the pro-
portionality requirement with respect to 휑. For instance, 풢 may comprise 4
tuples with SARS, 2 with Pneumonia, 4 with Bronchitis, 0 with Gastric flu, 4


















































, corresponding to the division of 풮풜
values into respiratory diseases in ℬ1 and digestive diseases in ℬ2. Then the















. Likewise, the volume of holes in 퐻2 equals that of
earth in 퐸2. In effect, the transformation from 풬 to 풫 can be decomposed in
two independent subtasks: filling the holes in 퐻1 with earth from 퐸1, and those
in 퐻2 with earth from 퐸2. We name such a subtask earth transportation in a
bucket, defined as follows.
Definition 3.3 (earth transportation in a bucket). Assume a bucket partition 휑
of a table 풟ℬ with sensitive attribute 풮풜, and any equivalence class 풢 that
follows the proportionality requirement with respect to 휑. Without loss of gen-
erality, assume bucket ℬ ∈ 휑 contains the 풮풜 values 푣1, 푣2, . . . , 푣푗 . Then, earth
transportation in ℬ with regard to 풢 is the transformation from (푞1, 푞2, . . . , 푞푗) to
(푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝푗), where 푞푖 is the distribution of 푣푖 in 풢 and 푝푖 is the distribution
of 푣푖 in 풟ℬ, 푖 = 1, 2, . . . , 푗.
We denote the cost of this earth transportation in bucket ℬ with regard to EC
풢 as 퐶퐸푇 (ℬ,풢). Once a table 풟ℬ is given, 푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝푗 are fixed. But the
values of 푞1, 푞2, . . . , 푞푗 depend on the EC 풢 at hand. For instance, in our running
scenario, the distribution of the 10 tuples from ℬ1 in 풢 among values SARS,
Pneumonia, and Bronchitis is 푞1 = 418 , 푞2 =
2
18
, and 푞3 = 418 . If the 10 tuples
are all Bronchitis, then 푞1 = 푞2 = 0 and 푞3 = 1018 . Actually, they could be any 10
tuples from ℬ1. Still, we are interested in the worst-case value of 퐶퐸푇 (ℬ,풢)
over all possible ECs following the proportionality requirement to 휑. Thus, we
define an upper bound of 퐶퐸푇 (ℬ,풢) as follows.
Definition 3.4 (upper-bound cost in a bucket). Assume a bucket partition 휑 of
a table 풟ℬ with sensitive attribute 풮풜, and a bucket ℬ ∈ 휑. Then, we define
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퐶퐸푇푈ℬ , the upper-bound cost of earth transportation inℬ, as the highest possible
value of 퐶퐸푇 (ℬ,풢) over all possible equivalence classes 풢 that follow the
proportionality requirement to 휑.
퐶퐸푇푈ℬ = max∀풢
{퐶퐸푇 (ℬ,풢)}
In the following, we present three theorems that form the foundation of
SABRE. Let 휑 be a bucket partition of table풟ℬ, and 풢 be an EC following pro-
portionality requirement with respect to 휑. Theorem 3.1 formalizes the intuition
gained from the above scenario—it essentially tells us that earth transportation
in a bucket can be independent from that of any other bucket. Given a bucket
퐵 ∈ 휑, theorem 3.2 determines 퐶퐸푇푈ℬ . Based on the above two, theorem 3.3
states that we can compute the cost of transforming the 풮풜 distribution in 풢 to
that in 풟ℬ, by the summation of the upper bounds related with all buckets in 휑.
Theorem 3.1 (Independence). Let 풢 be an EC that follows the proportionality
requirement with respect to a bucket partition 휑 of table 풟ℬ with sensitive at-
tribute SA. Given any bucket ℬ ∈ 휑, the earth transportation in ℬ with regard
to 풢 is independent from buckets in 휑 ∖ {ℬ}.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that ℬ contains tuples with 풮풜 values
of 푣1, 푣2, . . . , 푣푗 , and let 푧푖 be the set of tuples in 풢 with 풮풜 value of 푣푖, 푖 =
1, 2, . . . , 푗. We consider {푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝푗}, 푝푖 = 풩푖/∣풟ℬ∣, as the set of holes,
and {푞1, 푞2, . . . , 푞푗}, 푞푖 = ∣푧푖∣/∣풢∣, as the piles of earth. Given that 풢 follows
the proportionality requirement with respect to 휑, the number of tuples from ℬ

















Therefore, the volume of earth equals the volume of holes, hence earth trans-
portation between them can be done locally, i.e., the transformation from (푞1, 푞2,
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. . . , 푞푗) to (푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝푗) can be independent from the earth transportation of
any other bucket in 휑 ∖ {ℬ}.
Theorem 3.2 (Upper bound). Let 휑 be a bucket partition of table 풟ℬ with
sensitive attribute SA; assume that bucket ℬ ∈ 휑 contains 풮풜 values of 푣1,
푣2, . . ., 푣푗 . Then 퐶퐸푇푈ℬ , the upper-bound cost of earth transportation in ℬ, is
determined as follows:






푝푖 −min{푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝푗}
⎞⎠
, where ℋ is the domain hierarchy of 풮풜 and 푛 is the lowest common
ancestor of 푣1, . . . , 푣푗 .








, where 푑ℓ푖 is the distance between 푣ℓ and 푣푖.
Proof. Again, we consider {푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝푗} as a collection of holes, and {푞1, 푞2,
. . . , 푞푗} as piles of earth, where 푞푖 is the distribution of 푣푖 in 풢 (an EC following
proportionality requirement with respect to 휑). By Theorem 3.1,
∑푗
푖=1 푝푖 =∑푗
푖=1 푞푖. Categorical 풮풜. We divide the set of holes into two subsets: The
subset of holes “missing earth”, 퐻1 = {푝ℓ∣푝ℓ > 푞ℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 푗}, and that of
holes “in excess of earth”, 퐻2 = {푝ℓ∣푝ℓ ≤ 푞ℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 푗}. Likewise, we
separate the set of earth-piles in two corresponding subsets: that of “deficient”
piles, 퐸1 = {푞ℓ∣푝ℓ > 푞ℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 푗}, and that of “superfluous” piles, 퐸2 =
{푞ℓ∣푝ℓ ≤ 푞ℓ, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 푗}. The earth transportation in ℬ involving 풢 is done by
two steps.
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In the first step, we fill up hole 푝푖 with earth 푞푖, 푖 = 1, 2, . . . , 푗. Since the
distance between 푝푖 and 푞푖 is 0, the cost of this step is 0. Still, all the earth of
deficient piles in 퐸1 is used up; thus, in order to fill up the holes missing earth
in 퐻1, we need extra earth of 푛푒푔푒(푛) =
∑
∀푞ℓ∈퐸1(푝ℓ − 푞ℓ). Symmetrically, the
holes in excess of earth in 퐻2 are completely filled, and the superfluous earth-
piles in 퐸2 have extra earth of exactly 푝표푠푒(푛) =
∑
∀푞ℓ∈퐸2(푞ℓ − 푝ℓ). From the
independence of earth transportation within ℬ, i.e., from ∑푗푖=1 푝푖 = ∑푗푖=1 푞푖, it
follows that 푛푒푔푒(푛) = 푝표푠푒(푛), as we would expect.
In the second step, we have to move 푛푒푔푒(푛) earth from the superfluous
piles in 퐸2 to the holes missing earth in 퐻1. Since the distance between any two
elements in {푣1, . . . , 푣푗} is at most ℎ(푛)ℎ(ℋ) , the cost of the whole earth movement
is at most ℎ(푛)
ℎ(ℋ) ⋅ 푛푒푔푒(푛). However, 푛푒푔푒(푛) ≤
∑
∀푝ℓ∈퐻1 푝ℓ. Besides, because





푖=1 푝푖 −min{푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝푗}. Putting it all together, we get
퐶퐸푇 (ℬ,풢) ≤ ℎ(푛)
ℎ(ℋ) ⋅
(∑푗
푖=1 푝푖 −min{푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝푗}
)
.
Numerical 풮풜. We scan the holes {푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝푗} sequentially, and fill
up every hole in need of earth that we encounter. For each such hole, we use
earth from its nearest pile, resolving ties arbitrarily. If the nearest pile is used
up, we move earth from its second nearest pile. This continues until the hole
is filled up. Thus, we transfer earth in the most affordable way. Let 푞ℓ, 1 ≤
ℓ ≤ 푗, be the last pile that the process takes earth from. After 푞ℓ is used up,
all the holes are filled. Using 푞ℓ, we divide the holes {푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝푗} into two
groups: 퐻1, holes that are entirely filled by earth hailing from 푞ℓ, and 퐻2, the
rest. We name the above as sequential process, and denote its cost by 푠푒푞푐. The
following situation, which has all earth concentrated in the ℓ푡ℎ pile, corresponds
to distribution (푞˜1, 푞˜2, . . . , 푞˜푗), where 푞˜ℓ =
∑푗
푖=1 푝푖 and 푞˜푖 = 0 if 푖 ∕= ℓ. The cost
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of the given situation (by transforming (푞˜1, 푞˜2, . . . , 푞˜푗) to (푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝푗)) is an
upper bound of 푠푒푞푐. That is because filling a hole in 퐻1 sequential process has
the same cost as the given situation; on the other hand, filling a hole in 퐻2 the
former costs less than the latter, because in the former case some earth is brought
to the hole from a pile that is, by the definition of 퐻2, closer to it than pile 푞ℓ.
The cost of the given situation is
∑푗
푖=1(푑ℓ푖 × 푝푖). We cannot know which pile 푞ℓ
is, thus we consider the worst-case scenario, i.e., the maximum out of all ℓ. In








Both upper bounds are tight. The bounds are reached when the tuples from
ℬ assigned to 풢 all have the same 풮풜 value 푣ℓ. For categorial 풮풜, 푣ℓ is the
least frequent value among 푣1, 푣2, . . . , 푣푗 , with 푝ℓ = min{푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝푗}. For
numerical 풮풜, 푣ℓ is the value for which ∑푗푖=1(푑ℓ푖 × 푝푖) is maximized.
Theorem 3.3 (Additivity). Let 풢 be any EC that follows the proportionality
requirement with respect to a bucket partition 휑 of table 풟ℬ with sensitive at-
tribute 풮풜. Then the EMD of transforming the 풮풜 distribution 풬 in 풢 to the
distribution 풫 in 풟ℬ is tightly upper bounded by ∑
∀ℬ∈휑
퐶퐸푇푈ℬ .
Proof. In order to transform 풬 to 풫 , we need to carry out the earth transporta-
tion in each bucket ℬ ∈ 휑. Since these transportations do not affect each other
(Theorem 3.1), the EMD required to transform풬 to 풫 is the sum of their costs,
and the upper bound of this sum is the sum of the upper bounds to the individual
costs. The bound is tight, and reached when the cost of earth transportation in
each bucket ℬ arrives at its tight upper bound, i.e., all tuples allocated to 풢 from
ℬ share a same 풮풜 value (Theorem 3.2).
Example 3.3. Consider once again our running scenario. We still assume that
SARS, pneumonia, and bronchitis are in ℬ1, and ℬ2 comprises tuples of the
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remaining three 풮풜 values. We select 10 tuples from ℬ1 and 8 tuples from ℬ2 to
form 풢. If the 10 tuples from ℬ1 all have 풮풜 value bronchitis, then (푞1, 푞2, 푞3) =
(0, 0, 10
18
) and the cost of earth transportation in ℬ1 reaches its upper bound
1
2
⋅ [(푝1 + 푝2 + 푝3)−min{푝1, 푝2, 푝3}] = 29 , where (푝1, 푝2, 푝3) = ( 518 , 318 , 218). This
upper bound is realized by moving 5
18
earth from 푞3 to 푝1 (cost is 12× 518 ), 318 earth
from 푞3 to 푝2 (cost is 12× 318 ), and 218 earth from 푞3 to 푝3 (cost is 0× 218 ). Likewise,
if the 8 tuples from ℬ2 are all with gastric ulcer (or intestinal cancer), then the
cost of earth transportation in ℬ2 reaches its upper bound 12 ⋅ [(푝4 + 푝5 + 푝6)−
min{푝4, 푝5, 푝6}] = 16 . With 10 tuples of bronchitis and 8 of gastric ulcer, the 풮풜




, 0). The overall 풮풜 distribution in 풟ℬ is












). After the earth transportations in 퐵1 and 퐵2, 풬 is
transformed to 풫 with a cost upper bounded by 퐶퐸푇푈ℬ1 +퐶퐸푇푈ℬ2 = 29 + 16 = 718 .
After the above foundations, we can now discuss the generation of buck-
ets. SABRE partitions 풟ℬ hierarchically, based on the 풮풜 values of its tuples,
forming a bucketization tree. Each node of this tree denotes a bucket containing
tuples having a certain subset of 풮풜 values. The leaf nodes of the tree are the
buckets that correspond to the actual bucket partition of 풟ℬ. The tree starts
with a single node — the root — which corresponds to the entire table with the
whole domain of 풮풜. Then the tree grows in a top-down manner by recursively
splitting leaf nodes. In each iteration, we can compute the upper bounded cost
of each node/bucket (based on Theorem 3.2). By Theorem 3.3, we determine 풰 ,
the summation of all the upper bounds. In this way, we select the node that con-
tributes to the largest reduction of 풰 as the node to be further split. This process
terminates when 풰 becomes smaller than the closeness threshold t. By Theo-
rem 3.3, this termination condition guarantees that the 풮풜 distribution in any
EC formed from the final buckets according to the proportionality requirement
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will not differ from that in 풟ℬ by more than 푡.
We now elaborate on the way we split a leaf bucket/node 푛. For a categorical
풮풜, let ℋ be the domain hierarchy of 풮풜. Then each node in the bucketization
tree has a corresponding node in ℋ. The root of the tree matches the root of ℋ.



















Figure 3.4: Splitting at respiratory diseases
Example 3.4. Let disease be a categorical 풮풜 with the domain hierarchy of
Figure 3.1. Assume a table 풟ℬ, containing 5 tuples with SARS, 3 with Pneu-
monia, 2 with Bronchitis, 4 with Gastric flu, 2 with Gastric ulcer, and 2 with
















a threshold 푡 = 0.2. We build the bucketization tree in a top-down fashion as
follows. At the beginning, the tree comprises the root, respiratory and digestive
diseases. The upper bound cost of the root is calculated as 1× (( 5
18





) − 푚푖푛{ 5
18




}) = 1 × (1 − 2
18
) = 0.889. Since 0.889 > 0.2, we
split it. We add its two children respiratory diseases, digestive diseases to the




























is still larger than 푡, we further split the tree. Splitting respiratory diseases
would reduce 풰 by 2
9




; thus, we opt for the former. We add the three children of node respiratory
diseases to the tree. Now the sum of upper bounds of all leaf nodes is 1
6
< 푡.
Figure 3.4 shows the final tree.
On the other hand, for a numerical 풮풜, the children of 푛 are dynamically
determined. Let 푙푣 be the set of 풮풜 values included in 푛, sorted in ascending
order. We split 푙푣 to a left child 푐1, containing values in 푙푣 to the left of the
splitting point, and a right child 푐2 with the remaining ones. The splitting point




Example 3.5. Let salary be a numerical 풮풜 with values 1푘, 2푘, 3푘, 4푘. As-
sume that a table풟ℬ contains 2 tuples with 1푘, 3 with 2푘, 3 with 3푘, and 2 with
4푘. Then the salary distribution is (0.2, 0.3, 0.3, 0.2). We label the four values
from 1 to 4 sequentially. The upper bound cost for a bucketization tree com-
posed only of the root (1푘−4푘) is 푑11×0.2+푑12×0.3+푑13×0.3+푑14×0.2 =
0 + 1
3
× 0.3 + 2
3
× 0.3 + 1× 0.2 = 0.5. If we set the splitting point at 1푘, then
the left child of 1푘−4푘 will be 1푘, and its right child 2푘−4푘. The upper bound
cost of 1푘 is 0, and that of 2푘 − 4푘 is 푑42 × 0.3 + 푑43 × 0.3 + 푑44 × 0.2 = 0.3,
as shown in Figure 3.5(a). Figures 3.5(b),(c) depict the corresponding trees for
splitting along 2푘 and 3푘. The minimum sum of upper bounds is that in Figure






1k-2k 3k-4k 1k-3k 4k1k
Figure 3.5: Splitting of salary at 1k-4k
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Function bucketCat generates buckets for a categorical 풮풜. Input parameter
ℋ is the domain hierarchy of 풮풜; 풱풫 is the list of (푣푖, 푝푖) pairs, the 풮풜 value and
its frequency in the whole table, 푖 = 1, 2, . . . ,푚. ℒ stores all the leaf nodes of
the bucketization tree (steps 1-2). We use a node to represent its corresponding
bucket. Step 4 calculates the upper bound cost of the root 푟. Steps 5-7 compute
the potential cost reduction after splitting 푟 (푑푣 denotes the decreased value).
The root 푟 is the first node added to ℒ. 풰 , the sum of all upper bounds of the
nodes in ℒ, is initialized to 퐶퐸푇푈푟 (step 8). The leaf node 푛 whose splitting
reduces 풰 at most is split (step 10), 푛 is replaced by its children in ℒ (steps 11-
13), and 풰 is accordingly reduced (step 14). Steps 17-20 calculate how much
풰 can be deduced if 푛’s child is split. This process continues iteratively (steps
9-20) until 풰 < 푡 (steps 15-16). Eventually, each node in ℒ is associated to a
bucket in 휑, and 휑 is returned (steps 21-22).
Function bucketCat(ℋ, 풱풫)
Let ℒ be the set of leaf nodes in the bucketization tree;1
Initialize ℒ to be empty;2
Let 푟 be the root ofℋ;3
Calculate 퐶퐸푇푈푟 ;4







Add 푟 to ℒ and initialize 풰 = 퐶퐸푇푈푟 ;8
while 풰 ≥ 푡 do9
Let 푛 be the node in ℒ with the maximum 푑푣 value;10
Remove 푛 from ℒ;11
foreach child 푐 of 푛 inℋ do12
Add 푐 to ℒ;13
풰 = 풰 − 푑푣푛;14
if 풰 < 푡 then15
break;16
foreach child c of n do17













Let ℒ be the set of leaf nodes in the bucketization tree;1
Initialize ℒ to be empty;2
Create root 푟 and initialize its 풮풜 values 푙푣푟 to be 풱풫;3
Calculate 퐶퐸푇푈푟 ;4
Create 푐1 and 푐2, the left and right children of 푟;5
split (푟, 푐1, 푐2 );6
푑푣푟 = 퐶퐸푇
푈
푟 − 퐶퐸푇푈푐1 − 퐶퐸푇푈푐2 ;7
Add 푟 to ℒ and initialize 풰 = 퐶퐸푇푈푟 ;8
while 풰 ≥ 푡 do9
Find the node 푛 in ℒ with the maximum value of 푑푣;10
Remove 푛 from ℒ;11
foreach child 푐 of 푛 do12
Add 푐 to ℒ;13
풰 = 풰 − 푑푣푛;14
if 풰 < 푡 then15
break;16
foreach child 푐 of 푛 do17
Create 푔1 and 푔2, the left and right children of 푐;18
split ( 푐, 푔1, 푔2 );19
푑푣푐 = 퐶퐸푇
푈
푐 − 퐶퐸푇푈푔1 − 퐶퐸푇푈푔2 ;20
Let 휑 be the set of buckets related with nodes in ℒ;21
Return 휑;22
Similarly, Function bucketNum generates buckets of a numerical 풮풜. Input
parameter 풱풫 is the list of 풮풜 values and their frequencies in the whole table,
sorted in ascending order of 풮풜 values. Each node in the bucketization tree has
a container 푙푣 that records all 풮풜 values covered by that node. The root 푟 has
푙푣 equal to 풱풫 , i.e. 푟 covers all 풮풜 values (step 3). Procedure split calculates
the best gain of dividing 푟 into two child nodes (step 6) and 푟 is added as the
first node to ℒ (step 8). 퐶퐸푇푈푟 (step 4) is assigned as the initial value of 풰
(step 8). Then, nodes in ℒ are split iteratively until 풰 becomes smaller than
the closeness threshold 푡 (steps 9-20). In each round, the most cost-reducing
node 푛 is chosen from ℒ to be split (step 10), and replaced by its two children
(steps 11-13). The gain of splitting the children of 푛 is also calculated (steps
17-20). The best grandchildren for 푛 are dynamically determined by Procedure
split (step 19). Eventually, each node in ℒ is associated to a bucket, and the set
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of all buckets 휑 is returned (steps 21-22).
Procedure split(푛, 푐1, 푐2)
푢1 = 1.0, 푢2 = 1.0 ;1
foreach split point 푆푃 in 푙푣푛 do2
Clear 푙푣푐1 and 푙푣푐2 ;3
Push all elements in 푙푣푛 to the left of 푆푃 into 푙푣푐1 ;4
Allocate all remaining elements of 푙푣푛 to 푙푣푐2 ;5
Calculate 퐶퐸푇푈푐1 and 퐶퐸푇
푈
푐2 ;6
if 퐶퐸푇푈푐1 + 퐶퐸푇
푈







푏푒푠푡푃 = 푆푃 ;10
Clear 푙푣푐1 and 푙푣푐2 ;11
Push all elements in 푙푣푛 to the left of 푏푒푠푡푃 into 푙푣푐1 ;12
Allocate all the remaining elements of 푙푣푛 to 푙푣푐2 ;13
퐶퐸푇푈푐1 = 푢1;14
퐶퐸푇푈푐2 = 푢2;15
Procedure split dynamically divides a node 푛 into a left child 푐1 and a right




is selected (steps 2-10). The elements in 푙푣푛 are appropriately
assigned to the two children (steps 12-13).
3.4.2 SABRE’s redistribution scheme




To generate an equivalence class 풢 conforming to the proportionality require-
ment, we need to select ∣풢∣ ⋅ ∣ℬ푖∣∣풟ℬ∣ tuples from bucket ℬ푖, 푖 = 1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣.
However, ∣풢∣ ⋅ ∣ℬ푖∣∣풟ℬ∣ may not be an integer for some sizes of 풢 and some 푖 ∈
{1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣}. Setting a constraint to the size of 풢 so that each ∣풢∣ ⋅ ∣ℬ푖∣∣풟ℬ∣ be
an integer may severely limit the allowed EC size, hence defeat the purpose
of our study, which is to provide a flexible and quality-aware scheme for 푡-
closeness. For example, assume that ∣풟ℬ∣ = 50, 000 and ∣ℬ푖∣∣풟ℬ∣ = 0.1333 for
some 푖 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣}. Then each EC should have a size of at least 10, 000.
Such large ECs generally incur high information loss.
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We conclude that we should better relax the proportionality requirement:
it suffices that the number of tuples from each bucket ℬ푖 in an EC 풢 be ap-
proximately proportional to the size of the bucket. To ensure 푡-closeness, we
determine the size of each EC dynamically. Theorem 3.4 establishes that this
is always possible. Before presenting it, we introduce some auxiliary concepts
and notations.
Definition 3.5 (휑 distribution in an EC). Let 풢 be an EC from table 풟ℬ with








, where 푥푖 is the set of tuples from bucket ℬ푖 ∈ 휑 in 풢 and ∪∣휑∣푖=1 푥푖 = 풢.









. Furthermore, if 풢 conforms to the propor-
tionality requirement with respect to 휑, then 푑(풢, 휑) = 푑(풟ℬ, 휑). Given two 휑
distributions, we define 푑푢푖푗 to be the distance between element 푖 of the former
and element 푗 of the latter. Let 푑푦푧 be the ground distance between two 풮풜 val-
ues 푣푦 and 푣푧, and 풱푖 be the set of 풮풜 values in bucket ℬ푖 ∈ 휑, then we define
our 푑푢푖푗 metric as follows.
푑푢푖푗 =
⎧⎨⎩ 푚푎푥{푑푦푧∣푣푦 ∈ 풱푖, 푣푧 ∈ 풱푗}, 푖 ∕= 푗0, 푖 = 푗
We can transform the 풮풜 distribution풬 in an EC 풢 to that in the whole table,
풫 in two steps: First, we transform풬 to풬′, the 풮풜 distribution of an EC 풢 ′ that
follows the proportionality requirement; then, we transform 풬′ to 풫 . Lemma
3.1 proves that 풬′ exists and gives the upper bound cost of the transformation
from 풬 to 풬′. Theorem 3.4 builds on Lemma 3.1 and specifies the conditions
for EC sizes that satisfy 푡-closeness.
Lemma 3.1. Let 풢 be an EC generated from table 풟ℬ with bucket partition
휑, and 풬 = (푞1, 푞2, . . . , 푞푚) be the 풮풜 distribution in 풢. Then there exists an
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풮풜 distribution 풬′ = (푞′1, 푞′2, . . . , 푞′푚) of an EC following the proportionality
requirement with respect to 휑, such that the cost of transforming 풬 to 풬′ is
upper bounded by 풟 = 퐸푀퐷(푑(풢, 휑), 푑(풟ℬ, 휑)).
Proof. Let 풱 = {푣1, 푣2, . . . , 푣푚} be the domain of 풮풜. Consider the partition
of 풱 , 풱 = {풱1,풱2, . . . ,풱∣휑∣}, where 풱푖 is the set of 풮풜 values in ℬ푖 ∈ 휑. Given
풱 , we derive 풬 = (풬1,풬2, . . . ,풬∣휑∣) and 풬′ = (풬′1,풬′2, . . . ,풬′∣휑∣), where
푞푦 ∈ 풬푖 (푞′푦 ∈ 풬′푖) if and only if 푣푦 ∈ 풱푖. Let 푥푖 be the set of tuples from





∣풢∣ . The 휑 distribution in 풢 is 푑(풢, 휑) =( ∣푥1∣
∣풢∣ ,
∣푥2∣

















1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣. Initially, we set 푞′푧 = 0, 푧 = 1, 2, . . . ,푚. We see 푑(풟ℬ, 휑) as
a collection of holes to be filled by piles of earth transported from 푑(풢, 휑).
Moreover, we see 풬 and 풬′ as piles of earth. The elements 풬푖 ∈ 풬 (풬′푖 ∈
풬′) can be seen as clusters of piles of earth from 풬 (풬′). During the earth




∣풟ℬ∣ (costing by definition 푑
푢
푖푗 ⋅ 훿), then we also move 훿 earth from (a
pile in) the corresponding cluster 풬푖 to (a pile in) cluster 풬′푗 . Then, after all
holes in 푑(풟ℬ, 휑) are filled with earth from 푑(풢, 휑), the volume of earth in






1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣. In other words, 풬 is transformed to an 풮풜 distribution 풬′ that
follows the proportionality requirement with respect to 휑. Concerning the cost,
we distinguish two cases during the above earth transportation operation:
Case 1: If 푖 ∕= 푗, then the cost of earth transportation from (a pile in) cluster
풬푖 to (a pile in) cluster 풬′푗 is at most 푑푢푖푗 ⋅ 훿, since 푑푢푖푗 is, by its definition, the
maximum ground distance between any pile 푞푦 ∈ 풬푖 and any pile 푞′푧 ∈ 풬′푗 .
Case 2: If 푖 = 푗, then, at the transportation from (a pile in) cluster 풬푖 to (a
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pile in) cluster 풬′푖, we simply require that earth from pile 푞푦 ∈ 풬푖 only goes to
the corresponding pile 푞′푦 ∈ 풬′푖; the ground distance between these piles (푞푦 and
푞′푦) is 0, hence the cost of earth transportation is 0 too.
Based on the above two cases, we conclude that the cost of transforming 풬
to 풬′ is upper-bounded by 풟.
Example 3.6. We return to Example 3.4. Assume that 푡 = 0.45, so that Figure
3.3 shows the final bucketization tree. ℬ1 relates to Respiratory diseases with
∣ℬ1∣ = 10. ℬ2 relates to Digestive diseases, with ∣ℬ2∣ = 8. 휑 = {ℬ1,ℬ2}
is a bucket partition of 풟ℬ with 푑푢12 = 1. Suppose that 풢 contains 3 tuples
with SARS from ℬ1 and 2 tuples with Gastric flu from ℬ2. The disease dis-
tribution in 풢 then is 풬 = (푞1, . . . , 푞6) = (35 , 0, 0, 25 , 0, 0). Initially, 풬′ =
(푞′1, . . . , 푞
′
6) = (0, . . . , 0). Thus, 풬 = (풬1,풬2) = ({푞1, 푞2, 푞3}, {푞4, 푞5, 푞6}) =
({3
5
, 0, 0}, {2
5
, 0, 0, }), and풬′ = (풬′1,풬′2) = ({푞′1, 푞′2, 푞′3}, {푞′4, 푞′5, 푞′6}) = ({0, 0,













, and 푑(풢, 휑) =
( ∣푥1∣∣풢∣ ,
∣푥2∣











∣풟ℬ∣ (at cost 0),
2
5
earth from ∣푥2∣∣풢∣ to
∣ℬ2∣














). Thus, 퐸푀퐷(푑(풢, 휑), 푑(풟ℬ, 휑)) = 2
45
. Accordingly,
we also move 5
9
earth from 풬1 to 풬′1 (i.e., from 푞1 to 푞′1, at cost 0), and 25 earth









0). When moving 2
45
earth from 풬1 to 풬′2, there are multiple choices, we can
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three cases, the cost of transforming풬 to풬′ is 2
45
≤ 퐸푀퐷(푑(풢, 휑), 푑(풟ℬ, 휑)).
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Theorem 3.4 (Triangle inequality). Let 풢 be an EC from table 풟ℬ with bucket
partition 휑. If 풟 + 풰 ≤ 푡, where 풟 = 퐸푀퐷(푑(풢, 휑), 푑(풟ℬ, 휑)) and 풰 =∑
∀ℬ∈휑퐶퐸푇푈ℬ , then the 풮풜 distribution 풬 in 풢 is 푡-close to the 풮풜 distribution
풫 in 풟ℬ.
Proof. We transform 풬 to 풫 in two steps. First, we transform 풬 to 풬′, a distri-
bution that follows the proportionality requirement with respect to 휑; then, we
transform 풬′ to 풫 . By Lemma 3.1, the cost of transforming 풬 to 풬′ is upper-
bounded by 풟. Furthermore, by Theorem 3.3, the cost of transforming 풬′ to 풫
is upper bounded by 풰 . Therefore, the EMD of transforming 풬 to 풫 via 풬′ is
upper bounded by 풟+풰 . Thus, if 풟+풰 ≤ 푡, the EMD between풬 and 풫 is at
most 푡.
We now consider the process of dynamically determining the size of an
EC, or deciding how many tuples to take out from each bucket to form an
EC. First, we consider all tuples of 풟ℬ (i.e., all the buckets in 휑) as a single
EC, 푟. Then we split 푟 into two ECs by dichotomizing ℬ푖 into ℬ1푖 and ℬ2푖 ,
where 푖 = 1, 2 . . . , ∣휑∣. ℬ1푖 and ℬ2푖 have approximately the same size. The left
child 푐1 of 푟 is composed of ℬ1푖 , and the right child 푐2 of 푟 is composed of
ℬ2푖 , where 푖 = 1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣. Let 푑(푐1, 휑) and 푑(푐2, 휑) be the 휑 distributions
in 푐1 and 푐2 respectively. By Theorem 3.4, the split is allowed only if both
퐸푀퐷(푑(푐1, 휑), 푑(풟ℬ, 휑)) + 풰 ≤ 푡 and 퐸푀퐷(푑(푐2, 휑), 푑(풟ℬ, 휑)) + 풰 ≤ 푡
hold. After 푟 is split, we recursively split 푐1 and 푐2 in the same way. We illustrate
this process with an example.
Example 3.7. Re-consider Example 3.6, with 푡 = 0.45, 휑 = {ℬ1,ℬ2}, and
푑푢12 = 1. If we strictly follow the proportionality requirement, then there are at
most two ECs, each having 5 tuples from ℬ1 and 4 tuples from ℬ2. However,









Figure 3.6: Example of dynamically determining EC size
Theorem 3.3, we have 풰 = 퐶퐸푇푈ℬ1 + 퐶퐸푇푈ℬ2 = 29 + 16 = 718 (see Example 3.3).
The notation 푟 = [10, 8] in Figure 3.6 means that 푟 contains 10 tuples from ℬ1
and 8 tuples from ℬ2 (i.e., all tuples in 풟ℬ). We dichotomize 푟 into 푐1 = [5, 4]
and 푐2 = [5, 4]. Since both 푐1 and 푐2 follow the proportionality requirement with
respect to 휑, and 풰 = 7
18
< 푡, the split is allowed. We proceed to split 푐1 into
푔1 = [3, 2] and 푔2 = [2, 2]. Now 푑(풟ℬ, 휑) = (59 , 49), 푑(푔1, 휑) = (35 , 25), and





). Since 퐸푀퐷(푑(푔1, 휑), 푑(풟ℬ, 휑)) + 풰 = 245 + 718 < 0.45 and
퐸푀퐷(푑(푔2, 휑), 푑(풟ℬ, 휑)) + 풰 = 118 + 718 < 0.45, splitting 푐1 is allowed by
Theorem 3.4. If we further dichotomize 푔1 into 푔푔1 = [2, 1] and 푔푔2 = [1, 1],
then 퐸푀퐷(푑(푔푔1, 휑), 푑(풟ℬ, 휑)) + 풰 = 19 + 718 > 0.45. Thus, splitting 푔1 is
not allowed. Still, further splitting 푔2 into two ECs each having one tuple from
ℬ1 and one tuple from ℬ2 is allowed. The process of splitting 푐2 is similar to
푐1. The recursive splitting process generates the tree shown in Figure 3.6. Each
leaf node represents the size of a possible EC.
The redistribution phase of SABRE uses the binary tree as illustrated in Fig-
ure 3.6 to effectively split ECs. The same tree structure has also been employed
in Mondrian [49]. However, the trees for the two methods are generated in a
very different manner due to the distinct requirements of their underlying pri-
vacy models. The Mondrian 푘-anonymi-zation algorithm, under local recoding,
splits a node in the binary tree once it accommodates at least 2푘 tuples. Instead,
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the redistribution phase of SABRE, tailored for 푡-closeness, allows such a split-
ting, only if the resultant ECs strictly satisfy the conditions specified in Theorem
3.4. Still, the redistribution phase only determines the size of each possible EC
(i.e., the number of tuples from each bucket to compose it). How real tuples are
retrieved from each bucket to create an EC is discussed in Section 3.4.3.
Function ECSize(휑)
Let 휑 = {ℬ1,ℬ2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ,ℬ∣휑∣} be the set of buckets generated from the bucketization1
phase;
Let 푎 be an array, and 푎푖 be the 푖푡ℎ element of 푎;2
Create a tree 퐸퐶푇 and its root 푟;3
Initialize 푟.푎 by 푟.푎푖 = ∣ℬ푖∣, 푖 = 1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣;4
dichotomize (푟, 휑);5
Let 푆푎 be a set of arrays initialized to be empty;6
Traverse 퐸퐶푇 , and for each leaf node 푛 add 푛.푎 to 푆푎;7
Return 푆푎;8
Function ECSize describes our algorithm that determines the number of tu-
ples to be taken out from ℬ푖, 푖 = 1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣. Parameter 휑 is the set of buckets
generated from the bucketization phase (step 1, see Section 3.4.1). Each array
푎 represents an EC, and its 푖푡ℎ element 푎푖 is the number of tuples from ℬ푖 when
generating the EC (step 2). 퐸퐶푇 is a tree with each node associated with an
array 푎. The root of 퐸퐶푇 is 푟, and 푟.푎 represents an EC composed of the whole
table (steps 3-4). We call function dichotomize to generate 퐸퐶푇 (step 5). In the
final 퐸퐶푇 , each leaf node represents an EC that cannot be further split. Even-
tually, each leaf node 푛 in 퐸퐶푇 is scanned, and its 푛.푎 is stored in 푆푎 (steps
7-8).
Procedure dichotomize splits 퐸퐶푇 recursively. Parameter 푛 is a node in
퐸퐶푇 , and 휑 is the computed bucket partition (see Section 3.4.1) of table 풟ℬ.
Steps 3-5 split the EC denoted by node 푛 into two, whose sizes are determined
by 푎1푖 and 푎
2
푖 respectively, 푖 = 1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣. If both 푐1 and 푐2 follow Theorem
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Procedure dichotomize(푛,휑)
if 푛.푎푖 < 2, for all 푖 ∈ {1, . . . , ∣휑∣} then1
Return;2
foreach 푖 ∈ {1, . . . , ∣휑∣} do3
푎1푖 = 푟표푢푛푑(0.5× 푛.푎푖);4
푎2푖 = 푛.푎푖 − 푎1푖 ;5
Set 푐1.푎 by 푐1.푎푖 = 푎
1
푖 , 푖 = 1, . . . , ∣휑∣;6
풟1 = 퐸푀퐷(푑(푐1, 휑), 푑(풟ℬ, 휑));7
Set 푐2.푎 by 푐2.푎푖 = 푎
2
푖 , 푖 = 1, . . . , ∣휑∣;8
풟2 = 퐸푀퐷(푑(푐2, 휑), 푑(풟ℬ, 휑));9
if 풟1 + 푈 ≤ 푡 and 풟2 + 푈 ≤ 푡 then10
Set 푐1 and 푐2 to be the left and right child of 푛 respectively;11
dichotomize (푐1, 휑);12
dichotomize (푐2, 휑);13
3.4 (steps 6-10), then 푛 will acquire 푐1 and 푐2 as its children (step 11). Steps 12-
13 recursively examines whether the two newly generated children can be split.
The process terminates if splitting a node cannot generate two smaller ECs (the
evaluation of step 1 is true) or the evaluation of step 10 is false. When none of
the nodes in 퐸퐶푇 can be split, 퐸퐶푇 is fully generated.
Now our presentation of the two phases is complete. In the following, we
put the bucketization phase (Section 3.4.1) and the redistribution phase (section
3.4.2) together and summarize the framework of SABRE.
3.4.3 SABRE and its two instantiations
Algorithm SABRE provides a high level description of our framework. {푣1, 푣2,
. . . , 푣푚} is the domain of the sensitive attribute. The global 풮풜 distribution in
the whole table풟ℬ is (푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝푚), where 푝푖 = 풩푖∣풟ℬ∣ and풩푖 is the number of
tuples in 풟ℬ with 풮풜 value of 푣푖 (step 1). Steps 2-8 deal with the bucketization
phase. Function bucketCat computes the bucketization tree for categorical sen-
sitive attribute (step 5). If the 풮풜 is numerical, the tree is generated by function
bucketNum (step 8). In the final bucketization tree, each leaf node is associ-
ated to a bucket, and all the tuples with the 풮풜 values included in the leaf node
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will be pushed to the corresponding bucket. Thus, a bucket partition of 풟ℬ,
휑, is formed. Step 9 is the redistribution phase; function ECSize dynamically
determines the size of each possible EC. Steps 10-15 form all possible ECs and
output them. 푆푎, returned by ECSize, is a list of arrays. Each array represents
an EC. Given an array 푎 (step 10), SABRE takes 푎푖 tuples from bucket ℬ푖 ∈ 휑,
where 푎푖 is the 푖푡ℎ element of 푎 and 푖 = 1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣ (step 13). Then SABRE
forms an EC 풢 out of them (step 14). Each generated EC is output (step 15).
Algorithm: SABRE ( 풟ℬ, 풮풜, 푡 )
Let {푣1, 푣2, . . . , 푣푚} be all the 풮풜 values in 풟ℬ, and {푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝푚} be their1
distributions;
Let 풱풫 be the list of (푣푖, 푝푖), 푖 = 1, 2, . . . ,푚;2
if 풮풜 is categorical then3
Letℋ be the domain hierarchy of 풮풜;4
휑 = bucketCat (ℋ,풱풫);5
else6
Sort 풱풫 in the ascending order of 풮풜 values;7
휑 = bucketNum (풱풫);8
푆푎 = ECSize (휑);9
foreach array 푎 in 푆푎 do10
Create an empty EC, say 풢;11
foreach 푎푖, 푖푡ℎ element of 푎 do12
푒푐푖 = takeOut (ℬ푖, 푎푖);13
add 푒푐푖 to 풢;14
output 풢;15
When taking out tuples from a bucket, SABRE does not distinguish their
풮풜 values. The 푡-closeness between the EC and the whole table is anyway
guaranteed by Theorems 3.3 and 3.4. Which tuples to pick is to be determined
by information loss considerations. As discussed, we adopt the General Loss
Metric (GLM) (see Section 2.3), as we assume that the anonymized data are for
multiple, not known a priori, uses. GLM requires the minimum bound boxes of
ECs to be as small as possible. We achieve this by greedily picking tuples of
similar QI values, to the extent that is possible.
We provide two instantiations of SABRE: SABRE-KNN and SABRE-AK.
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They differ only in function takeOut (ℬ푖, 푎푖) (step 13 of Algorithm SABRE),
which determines the tuples that should be picked from each bucket. Both
schemes utilize the notion of nearest neighbors. SABRE-KNN finds the exact
neighbors, whereas SABRE-AK uses approximate neighbors.
We define a multidimensional space with each of the QI attributes serving
as a dimension. The axis for a dimension defined by a numerical QI attribute is
straightforward. For a categorical QI, the ordering of all leaves by a pre-order
traversal of its domain hierarchy forms the axis. Thus, each tuple is represented
as a point in this space. We use the Euclidean distance to measure the distance
between two points.
SABRE-KNN selects 푎푖 tuples from bucket ℬ푖 based on a 푘NN search. First,
it forms an empty EC 풢. Then it selects a random tuple 푥 from a randomly
selected bucket ℬ ∈ 휑. Finally, in each bucket ℬ푖, 푖 = 1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣, it finds the
nearest 푎푖 neighbors of 푥 and adds them into 풢. 푥 and all its selected nearest
neighbors are deleted from their original buckets. Thus, to form an EC, all
tuples in the buckets need to be scanned once. The time cost of this operation
is 푂(∣푆풢∣ ⋅ ∣풟ℬ∣), where ∣푆풢∣ is the number of ECs and ∣풟ℬ∣ is the size of the
dataset.
As an alternative to the computationally more demanding SABRE-KNN, we
also suggest a more efficient scheme, SABRE-AK, that looks for approximate
nearest neighbors of 푥. This is facilitated by the Hilbert space-filling curve [59],
a continuous fractal that maps regions of the multidimensional QI space to one-
dimensional Hilbert values. Each tuple has a Hilbert value corresponding to the
region that contains it. If two tuples are close in the multi-dimensional space,
their Hilbert values are also close with high probability. SABRE-AK first sorts
all tuples in each bucket in ascending order of their Hilbert values. Then, when
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looking for 푥’s 푎푖 nearest neighbors in bucket ℬ푖, it selects the 푎푖 tuples that
are closest to 푥 in terms of their Hilbert values. In practice, we use binary
search to find in ℬ푖 a tuple 푥¯, whose Hilbert value is closest to that of 푥. Then
we check the neighbors of 푥¯ and select the closest 푎푖 ones (including 푥¯) to











where ∣휑∣ is the number of buckets, ∣풟ℬ∣∣휑∣ the average size of a bucket, and ∣풟ℬ∣∣푆풢 ∣⋅∣휑∣





⋅ ∣휑∣) << ∣풟ℬ∣, we expect SABRE-AK to be more efficient
than SABRE-KNN.
3.5 Experimental study
In this section we evaluate the performance of our SABRE-based schemes:
SABRE-KNN, SABRE-AK. We compare SABRE against tIncognito [52] and
tMondrian [53], i.e., the 푡-closeness schemes extended from Incognito [48] and
Mondrian [49], respectively. The prototype was implemented in Java and the
experiments were run on a core-2 duo 2.33GHz CPU machine, with 4GB RAM,
running windows XP. We use the CENSUS dataset [3], which contains 500,000
tuples, and has 8 attributes as shown in Table 3.4; the value following the type is
the height of the corresponding attribute hierarchy. For instance, attribute mari-
tal status is categorical and has a hierarchy of height 2. The first 7 attributes are
used by default as the QI, and the last one (i.e., salary) as the sensitive attribute
divided into 50 classes. The least frequent salary class is 49 with frequency
0.2018%, while the most frequent one is 12 with frequency 4.8402%. We gen-
erate 5 microdata tables by randomly taking 100,000 to 500,000 tuples from the
dataset; the one with 100,000 tuples is the default dataset. 푡-closeness provides
protection against the disclosure of 풮풜 values. Yet it does not handle identity
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disclosure. 푘-anonymity copes with identity disclosure by ensuring that each re-
leased tuple is indistinguishable from at least 푘 − 1 other tuples with respect to
their QI values. Still, to create a level playing field, as tIncognito and tMondrian
do, SABRE combines t-closeness and 푘-anonymity together. We set the default
value of k to be 6 (i.e., the size of EC is at least 6). The closeness threshold t is
a variable, in default it is set to 0.35.
Attribute Cardinality Type
age 79 numerical (4)
sex 2 categorical (1)
education 17 numerical (4)
marital status 6 categorical (2)
race 9 categorical (1)
work class 10 categorical (3)
birth place 83 categorical (2)
salary 50 numerical
Table 3.4: The CENSUS dataset
We use several metrics to evaluate the quality of the anonymized dataset un-
der the schemes we compare. First, we measure the average information loss
(see section 2.3). Then we study the utility of the anonymized dataset using
median relative errors [82] and KL-divergence [40]. We also compare the effi-
ciency of the various schemes based on the elapsed time.
3.5.1 Basic results
We first study the effect of varying the closeness threshold 푡. Figure 3.7 shows
the results. As expected, as 푡 grows and the requirement for similarity between
the salary distribution in each EC and that in the whole table is relaxed, the in-
formation quality for all schemes is improved (Figure 3.7(a)). The two SABRE-
based schemes are about equally effective (with SABRE-KNN slightly better
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than SABRE-AK) and provide superior information quality (i.e., lower average
information loss) compared to both tIncognito and tMondrian. The benefit of
a scheme tailored for 푡-closeness emerges. After all, SABRE selects tuples
from buckets in a sophisticated manner, and forms ECs with tuples of as close
as possible QI values. Thus, it competes successfully against the schemes of
both tIncognito and tMondrian; these schemes were principally designed for the
less complex problem of 푘-anonymization. Moreover, as Figure 3.7(b) shows,
SABRE-AK is the most efficient. In all cases, it takes no more than 4 seconds
to complete the processing. The time efficiency of tMondrian is comparable to





























Figure 3.7: Effect of varying closeness threshold
Next, we investigate the effect of the QI size. We vary the QI size from 3
to 7. When the QI dimensionality increases, data becomes more sparse in the
QI space, due to the higher-dimensional degrees of freedom offered; thus, the
formed ECs are more likely to have bigger minimum bounding boxes. Thus, we
expect information quality to worsen as dimensionality grows for all methods.
Still, Figure 3.8(a) shows that the average information loss of both tIncognito
and tMondrian grows in a substantially steep manner as QI size grows, while the
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SABRE-based schemes degrade only marginally. Thus, the information qual-
ity gap between tIncognito/tMondrian and the SABRE-based schemes widens
as the QI size increases. This result clearly indicates that the SABRE-based
methods are more scalable with respect to QI size. Moreover, Figure 3.8(b)


























Figure 3.8: Effect of varying QI size
Our next experiment studies the effect of database size. We vary the size
of microdata table from 100,000 to 500,000 tuples. The results are reported in
Figure 3.9. As Figure 3.9(a) shows, the data size has no much effect on the
information quality of the schemes, except tIncognito. Still, as expected, the
elapsed time increases as the table size grows for all schemes; SABRE-AK and
tMondrian remain superior in this case.
SABRE guarantees that the EMD difference between the distribution of a
sensitive attribute in an EC and that in the original input table is at most 푡.
However, the actual closeness of the anonymized data may be smaller than 푡.
We check the real closeness of the anonymized data as follows. For each EC we
calculate its closeness value, and we use the maximum one as the real closeness
of the whole anonymized dataset. In Figure 3.10(a), we vary 푡 from 0.15 to 0.55.





























Figure 3.9: Effect of varying 풟ℬ dimensionality (size)
that the real EMD difference of all schemes is smaller than the given threshold
푡. This result indicates that the anonymized data achieves better privacy than the
requirement. Furthermore, the SABRE-based schemes and tIncognito achieve
consistently smaller real difference than tMondrian; this result indicates that
























Figure 3.10: Real closeness
Figure 3.11 presents the results of the four approaches as we vary the 푘
parameter of the 푘-anonymity guarantee that all methods also provide. As 푘
increases, identity protection is improved. But a larger 푘 implies that more
tuples will be in an EC, thus the minimum bounding box to cover them becomes
larger, resulting in higher information loss. The behavior of tIncognito is not



























Figure 3.11: Effect of varying k
3.5.2 Accuracy of aggregation queries
Apart from information loss, we also study the utility of the anonymized data. In
this section, we focus on aggregation queries as they are the basis of statistical
analysis and many data mining applications (e.g., association rule mining and
decision trees). We first consider the following type of aggregation queries with
the median relative error as the metric [82]:
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM Anonymized-data
WHERE pred(퐴1) AND . . . AND pred(퐴휆) AND pred(풮풜)
Each 퐴푖 is a QI attribute. 풮풜 is a sensitive attribute. The query has predicates
on the 휆 randomly selected QI attributes and 풮풜. Let 퐴 be one of these 휆 + 1
attributes (휆 QI attributes + 풮풜). 푝푟푒푑(퐴) has the form of 퐴 ∈ 푅. 푅 is a
random interval in the domain of 퐴. 푅 has the length of ∣퐴∣ ⋅ 휃 1휆+1 , where
∣퐴∣ is the domain length of A and 휃 is the expected selectivity. Given a query,
the precise result 푝푟푒푐 is computed from the original table, and the estimated
result 푒푠푡 is obtained from the anonymized table. To calculate 푒푠푡, we assume
that tuples in each EC are uniformly distributed, and consider the intersection
between the query and the EC. We define ∣푒푠푡−푝푟푒푐∣
푝푟푒푐
× 100% as the relative error.
Our workload consists of 10,000 queries, and we measure the workload error as
the median relative error. Relative error is undefined when 푝푟푒푐 is 0. If 푝푟푒푐 in
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Figure 3.12: Median relative error
We first set 휃 to 0.1, and vary 휆. Each predicate in the WHERE clause ex-
cept the one on 풮풜 has some error. As 휆 increases, the number of predicates
increases, hence the overall error of all the predicates is expected to increase
as well. Not surprisingly, the error increases as 휆 grows, as shown in Figure
3.12(a). In the following experiments we fix 휆 to 3. Next we set 휃 to 0.1, and
vary the QI size. As the QI size increases, data tend to be more sparse in the
QI space, and it is more likely that ECs with bigger minimum bound boxes are
created. Consequently, the information loss of the anonymized data grows, and
the error we measure also increases. Expectedly, in Figure 3.12(b) the workload
error increases with QI size. In Figure 3.12(c) we fix 휃 to 0.1 and vary 푡. As
푡 grows, the requirement on the distribution of each EC is relaxed, hence the
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information quality of anonymized data rises, and the error we measure drops.
Finally, in Figure 3.12(d) we vary the selectivity 휃. When 휃 increases, the range
푅 for each attribute in a predicate increases. This makes the minimum bound
box of an EC more likely to be entirely contained in the query region, there-
fore, the estimate becomes slightly more accurate and the error smaller. In all
the above experiments, we find that SABRE-based schemes offer better utility.
Remarkably, SABRE-based techniques outperform tIncognito by one order of
magnitude in terms of median relative error.
In the following, we evaluate the utility based on typical OLAP queries using
the KL-divergence metric (as in [40]):
SELECT 퐴1, 퐴2,..., 퐴휇, COUNT(*)
FROM Anonymized-data
WHERE 풮풜 = val
GROUP BY 퐴1, 퐴2,..., 퐴휇
All GROUP-BYs for all possible combinations of the QI attributes compose
the OLAP datacube lattice. Level 휇 of the lattice corresponds to all GROUP-
BYs over exactly 휇 attributes. We build two datacube lattices on the CENSUS
dataset: 훼 (on the original dataset), and 훽 (on the anonymized dataset). For each
cell of 훽, we consider the intersection between the cell and each EC, assuming a
uniform distribution of tuples within the EC. Let 훼푐 and 훽푐 be values of a cell in
훼 and 훽 respectively. We use KL-divergence to measure the difference between




훼푐 × log 훼푐
훽푐
In Figure 3.13(a), the level of the lattice is set to 2, and we vary 푡. As 푡 in-
creases, KL-divergence decreases. This is so because, for larger 푡, the closeness
requirement is relaxed, hence the information quality of the anonymized data is
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improved. Ideally, the lower the KL-divergence is, the better the quality of the
anonymized data. When all the cells in 훼 and 훽 are the same, KL-divergence
is 0. In Figure 3.13(b) we vary the lattice level. When the level is higher, the
granularity of the GROUP-BYs in the aggregation query becomes finer. On the
other hand, when the level is lower, an aggregation query is more likely to in-
clude the whole range of an anonymized EC. This effect makes the four schemes
perform better at lower levels. In Figure 3.13(c) we set the level of lattice to 2,
and vary the QI size. SABRE-KNN and SABRE-AK are significantly more scal-
able than the other two methods with growing QI size. Eventually, in Figure
3.13(d) we set the level to 2, and vary the size of the dataset, to get a slightly
improving trend of information quality, due to increasing data density. In all the






























































Figure 3.13: KL-divergence with OLAP queries
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3.6 Discussion
In this section we make a discussion on SABRE. First, we examine the effect of
the 풮풜 hierarchy on information quality. For a categorical 풮풜, the set of chil-
dren of a split node in the bucketization tree depends on the pre-defined domain
hierarchy of 풮풜. With Figure 3.1 as the hierarchy, the root of the bucketization
tree is respiratory and digestive diseases. If it is split, its children will be res-
piratory diseases and digestive diseases, which are pre-defined in Figure 3.1.
Thus, the bucketization process is affected by the 풮풜 hierarchy. Besides, the
structure of a hierarchy is shaped by the number of its leaves and the fanouts
of its root and internal nodes (the height is automatically decided thereby). We


























Figure 3.14: Effect of varying fanout
In Table 3.4, salary is a numerical sensitive attribute with 50 distinct val-
ues. Next, we consider them as 50 leaves, and build hierarchies over them to see
the effects on anonymization process. To simplify the problem, we assume that
the fanouts in a simulated hierarchy are uniform, while its leaves are sorted from
left to right by the ascending order of their values. Figure 3.14 presents our ex-
perimental results. We observe that the information quality of the anonymized
data does not change uniformly as a function of fanout. Still, overall the curves
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suggest that a smaller value of fanout tends to preserve more information. After
all, when the fanout is smaller, the hierarchy is deeper. Thus, the intermediate
levels between the root and leaves are increased, hence the bucketization gains
more flexibility in partitioning 풮풜 values to buckets at several levels. In effect,
the redistribution phase can later redistribute tuples to ECs more effectively.
Apart from the preceding discussion, we also examine the potential for an
extension of SABRE to settings with more than one sensitive attributes. With-
out loss of generality, assume that 풟ℬ has two sensitive attributes 푆퐴1 =
{푢1, 푢2, . . . , 푢푛} and 푆퐴2 = {푣1, 푣2, . . . , 푣푚}. For the sake of simplicity we
consider the case that 푆퐴1 is independent of 푆퐴2. SABRE is extended to attain
푡-closeness with respect to both 푆퐴1 and 푆퐴2 as follows. It first transforms
풟ℬ to 풟ℬ1, which satisfies 푡-closeness with respect to 푆퐴1. Then it checks
each EC in 풟ℬ1 to determine whether it also observes 푡-closeness with respect
to 푆퐴2. If it does not, then it is merged with its nearest neighbor ECs, until
푡-closeness is attained. This effect is always achievable because an EC formed
from the union of two ECs will not have an increased distance from 풟ℬ with
respect to 푆퐴2 distribution. In particular, let 풫 be the overall 푆퐴2 distribution
in 풟ℬ, and 풬1 and 풬2 be the 푆퐴2 distributions of two ECs in 풟ℬ1, respec-
tively. Let 풬 be the 푆퐴2 distribution of the EC formed from the union of the
two ECs; then, 퐸푀퐷(풫 ,풬) ≤ max{퐸푀퐷(풫 ,풬1), 퐸푀퐷(풫 ,풬2)} [52]. In
effect, after all the required merges of ECs in 풟ℬ1, we can transform 풟ℬ1 to
풟ℬ2, which attains 푡-closeness with respect to both 푆퐴1 and 푆퐴2.
Lastly, we discuss the applicability of other distance metrics in SABRE.
Let 푑 be a distance measure, and 풫1, 풫2, 풫3 be any three sensitive attribute
distributions. To be applicable in SABRE, 푑 needs to satisfy the following
properties: I. non-negativity: 푑(풫1,풫2) ≥ 0; II. identity of indiscernibles:
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푑(풫1,풫2) = 0 if and only if 풫1 = 풫2; and III. triangle inequality: 푑(풫1,풫3) ≤
푑(풫1,풫2) + 푑(풫2,풫3). If 푑 also has the property of symmetry, then 푑 is a
metric. Therefore, besides EMD, other measures such as Euclidean metric
and Hamming distance can also be applied to SABRE. However, neither the
KL-divergence nor the Jensen-Shannon divergence has the triangle inequality
property, hence they are inapplicable to SABRE. Still, the square root of the
Jensen-Shannon divergence is a metric and therefore a possible candidate dis-
tance measure for SABRE. Nevertheless, when a new distance measure is ap-
plied to SABRE, the upper bound of the cost related with a bucket (Theorem
3.2) needs to be customized for that measure.
As a final note, 푡-closeness based on EMD has the drawback that it defines
no clear intelligible relationship between t and the privacy it affords. However,
EMD is still a meaningful distance measure for t-closeness, due to its following
attractive properties [53]: 1. Awareness of semantic closeness; 2. Simplicity for
understanding; 3. Subset property (i.e., if table 풟ℬ satisfies 푡-closeness in QI,
then it also satisfies 푡-closeness in any subset of QI.)
3.7 Summary
This chapter proposed SABRE, a novel framework for distribution-aware mi-
crodata anonymization based on the 푡-closeness principle. SABRE guarantees
푡-closeness in an elegant and efficient manner, without depending on techniques
developed for other privacy models. We have shown the applicability of our
scheme on both categorical and numerical attributes. Our extensive exper-
imental study demonstrated that our two SABRE instantiations, SABRE-AK
and SABRE-KNN, clearly outperform previous schemes in terms of informa-
tion quality, while SABRE-AK also outperforms them in terms of efficiency. In
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conclusion, SABRE provides the best known resolution of the tradeoff between






The most recently proposed privacy model, 푡-closeness, raises the privacy guar-
antees above those of its predecessors, i.e., 푘-anonymity and ℓ-diversity. How-
ever, all the instantiations of 푡-closeness interpret the 푡 threshold as a bound on
the cumulative distance between two frequency distributions, failing to translate
푡 to a comprehensible privacy guarantee. In this chapter we propose 훽-likeness,
a new privacy principle, which requires that each equivalence class (EC) should
satisfy a threshold 훽 on the positive relative difference between each 풮풜 value’s
frequency in the EC and that in the whole table. Therefore, the 훽 value corre-
sponds to an intelligible privacy guarantee that limits an attacker’s information
gain.
4.1 Introduction
The 푡-closeness model requires that the frequency distribution of 풮풜 values in an
EC differs from their overall distribution by at most a given threshold 푡; in effect,
this threshold aims to constrain the information an adversary gains after seeing
a single EC with respect to the information provided by the full released table.
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Just like ℓ-diversity is open to many ways of measuring the number of “well-
represented” values in an EC [57], 푡-closeness is open to diverse frequency
distribution distance functions. To date, functions such as the Earth Mover’s
Distance (EMD) [52], Kullback-Leibler divergence [63], and Jensen-Shannon
divergence [53, 54] have been adopted. Still, all these functions interpret the 푡
threshold as a bound on the cumulative difference between two frequency dis-
tributions. Indeed, this interpretation emanates out of the 푡-closeness model
itself [52, 53], not out of a particular manifestation. However, a privacy model
should provide grounds for effective and human-understandable policy [60]. Yet
a model that bounds a cumulative function of frequency differences between dis-
tributions fails to provide a meaningful privacy guarantee for the persons whose
privacy is at stake.
To elaborate on this point, we first discuss EMD. Assume a data set 풟ℬ
with 풮풜 values HIV and Flu, having semantic distance 1 (for the purpose of
measuring EMD between them). If the overall 풮풜 distribution between them
is 풫 = (0.4, 0.6), and their distribution in an EC is 풬 = (0.5, 0.5), then the
EMD between 풫 and 풬 is 퐸푀퐷(풫 ,풬) = 0.1. Still, if their overall distribu-
tion is 풫 ′ = (0.01, 0.99) and their distribution in an EC is 풬′ = (0.11, 0.89),
then 퐸푀퐷(풫 ′,풬′) = 0.1 again. Both cases satisfy 0.1-closeness. However,
the information gain in the latter case is much larger than that in the former:
the probability of HIV rises by only 25% from 0.4 to 0.5, but it rises by 1000%
from 0.01 to 0.11. In effect, the two cases do not afford the same privacy in hu-
man terms. This example appears in [52], where it is noted that EMD does not
provide a clear privacy guarantee. In fact, not only EMD, but any distance func-
tion that aggregates absolute differences would face a similar problem, since
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such functions do not provide informative maximum relative difference guaran-
tees [44] about individual 풮풜 values. In the current example, a small relative
difference of Flu-frequency between 풫 ′ and 풬′ evens up a large relative differ-
ence of HIV-frequency between them.
The recently proposed alternatives to EMD as frequency distribution dis-
tance functions, namely Kullback-Leibler divergence [63] and Jensen-Shannon
divergence [53, 54], also fail to pay appropriate attention to less frequent 풮풜
values and their relative differences. In our running example, assume a dataset
where the overall distribution of HIV and Flu is 풫˜ = (0.01, 0.99), and their
distribution in an EC is 풬˜= (0.03, 0.97). Then the K-L divergence (J-S diver-
gence) between 풫 and 풬 (see above), is 0.0290 (0.0073), while that between 풫˜
and 풬˜ is 0.0133 (0.0038). In effect, both these alternatives estimate the privacy
afforded by 풬˜ with respect to 풫˜ as higher than that afforded by 풬 with respect
to 풫 . However, the confidence for HIV increases only by 25% in the latter case,
while it rises by 200% in the former. Furthermore, the observed problem is ag-
gravated when small frequency differences for a multitude of 풮풜 values balance
out a large difference (i.e., privacy breach) for a single critical value.
From the above discussion, we derive a property that a more appropriate
privacy model should have: it should require that each EC satisfy a bound on
the relative frequency difference of each single 풮풜 value therein. Besides, in
most real-world applications, it is information gain in the form of an increase in
the adversary’s confidence for a certain 풮풜 value (e.g., HIV-positive) that poses
a privacy threat. A decrease in the adversary’s confidence does not1 constitute
1In case of a binary sensitive value (e.g., homosexual, heterosexual) a decrease in one implies
an increase in the other.
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a threat. We deduce that it suffices to pose a bound on positive frequency dif-
ferences only. Besides, a novel privacy model requires an anonymization algo-
rithm customized for the particular privacy-utility tradeoff posed by that model
itself [27, 41].
Past work has attempted to propose a privacy model that has the first prop-
erty outlined above: 훿-disclosure [21]. However, this attempt fails in three fun-
damental respects: (1) it postulates that every 풮풜 value in the overall table
should also occur in each EC; (2) it does not distinguish between an increase
and a decrease in the adversary’s confidence on an 풮풜 value; (3) it focuses on
a negative result, namely the destruction of data-mining utility by existing algo-
rithms adopted to 훿-disclosure (and other models). Our work differs from [21]
in all these three respects.
In this chapter, we propose 훽-likeness: a robust model for microdata anony-
mization that follows on the progression from 푘-anonymity to ℓ-diversity to 푡-
closeness, while eschewing the drawbacks of 훿-disclosure; this model imposes
a threshold on the positive relative difference of each 풮풜 value frequency be-
tween an EC and the overall table. Thereby, it provides a human-understandable
privacy guarantee that limits an adversary’s information gain; such a compre-
hensible guarantee is not provided by aggregate measures. Furthermore, we
accompany our privacy model with an anonymization algorithm tailored for its
own particular requirements. Our scheme first partitions tuples into buckets by
their 풮풜 value frequencies, and then redistributes those tuples to ECs. Our ex-
perimental study demonstrates that our scheme: (i) provides effective privacy
guarantees in a way that state-of-the-art 푡-closeness schemes cannot, even when
set to achieve the same information accuracy or privacy measured by the crite-
rion of 푡-closeness; (ii) is more effective and efficient in its task than both the
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훿-disclosure scheme used in [21] (which is an adaptation of Mondrian [49,50]),
and a similar benchmark scheme that we devise by adapting Mondrian to the
new model.
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section,
we introduce the modeling of 훽-likeness. Section 4.3 presents BUREL, an al-
gorithm customized for 훽-likeness. We carry out a comprehensive performance
evaluation in Section 4.4, and conclude our work in Section 4.5.
4.2 The privacy model
This section introduces our new privacy model, 훽-likeness. Table 4.1 gathers
together the notations we use throughout this chapter.
풟ℬ Original microdata table
풮풜 Sensitive attribute in 풟ℬ
풱 = {푣1, 푣2, . . . , 푣푚} The domain of 풮풜
푁푖 Number of tuples with 푣푖 in 풟ℬ
푝푖 = 푁푖/∣풟ℬ∣ Frequency of 푣푖 in 풟ℬ
풫 = (푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝푚) Overall 풮풜 distribution in 풟ℬ
풢 Equivalence class
풬 = (푞1, 푞2, . . . , 푞푚) 풮풜 distribution in 풢
Table 4.1: Notations
4.2.1 훽-likeness
In our model, we do not perturb the 풮풜 value of any tuple in 풟ℬ. Therefore,
once 풟ℬ is anonymized and published, 풫 , the 풮풜 distribution in 풟ℬ, will be
public knowledge. Thus, given any EC 풢 with 풮풜 distribution 풬, we need to
constrain the information gained from 풬 with respect to 풫 .
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Definition 4.1 (information gain). Assume a table 풟ℬ with a sensitive attribute
풮풜. Let 풱 = {푣1, 푣2, . . . , 푣푚} be the 풮풜 domain, and 풫 = (푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝푚)
be the overall 풮풜 distribution in 풟ℬ. Suppose that 풬 = (푞1, 푞2, . . . , 푞푚) is
the 풮풜 distribution in an equivalence class 풢, formed by tuples from 풟ℬ. The
information gain on any 풮풜 value 푣푖 ∈ 풱 is D(푝푖, 푞푖), where D is a distance
function between 푝푖 and 푞푖.
We say that the information gain on 푣푖 is positive, when 푝푖 < 푞푖, and neg-
ative, when 푝푖 ≥ 푞푖. Negative information gain lowers the correlation between
a personal record and 푣푖 in EC 풢 below that in the whole table. In most cases,
such gain enhances privacy. However, there may exist 풮풜 values such as het-
erosexual, for which a reduced likelihood may inadvertently violate privacy.
Nevertheless, we assume that the 풮풜 domain always includes the negation of
such values. Thus, negative information gain on heterosexual always appears
as positive gain for homosexual. Therefore, we can directly control the positive
gain on the value (such as homosexual) that poses the privacy threat. Under this
reasonable assumption, we are concerned with positive information gain only.
Then we define basic 훽-likeness as follows.
Definition 4.2 (basic 훽-likeness). Given table 풟ℬ with sensitive attribute 풮풜,
let 풱 = {푣1, . . . , 푣푚} be the 풮풜 domain, and 풫 = (푝1, . . . , 푝푚) the overall 풮풜
distribution in 풟ℬ. An EC 풢 with 풮풜 distribution 풬= (푞1, . . . , 푞푚) is said to
satisfy basic 훽-likeness, if and only if max{D(푝푖, 푞푖)∣푝푖 ∈ 풫 , 푝푖 < 푞푖} ≤ 훽,
where 훽 > 0 is a threshold.
For a table 풟ℬ′ anonymized from table 풟ℬ to obey 훽-likeness, all equiv-
alence classes 풢 ⊂ 풟ℬ′ have to conform to 훽-likeness. Contrary to previous
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models [21, 52, 54, 63], basic 훽-likeness clearly quantifies the relationship be-
tween the 훽 threshold and positive information gain. Thanks to the maximum-
distance threshold it imposes, it inherently safeguards against skewness attacks
and semantic attacks [52]. Lastly, as it clearly distinguishes between positive
and negative information gain (and accepts 풮풜 values absent from an EC), it
allows for more flexibility in anonymization, hence higher information quality
than models like 훿-disclosure [21].
Apart from specifying a maximum, instead of a cumulative, distance thresh-
old, we should also define the distance function D in an appropriate manner. As
we have argued, a measure of absolute difference does not serve our purposes,
since it fails to protect less frequent 풮풜 values. We opt for relative difference
instead, and define the distance function as D(푝푖, 푞푖) = 푞푖−푝푖푝푖 . This function
obeys the monotonicity property.
Lemma 4.1 (Monotonicity Property). Assume that an 풮풜 value 푣푖 ∈ 풱 has
frequency 푝푖 in the overall table 풟ℬ, 푞1푖 (푞2푖 ) in EC 풢1 (풢2), generated from
tuples in 풟ℬ, and 푞3푖 in 풢1 ∪ 풢2. Then D(푝푖, 푞3푖 ) ≤ max{D(푝푖, 푞1푖 ),D(푝푖, 푞2푖 )}.
Proof. Assume there are 푛1 (푛2) tuples with 푣푖 in 풢1 (풢2). Then 푞1푖 = 푛1∣풢1∣ ,
푞2푖 =
푛2






∣풢1∣+∣풢2∣ ≤ max{푞1푖 , 푞2푖 }. Thus, D(푝푖, 푞3푖 ) ≤
max{D(푝푖, 푞1푖 ),D(푝푖, 푞2푖 )}.
The monotonicity property ensures that a union of two ECs yields no larger
distance between 푝푖 and 푞푖 than its united parts. Hence, ECs violating 훽-likeness
can be transformed to follow 훽-likeness by merge operations. The relative dis-
tance function instantiates basic 훽-likeness by the constraint D(푝푖, 푞푖) = 푞푖−푝푖푝푖 ≤
훽, where 푝푖 and 푞푖 are the distributions of any 풮풜 value 푣푖 ∈ 풱 in the whole ta-
ble and an EC, respectively. This constraint amounts to an upper bound for the
frequency of 푣푖 in any EC, 푞푖, namely 푞푖 ≤ (1 + 훽) ⋅ 푝푖. Our relative distance
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function pays due attention to less frequent 풮풜 values. However, this function
provides a meaningful frequency bound only if (1 + 훽) ⋅ 푝푖 < 1; it then caters
for 풮풜 values whose frequency in 풟ℬ is 푝푖 < 11+훽 . In our effort to pay due
attention to such less frequent values, we have discriminated against 풮풜 values
of frequency larger than 1
1+훽
. Such values can assume frequency 1 in an EC.
Thus, an adversary identifying that a person’s record is within such an EC can
infer the 풮풜 value of that person with 100% confidence. The disclosure of such
frequent 풮풜 values may pose a privacy threat. To address this limitation, we
provide an enhanced definition of 훽-likeness.
Definition 4.3 (enhanced 훽-likeness). For table풟ℬ with sensitive attribute 풮풜,
let 풱 = {푣1, . . . , 푣푚} be the 풮풜 domain, and 풫 = (푝1, . . . , 푝푚) the overall
풮풜 distribution in 풟ℬ. An EC 풢 with 풮풜 distribution 풬 = (푞1, . . . , 푞푚) is
said to satisfy enhanced 훽-likeness, if and only if ∀푞푖, D(푝푖, 푞푖) = 푞푖−푝푖푝푖 ≤
min{훽,− ln(푝푖)}, where 훽 > 0 is a threshold and ln(푝푖) is the natural loga-
rithm of 푝푖.
The inequality constraint in the above definition implies 푞푖 ≤ 푝푖 ⋅ (1 +
min{훽,− ln(푝푖)}). We can then define the upper bound that enhanced 훽-likeness
imposes on the frequency of 푣푖 in an EC by function 푓(푝푖) = 푝푖⋅(1+min{훽,− ln(푝푖)}),
which can be decomposed as follows.
푓(푝푖) =
⎧⎨⎩ 푝푖 (1 + 훽) , 0 < 푝푖 ≤ 푒
−훽
푝푖 (1− ln(푝푖)) , 푒−훽 ≤ 푝푖 ≤ 1
(4.1)
The first segment of 푓(푝푖) is a linear, monotonically increasing function of
푝푖. The second segment is a concave, also monotonically increasing function of
푝푖, with derivative− ln(푝푖). The two segments meet at 푝푖 = 푒−훽 . In effect, 푓(푝푖)
is a continuous, monotonically increasing function of 푝푖 in (0, 1] with 푓(0) = 0
and 푓(1) = 1. Intuitively, the second segment bends the function’s slope so
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as not to exceed the maximum value of 1. The monotonicity of 푓(푝푖) implies
that an EC 풢 following the enhanced 훽-likeness constraint obeys the following
properties:
1. The maximum frequency of an 풮풜 value 푣푖 in 풢 is less than 1, i.e., 푓(푝푖) <
1 for any 푝푖 < 1.
2. For two 풮풜 values 푣푖 and 푣ℓ, such that 푝푖 < 푝ℓ, the maximum allowed
frequency of 푣푖 in 풢 is less than that of 푣ℓ, i.e., 푓(푝푖) < 푓(푝ℓ).
3. For an 풮풜 value 푣푖 that is ‘infrequent’ in table 풟ℬ, with 푝푖 ≤ 푒−훽 , its
frequency in 풢 is at most 훽 times larger than 푝푖, i.e., 푞푖 ≤ 푓(푝푖) = (1 +
훽) ⋅ 푝푖.
4. For an 풮풜 value 푣푖 that is ‘frequent’ in table 풟ℬ, with 푝푖 > 푒−훽 , its
frequency in 풢 is at most − ln(푝푖) times larger than 푝푖, i.e., 푞푖 ≤ 푓(푝푖) =
(1− ln(푝푖)) ⋅ 푝푖 < (1 + 훽) ⋅ 푝푖.
These properties guarantee that privacy is protected for all 풮풜 values. Less
frequent values receive due attention, with a concrete privacy guarantee, while
more frequent values are disallowed from assuming frequency values of 1. The
function of the 훽 parameter is twofold: It defines the privacy constraint for
less frequent values, as well as the frequency threshold 푒−훽 above which 풮풜
values are considered frequent enough for their privacy constraint to assume a
default form independent of 훽. We emphasize that our framework for enhanced
훽-likeness is valid for any monotonic upper-bound function, and independent
of the particular choice we make. Our choice of the natural logarithm of 푝푖 is
justified as a convenient choice that confers the desirable properties to the 푓(푝푖)
function.
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Since enhanced 훽-likeness provides even more robust privacy than basic 훽-
likeness, in the following we focus on it. Unless specified otherwise, 훽-likeness
henceforward always refers to enhanced 훽-likeness.
4.2.2 Extensions of 훽-likeness
Definition 4.3 limits the information gain on a single 풮풜 value. Still, it usually
makes sense to treat groups of related 풮풜 values in unison. For a categorical 풮풜,
an attacker may also be interested in the association between an individual and a
group of semantically related 풮풜 values. Assuming a domain hierarchy having
all values in 풱 as leaf nodes, the set of leaves under a common ancestor are
semantically related. Figure 4.1 shows an example hierarchy for 풮풜 disease.
Values SARS, pneumonia, and bronchitis are semantically related, as
they are all respiratory diseases. Likewise, in case of a numerical 풮풜, it may be








Pneumonia BronchitisSARS Gastric flu Gastric ulcer
Intestinal 
cancer
Figure 4.1: Domain hierarchy for diseases
Let 풱 ′ ⊆ 풱 be a set of semantically related 풮풜 values in an EC 풢. The prior
probability of associating an individual with 풱 ′ is 휌1 =∑푣푖∈풱 ′ 푝푖; the respective
posterior probability is 휌2 =
∑
푣푖∈풱 ′ 푞푖. To effectively evaluate the information
gain on 풱 ′, we need to measure the distance between 휌1 and 휌2, as follows.
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Definition 4.4 (Semantic 훽-likeness). Let 풢 be an EC generated from tuples in
table 풟ℬ with a categorical 풮풜, ℋ be the domain hierarchy of 풮풜. 풢 obeys
semantic 훽-likeness iff, for any internal node 퐼 below a certain level ℓ in ℋ,
D(휌1, 휌2) ≤ min{훽,− ln(휌1)}, with 휌1 = ∑푣푖∈leaves(퐼) 푝푖, 휌2 = ∑푣푖∈leaves(퐼) 푞푖,
where leaves(퐼) is the set of leaves under 퐼 .
We develop an analogous definition for numerical 풮풜 as follows.
Definition 4.5 (Range-based 훽-likeness). Let 풢 be an EC generated from tuples
in table 풟ℬ with a numerical 풮풜. We say that 풢 conforms to range-based 훽-





{푣푖} ≤ 휀, D(휌1, 휌2) ≤ min{훽,− ln(휌1)}, where 휌1 = ∑푣푖∈풱 ′ 푝푖 and 휌2 =∑
푣푖∈풱 ′ 푞푖.
In definition 4.5, the range 풱 ′ is specified by the absolute difference between
the maximum and minimum value therein. Instead, we can also define the subset
by relative difference as follows.
max푣푖∈풱 ′{푣푖} −min푣푖∈풱 ′{푣푖}
min푣푖∈풱 ′{푣푖}
≤ 휀
Lemma 4.1 proves the monotonicity of distance function D(푝푖, 푞푖). Simi-
larly, D(휌1, 휌2) also has this property.
Lemma 4.2. Let (푞11, 푞12, . . . , 푞1푚) and (푞21, 푞22, . . . , 푞2푚) be the 푆퐴 distributions of
two ECs 풢1 and 풢2, respectively, and (푞31, 푞32, . . . , 푞3푚) be the 푆퐴 distribution in
풢1 ∪ 풢2. Assume that 풱 ′ ⊂ 풱 is any subset of related 풮풜 values. Then, we have
D(휌1, 휌
3
2) ≤ max{D(휌1, 휌12),D(휌1, 휌22)}, where 휌1 =
∑







푛 = 1, 2, 3.
The proof is analogous to that of lemma 4.1. The extensions of 훽-likeness
further enhance the privacy it affords. However, a data set satisfying the regular
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definition of enhanced 훽-likeness (Definition 4.3) does not automatically fulfill
its semantic and range-based extensions (Definitions 4.4 and 4.5). The following
Lemma provides a formal proof.
Lemma 4.3. Given an EC 풢 satisfying enhanced 훽-likeness, 풢 does not auto-
matically follow extended 훽-likeness.
Proof. We offer a counter example. Given 훽 and two related 풮풜 values, under
an extension of 훽-likeness, 푣1 and 푣2, assume that their frequencies in 풟ℬ and
풢 are 0 < 푝1 = 푝2 = 푝 ≤ 1, 푞1 = 푞2 = 푞, respectively, and that 훽 > − ln(푝).
Since 풢 follows enhanced 훽-likeness, it holds that D(푝1, 푞1) = D(푝2, 푞2) ≤
− ln(푝). Thus, 푞 ≤ 푝 − 푝 ln(푝). Assume that 푞 = 푝 − 푝 ln(푝). In order for 풢
to satisfy extended (i.e., semantic or range-based) 훽-likeness, it should hold that
푞1 + 푞2 ≤ (푝1 + 푝2) − (푝1 + 푝2) ln(푝1 + 푝2), or 푞 ≤ 푝 − 푝 ln(2푝)2 . Substituting
푞, it should hold that 푝 − 푝 ln(푝) ≤ 푝 − 푝 ln(2푝)
2
⇔ 2 ln(푝) ≥ ln(2푝) ⇔ 푝 ≥ 2.
However, 푝 < 1, hence the last inequality cannot hold. Thus, neither semantic
nor range-based 훽-likeness follows from regular enhanced 훽-likeness.
4.3 The algorithm
In this section we design our algorithm customized for 훽-likeness. The funda-
mental intuition is based on the following observation. Assume 풟ℬ is parti-
tioned into a set of buckets by a ‘group-by’ on 풮풜. If we form an EC by taking
from each bucket a number of tuples proportional to the bucket’s size, then the
풮풜 distribution in the formed EC will be the same as the global 풮풜 distribution
in 풟ℬ, preventing adversaries from gaining extra information on 풮풜 values.
However, we actually wish to allow for some variation in 풮풜 distributions,
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observing the 훽-likeness constraint. Thus, we can follow a more relaxed ap-
proach, in which again all tuples of the same 풮풜 value still appear in a single
bucket, but now more than one 풮풜 values may co-exist in one bucket. Again
we form ECs choosing tuples proportionally to the sizes of the buckets they hail
from, without discriminating between different 풮풜 values therein. This way, the
풮풜 distribution in the created EC is not guaranteed to be the same as that in풟ℬ.
Some privacy is sacrificed for the sake of flexibility and information quality. We
do aim at such information quality, to the extent allowed by the 훽-likeness con-
straint. The following two definitions along with the example clarify the above
intuition. Our analysis borrows some formulations from SABRE (see Chapter
3), our work where we develop an algorithm for the 푡-closeness model.
Definition 4.6 (bucket partition (Chapter 3)). Let 풟ℬ be a table with sensitive
attribute 풮풜, we say that a set of buckets 휑 forms an exact bucket partition of
풟ℬ if and only if ∪
∀ℬ∈휑
ℬ = 풟ℬ and each 풮풜 value, and each tuple, appears in
exactly one bucket.
Definition 4.7 (proportionality requirement (Chapter 3)). Let 휑 be a bucket par-
tition of table 풟ℬ. Assume that an EC, 풢, is formed with 푥푗 tuples from bucket
ℬ푗 ∈ 휑, 푗 = 1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣. 풢 abides to the proportionality requirement with
respect to 휑, if and only if the values 푥푗 are proportional to the sizes of buckets
∣ℬ푗∣, i.e., 푥1 : 푥2 : . . . : 푥∣휑∣ = ∣ℬ1∣ : ∣ℬ2∣ : . . . : ∣ℬ∣휑∣∣.
Name Weight Age Disease
Mike 70 40 SARS
John 60 60 pneumonia
Bob 50 50 bronchitis
Alice 70 50 intestinal cancer
Beth 80 50 hepatitis
Carol 60 70 gastric ulcer
Table 4.2: Patient records
Age

















Figure 4.2: Better information quality
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Example 4.1. Consider Table 4.2, where {weight, age} is the QI, and
disease is the 풮풜. Figure 4.2 shows the QI-space and the distribution of
tuples, with each QI attribute corresponding to a dimension. A bucket partition
휑 of this table could consist of six buckets of one tuple each, 푏1, 푏2, . . . , 푏6, with
풮풜 values SARS, pneumonia, bronchitis, hepatitis, gastric ulcer, and intestinal
cancer, respectively. Taking one tuple from each of these buckets, we could build
a single EC satisfying 0-likeness. Still, such an EC covers the entire QI-space,
incurring high information loss. An alternative bucket partition could consist
of three buckets of two tuples each, 휑 = {ℬ1,ℬ2,ℬ3}, with SARS and pneu-
monia in bucket ℬ1, bronchitis and hepatitis in ℬ2, and the rest in ℬ3. We can
then build two ECs, by taking one tuple from each of these buckets, as shown in
Figure 4.2. Tuples in the same EC are labeled by the same number in the fig-
ure. This EC partitioning achieves better information quality, as the minimum
bounding boxes of ECs in QI-space are smaller.
A relaxed bucket partition, as in the above example, enables higher informa-
tion quality, but no longer abides by 0-likeness. Still, it suffices to create ECs in
such a way that they obey 훽-likeness for a given 훽. For instance, the anonymi-
zation produced in Example 4.1 satisfies 훽-likeness (for 훽 ≥ 1) with respect to
the distribution of disease in Table 4.2.
Following the above observations, we propose our 훽-likeness scheme, whose
main body is composed of two phases—first, the bucketization phase partitions
tuples into a set of buckets, so that ECs formed under the proportionality re-
quirement obey 훽-likeness; then, the redistribution phase relaxes the propor-
tionality requirement to further improve information quality, and dynamically
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determines the size of each possible EC. After the EC sizes are calculated, tu-
ples are retrieved from buckets in a way that aims to preserve information qual-
ity, and concrete ECs are generated over them.
4.3.1 Bucketization phase
Let 풱 = {푣1, 푣2, . . . , 푣푚} be the domain of 풮풜, and 풫 = (푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝푚) be the
overall distribution of 풮풜 values in a table풟ℬ. We partition 풱 into subsets, and
use them to divide풟ℬ into a bucket partition 휑; that is, all tuples in풟ℬ with 풮풜
values in the same subset of 풱 are pushed to a single bucket of 휑. Suppose that
EC 풢 is formed by taking 푥푗 tuples from bucket ℬ푗∈휑, 푗=1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣. Let 푉푗
be the subset of 풮풜 values contained in bucket ℬ푗 . In a worst-case scenario, all
푥푗 tuples may have the least frequent 풮풜 value in 푉푗 , 푣ℓ푗 , with 푝ℓ푗 = min
푣푖∈푉푗
{푝푖},
hence the frequency of 푣ℓ푗 in 풢 will be 푞ℓ푗 = 푥푗∣풢∣ . For 훽-likeness to hold, it should
hold in this worst-case scenario, i.e., 푥푗∣풢∣ ≤ 푓(푝ℓ푗) = (1 + min{훽,− ln(푝ℓ푗)}) ⋅
푝ℓ푗 . We then arrive at the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 (Eligibility Condition). Let 휑 be a bucket partition of table 풟ℬ
with sensitive attribute 풮풜, 풢 an EC formed with 푥푗 tuples from bucket ℬ푗 ∈휑,
푉푗 the set of 풮풜 values in bucket ℬ푗∈휑, and 푝ℓ푗 = min
푣푖∈푉푗
{푝푖}, 푗=1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣. If
∀푗∈{1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣}, 푥푗∣풢∣ ≤ 푓(푝ℓ푗), then 풢 follows 훽-likeness.
Proof. For any 풮풜 value 푣푘 ∈ 풱 , let ℬ푗 ∈ 휑 be the single bucket that contains
tuples in 풟ℬ with 푣푘 as their 풮풜 value, hence 푣푘 ∈푉푗 . Since 풢 draws 푥푗 tuples
from ℬ푗 , the frequency of 푣푘 in 풢 is 푞푘≤ 푥푗∣퐺∣≤푓(푝ℓ푗)≤푓(푝푘). Expanding to all
푣푘∈풱 , we conclude that 풢 follows 훽-likeness.
Theorem 4.1 defines the eligibility condition for an EC to follow 훽-likeness.
However, it does not provide a way to specify a particular number of tuples
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푥푗 to choose from a given bucket ℬ푗 . In other words, although it effectively
allows to verify 훽-likeness, it offers no guidance for constructing a 훽-likeness-
complying anonymization. To overcome this lack of guidance, we start out by
assuming that ECs are formed following the proportionality requirement. Under




푣푖∈푉푗 푝푖, and the next lemma can be
easily deduced from Theorem 4.1.
Lemma 4.4. Let 풢 be an EC that follows the proportionality requirement with
respect to a bucket partition 휑 of table 풟ℬ with sensitive attribute 풮풜, 푉푗 the
set of 풮풜 values in bucket ℬ푗 ∈ 휑, and 푝ℓ푗 = min
푣푖∈푉푗
{푝푖}, 푗 = 1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣. If
∀푗 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣}, ∑푣푖∈푉푗 푝푖 ≤ 푓(푝ℓ푗), then 풢 follows 훽-likeness.
In effect, Lemma 4.4 determines the condition that the frequencies of a sub-
set of 풮풜 values, 푉푗 ⊂ 풱 , should obey, so that, if the values in 푉푗 are put in the
same bucket퐵푗 of a bucket partition 휑, then ECs obeying the proportionality re-
quirement over 휑will satisfy 훽-likeness. This condition is trivially satisfied by a
bucket partition with a single 풮풜 value per bucket. However, such a bucket par-
tition would force every EC to follow a strict proportionality requirement over
a large number of buckets, leading to anonymizations of poor information qual-
ity. We should better strive to achieve a loose bucket partition that satisfies the
condition of Lemma 4.4 in a non-trivial manner, having more than one distinct
풮풜 values per bucket and as few buckets as possible (as in Example 4.1).
We develop a bucketization scheme for this task. We start out by rep-
resenting, 풫 , the set of 풮풜 frequencies in 풟ℬ, in ascending order so that,
푝푖 ≤ 푝푖+1, 푖 = 1, . . . ,푚− 1. By Lemma 4.4, a set of consecutive 풮풜 val-
ues in 풱 , 푣푏, 푣푏+1, . . . , 푣푒, are allowed to be in the same bucket provided that∑푒
푖=푏 푝푖 < 푓(푝ℓ), where 푝ℓ=min{푝푏, 푝푏+1, . . . , 푝푒}.
Our bucketization scheme, presented in Function DPpartition, partitions 풱
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by dynamic programming, aiming to minimize the number of buckets. Let 푁 [푒]
denote the minimum number of buckets to which we can partition the prefix of
푒 elements in 풱 , i.e., 푣1, 푣2, . . . , 푣푒. The value of 푁 [푒] is calculated recursively
as:
푁 [푒] = min
{푏∣Combinable(푏,푒)=푡푟푢푒}
{푁 [푏− 1]}+ 1 (4.2)
Function Combinable(푏, 푒) checks whether 풮풜 values 푣푏, . . . , 푣푒, 푏 < 푒 are al-
lowed to be in the same bucket, i.e., whether the inequality
∑푒
푖=푏 푝푖 < 푓(푝ℓ),
holds, with 푝ℓ=min{푝푏, 푝푏+1, . . . , 푝푒}. The base case is 푁(0) = 0.
Function DPpartition(풟ℬ, 풮풜)
Let 풱 = {푣1, 푣2, . . . , 푣푚} be the domain of 풮풜, with overall distribution1
풫 = (푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝푚) in 풟ℬ;
Assume that 푝푛 ≤ 푝푛+1, where 푛 = 1, 2, . . . ,푚− 1;2
푁 [0] = 0;3
푆[0] = 0;4
for e=1 to 푚 do5
푁 [푒] = 푁 [푒− 1] + 1;6
푆[푒] = 푒;7
푏 = 푒− 1;8
while 푏 > 0 and Combinable(푏, 푒) = 푡푟푢푒 do9
if 푁 [푏− 1] + 1 < 푁 [푒] then10
푁 [푒] = 푁 [푏− 1] + 1;11
푆[푒] = 푏;12
푏 = 푏− 1;13
Initialize 휑 to be empty;14
푒 = 푚;15
while 푒 > 0 do16
푏 = 푆[푒];17
Create a new bucket ℬ, containing tuples with 풮풜 values in {푣푏, 푣푏+1, . . . , 푣푒};18
휑 = 휑 ∪ {ℬ};19
푒 = 푆[푒]− 1;20
Return 휑;21
Function DPpartition consists of two parts. The first part (steps 3-13) runs
the DP recursion of Equation 4.2 (recording the value of 푏 that minimizes the
number of segments for the first 푒 elements - step 12) to evaluate the final min-
imum value 푁 [푚] and split 풱 into segments accordingly; thereby it needs to
assess the combinability of 푚2 possible buckets of consecutive values in 풱 . To
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assess combinability, we maintain the running
∑
푝푖 within a bucket, updated in
푂(1) at each step, while the min{푝푖} within a bucket is simply its first element.
The complexity of this part is 푂(푚2). The second part (steps 14-20) uses the
results of the first part to build the derived bucket partition. Tuples with the
풮풜 values in a segment are pushed into a corresponding bucket (step 18), in
푂(∣풟ℬ∣). The overall time complexity of the algorithm is 푂(푚2 + ∣풟ℬ∣).
4.3.2 Redistribution phase
The bucketization phase of our scheme delivers a bucket partition 휑 of 풟ℬ. We
have so far assumed, as a starting point, that ECs are formed from 휑 strictly
following the proportionality requirement, so as to satisfy 훽-likeness. However,
a strict adherence to the proportionality requirement may result in large ECs,
incurring high information loss. For example, if the size of some bucket ℬ푗 ∈ 휑
is a prime number (other than 2), then, in order to strictly follow the propor-
tionality requirement, we should form an EC out of the whole table. We should
rather relax the proportionality requirement: it should suffice that the number
of tuples 푥푗 chosen from bucket ℬ푗 in EC 풢 be approximately proportional to
the size of ℬ푗 , i.e., 푥푗∣풢∣ ≈ ∣ℬ푗 ∣∣풟ℬ∣ =
∑
푣푖∈푉푗 푝푖. The rationale for this relaxation is
as follows. The bucket partition 휑 returned by DPpartition obeys the inequal-
ity
∑
푣푖∈푉푗 푝푖 ≤ 푓(푝ℓ푗) (Lemma 4.4), where 푉푗 is the set of 풮풜 values in bucket
ℬ푗 ∈ 휑 and 푣ℓ푗 is the least frequent value in 푉푗 . It follows that, if 푥푗∣풢∣ ≈
∑
푣푖∈푉푗 푝푖
(i.e., if we draw tuples into ECs approximately proportionally to the size of the
bucket in 휑 they hail from), then the eligibility condition 푥푗∣풢∣ ≤ 푓(푝ℓ푗) (Theorem
4.1), and hence 훽-likeness, will be easy to achieve.
To ensure 훽-likeness, we determine the EC sizes to use in the anonymization
by constructing a binary tree, the ECTree, in a top-down fashion. We start with a
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bucket partition 휑 = {ℬ1, . . . ,ℬ∣휑∣}. The root of the tree 푟 represents a potential
EC that contains all tuples in 풟ℬ, i.e., ∣ℬ푗∣ tuples from bucket ℬ푗 . We denote
the contents of the root as 푟 =
[
∣ℬ1∣, . . . , ∣ℬ∣휑∣∣
]
. This can be a valid EC, but we
prefer to have smaller ones. Then, we proceed to split 푟 into two children (each
representing an EC) by dichotomizing each ℬ푗 into ℬ1푗 and ℬ2푗 . The left child
푐퐿 contains ℬ1푗 and the right child 푐푅 contains ℬ2푗 , 푗 = 1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣. We ensure




and ∣ℬ2푗 ∣ = ∣ℬ푗∣ − ∣ℬ1푗 ∣. The split is allowed only if both 푐퐿 and 푐푅 satisfy
the eligibility condition (Theorem 4.1), i.e., they can form ECs satisfying 훽-
likeness. Assume the left child of 푟 is 푐퐿 =
[
∣ℬ11∣, . . . , ∣ℬ1∣휑∣∣
]
. Then, for the





푝ℓ푗 is the frequency of the least frequent (in 풟ℬ) 풮풜 value included in ℬ푗 . An
analogous condition applies for the right child 푐푅. If splitting 푟 into 푐퐿 and 푐푅
is allowed, we proceed to check whether we can split 푐퐿 and 푐푅 themselves.
The splitting terminates when no node can be split any further. Then we get a
final ECTree, in which each leaf node configures the number of tuples an EC
should get from each bucket. A function biSplit(휑) returns the list of leaf nodes.
Example 4.2 illustrates this process.
[5, 6, 8]
[1, 1, 2]
[3, 3, 4][2, 3, 4]
[1, 2, 2]
Figure 4.3: An example of dynamically determining EC sizes
Example 4.2. Let disease be a categorical 풮풜 with the domain hierarchy of
figure 4.1. Consider a table, containing 2 tuples with SARS, 3 with pneumonia,
3 with bronchitis, 3 with hepatitis, 4 with gastric ulcer, and 4
with intestinal cancer. Assume that 훽 = 2. Therefore, the overall 풮풜
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distribution is 풫 = (푝1, 푝2, 푝3, 푝4, 푝5, 푝6) = ( 219 , 319 , 319 , 319 , 419 , 419). 푓(푝1) ≈
0.31, 푓(푝2) = 푓(푝3) = 푓(푝4) ≈ 0.45, and 푓(푝5) = 푓(푝6) ≈ 0.54. By the
bucketization phase (see algorithm DPpartition) we have a bucket partition of
the table, 휑 = {퐵1, 퐵2, 퐵3}, where 퐵1 accommodates tuples with SARS and
pneumonia, 퐵2 has bronchitis and hepatitis, and 퐵3 contains the
remaining two. The root node 푟 = [5, 6, 8] in Figure 4.3 represents an EC with
5 tuples from 퐵1, 6 from 퐵2, and 8 from 퐵3 (i.e., all tuples in the table). We
split 푟 into 푐1 = [2, 3, 4] and 푐2 = [3, 3, 4]. Then EC 푐1 has a size 9, and
contains 2 tuples from 퐵1 with 29 < 푚푖푛{푓(푝1), 푓(푝2)}, 3 tuples from 퐵2 with
3
9
< min{푓(푝3), 푓(푝4)}, and 4 tuples from 퐵3 with 49 < min{푓(푝5), 푓(푝6)}.
Thus, 푐1 obeys the eligibility condition (Theorem 4.1). Similarly, we can ver-
ify that 푐2 also satisfies the condition. Therefore, splitting 푟 into 푐1 and 푐2 is
allowed. Recursively, we can split 푐1 into [1, 1, 2] and [1, 2, 2]. When we try
to split 푐2 into 푔1 = [1, 1, 2] and 푔2 = [2, 2, 2], we find 푔2 does not satisfy the
eligibility condition (Theorem 4.1), because 2
6
> min{푓(푝1), 푓(푝2)}, hence this
splitting is not allowed. Figure 4.3 is the final tree, with each leaf node showing
the number of tuples a possible EC should draw from each bucket. In this case,
no EC draws 0 tuples from a bucket, but that can be allowed in the general case,
conferring flexibility to the algorithm.
4.3.3 BUREL
We now put the above two phases together to devise BUREL, our algorithm that
first BUcketizes tuples into buckets and then REdistributes them from buckets to
ECs to attain 훽-Likeness. BUREL and SABRE (Chapter 3) have two phases of
common names. However, their internal workings, and the theoretical analysis
that accompanies them, are different and particular to each scheme and model.
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In its own bucketization phase, SABRE organizes 풮풜 values in a tree and hashes
them into buckets by the tree hierarchy so that similar 풮풜 values stay in the same
bucket. On the other hand, BUREL sorts the 풮풜 values by ascending order of
frequencies and employs dynamic programming to partition them in segments
of 풮풜 values with similar frequencies. In the redistribution phase, both SABRE
and BUREL use a binary tree to split ECs. However, each algorithm caters to the
requirements of the model it is designed for, extracted from the corresponding
theoretical analysis, when checking the eligibility of a split.
Algorithm: BUREL ( 풟ℬ, 풮풜, 훽 )




foreach array 푎 in 푆푎 do4
Create an empty EC, say 풢;5
foreach 푎푗 , 푗푡ℎ element of 푎 do6
푒푐푗 = Retrieve(ℬ푗 , 푎푗);7
add 푒푐푗 to 풢;8
Output 풢;9
The bucketization phase of BUREL returns 휑, a bucket partition of 풟ℬ (step
2). Then, its redistribution phase (function biSplit) determines the size of each
possible EC as a leaf in the ECTree and returns a list of arrays 푆푎 (step 3).
Each array contains the size values in a leaf of the ECTree. Then, specific ECs
following the prescribed sizes are materialized and output (steps 4-9). Given an
array 푎 ∈ 푆푎, BUREL retrieves 푎푗 tuples from bucket ℬ푗 ∈ 휑, where 푎푗 is the
푗th element of 푎 and 푗 = 1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣, and forms an EC 풢 out of the retrieved
tuples (steps 6-8).
When retrieving tuples from a bucket, BUREL does not consider their 푆퐴
values. The 훽-likeness between the constructed EC 풢 and the whole table 풟ℬ
is guaranteed by Theorem 4.1. Instead, it determines which tuples to select
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by information loss considerations, as prescribed by the General Loss Metric
(GLM) (Section 2.3). GLM requires the Minimum Bounding Boxes of ECs to
be as small as possible. Thus, function Retrieve(ℬ푖, 푎푖) (step 7) greedily picks
tuples of as similar as possible QI values. Our greedy strategy utilizes the notion
of nearest neighbors. We define a multidimensional space with each of the QI
attributes as a dimension. The mapping to such a QI-space for a numerical QI
attribute 푁퐴 is straightforward [41]. The axis of a categorical QI attribute 퐶퐴 is
formed by the order provided by a pre-order traversal of the leaves in its domain
hierarchyℋ퐶퐴. Each tuple is represented as a point in this QI-space.
In order to form an EC 풢, BUREL first randomly picks a tuple 푥 from a
bucket of 휑 in 풢. Then, the function Retrieve finds the 푎푗 nearest neighbors (by
Euclidean distance) of 푥 in each bucket ℬ푗 , 푗 = 1, 2, . . . , ∣휑∣, and adds them
into 풢, until the size specifications are satisfied. Still, this process can be com-
putationally demanding even with a sophisticated index structure [34]. Thus,
we suggest a more efficient heuristic method using the Hilbert space-filling
curve [59], a continuous fractal that can map regions of QI-space, hence tuples,
to 1D Hilbert values, as in [41]. Tuples that are close in the QI-space are also
likely to have nearby Hilbert values. Thus BUREL sorts all tuples in a bucket
ℬ푗 by the ascending order of their Hilbert values. Thereafter it uses this order to
select the 푎푗 nearest neighbors of a tuple 푥within each bucket. In our implemen-
tation, we find the nearest Hilbert-neighbor 푥¯ of 푥 within a bucket ℬ푗 by binary
search, and then expand to the next closest 푎푗 neighbors to 푥. The average time









∣휑∣ is the number of buckets, ∣풟ℬ∣∣휑∣ the average size of a bucket, and ∣풟ℬ∣∣푆풢 ∣∣휑∣ the
average number of tuples taken out from a bucket to form an EC.
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4.3.4 BUREL for extended 훽-likeness
We now extend BUREL to semantic and range-based 훽-likeness. Instead of ac-
cepting each generated EC as it is, we buffer it in an EC list 퐿풢 . After the
generation of all possible ECs, we check each EC in 퐿풢 . Given an EC 풢1, its
distance from another EC 풢2 is calculated as ℐℒ(풢1 ∪풢2)−ℐℒ(풢1), i.e., as the
increased information loss of 풢1 after being merged with 풢2. If an EC does not
satisfy extended 훽-likeness, we greedily merge it with its nearest neighbors, one
by one, until extended 훽-likeness is satisfied. Such a result is always possible,
since extended 훽-likeness obeys the monotonicity property (Lemma 4.2). To
find the nearest neighbors of an EC, we scan the whole list 퐿풢 . Therefore, the
time complexity of the whole process is 푂(∣퐿풢∣2). We emphasize that BUREL
for range-based 훽-likeness provides a robust solution to the problem of anony-
mization under a numerical 풮풜, studied in [51, 86].
4.4 Experiments
In this section we evaluate the performance of BUREL. Our prototype was im-
plemented in Java and the experiments were run on a Core2 Duo 2.33GHz CPU
machine with 4GB RAM running Windows XP. In our experimental study, we
have used the CENSUS dataset2 [3], which contains 500, 000 tuples on 6 at-
tributes as shown in Table 4.3. For categorical attributes, the value following the
type is the height of the corresponding attribute hierarchy; for instance, attribute
marital status is categorical and has a hierarchy of height 2. The first 5 attributes
are potential QI-attributes, and the last one (i.e., salary class) is the sensitive at-
tribute. By default, we take the first three attributes as QI. The least frequent
2This dataset is the same as that in the experiments of SABRE (Chapter 3). We select 6 out of
the 8 attributes to avoid the curse of high dimensionality [8], thus better preserving information.
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value of 풮풜 salary class is 49, with frequency 0.2018%; the most frequent 풮풜
value is 12, with frequency 4.8402%. The value 훽 = 1 produces frequency
threshold 푒−훽 ≈ 37%, which marks all 풮풜 values as ‘infrequent’, and allows the
frequency of any 풮풜 value in any EC to be at most 4.8402%×2 = 9.7%. Thus, 1
is already a small threshold of 훽. In our experiments, we use 훽 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
We generate 5 microdata tables by randomly taking 100, 000 to 500, 000 tuples
from the dataset; the one with 500, 000 tuples is our default dataset.
Attribute Cardinality Type
Age 79 numerical
Gender 2 categorical (1)
Education Level 17 numerical
Marital Status 6 categorical (2)
Work Class 10 categorical (3)
Salary Class 50 sensitive attribute
Table 4.3: The CENSUS dataset
We treat the likeness threshold 훽 as a variable, set by default to 4. Then, for
any 풮풜 value 푣푖, if 푝푖 ≤ 푒−4 = 0.018, then its frequency 푞푖 in any EC should
not exceed 5푝푖; if 푝푖 > 1.8%, then 푞푖 ≤ (1− 푙푛(푝푖)) ⋅ 푝푖. The highest 풮풜 value
frequency in our data set does not exceed 5%, so the frequency of any salary
value in any EC will not exceed 20%.
As we have discussed, there are two predecessor distribution-based models
that 훽-likeness can be compared to: 푡-closeness and 훿-disclosure. The latter can
be configured to achieve a privacy guarantee comparable, though not equiva-
lent, to 훽-likeness. On the other hand, 푡-closeness cannot be configured in a
similar fashion. Thus, in order to compare our 훽-likeness scheme to existing
푡-closeness schemes, we configure all compared schemes to achieve either the
same privacy in terms of 푡-closeness, or the same information loss, on a given
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data, and compare the privacy guarantee they achieve in terms of 훽-likeness;
this approach creates an even playing field. Then, we evaluate BUREL on infor-
mation loss, runtime, and accuracy on aggregate queries; for this evaluation, we
compare it to both the 훿-disclosure scheme used in [21] (which is an adaptation
of Mondrian [49, 50]), as well as to a similar 훽-likeness scheme that we devise
by adapting Mondrian to the new model. Finally, we also evaluate BUREL on
range-based 훽-likeness.
4.4.1 Face-to-face with 푡-closeness
Our first task is to compare our new 훽-likeness privacy model to the predecessor
distribution-based model of 푡-closeness. We argue that 훽-likeness provides a
more informative and comprehensible privacy guarantee than 푡-closeness does.
Still, in order to create an even playing field on which to compare 훽-likeness to































(a) vary beta (b) vary 푡 (c) vary AIL
Figure 4.4: Comparison to 푡-closeness
In the first comparison, for a given dataset 풟ℬ and 훽, we let BUREL trans-
form 풟ℬ to 풟ℬ훽 , satisfying 훽-likeness. We then measure the closeness 푡훽 ,
by the 푡-closeness model, between 풟ℬ훽 and 풟ℬ, i.e., the maximum EMD of
the 풮풜 distribution in an EC of 풟ℬ훽 from its distribution in 풟ℬ. We then ap-
ply 푡-closeness schemes tMondrian [53] and SABRE on 풟ℬ as well, with 푡훽
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as the 푡-closeness threshold, to produce 풟ℬ푀푡훽 and 풟ℬ푆푡훽 , respectively. There-
fore, data sets 풟ℬ훽 , 풟ℬ푀푡훽 , and 풟ℬ푆푡훽 all achieve the same privacy under the
criterion of 푡-closeness, as expressed by the value of 푡훽 . Then we measure the
훽 value achieved by 풟ℬ푀푡훽 and 풟ℬ푆푡훽 with respect to 풟ℬ. Given that all three
schemes achieve the same privacy in terms of 푡-closeness, we are interested to
compare the privacy they ahieve in terms of 훽-likeness. Figure 4.4(a) shows the
results (in logarithmic y-axis), as a function of the 훽 parameter. Remarkably,
while all the three schemes are tuned to ensure the same 푡-closeness guarantee,
BUREL provides consistently higher privacy by the criterion of 훽-likeness than
SABRE and tMondrian. This result is expected, since 푡-closeness restricts only
the cumulative difference between 풮풜 distributions, indifferent to the relative
frequency difference of each individual 풮풜 value between an EC and the whole
table.
In the second comparison, for a given dataset 풟ℬ and a closeness constraint
푡, we let tMondrian (SABRE) transform 풟ℬ to 풟ℬ푀푡 (풟ℬ푆푡 ), abiding by 푡-
closeness. We then let BUREL find, by binary search, a value 훽푡, such that,
when 훽-likeness is enforced on 풟ℬ by BUREL for 훽푡, it produces an anony-
mization 풟ℬ훽푡 characterized by the same (or smaller) closeness parameter 푡 as
풟ℬ푀푡 (풟ℬ푆푡 ). Thus, again we get three anonymized versions of풟ℬ that achieve
the same degree of privacy under 푡-closeness. While in our first comparison we
arrived at this state starting out with a 훽 parameter, now we do so starting out
with a 푡 parameter. Therefore, our results are not biased against 푡-closeness
schemes. As before, we compare the 훽-likeness achieved by 풟ℬ푀푡 (풟ℬ푆푡 ) to
that achieved by 풟ℬ훽푡 , as a function of 푡. The results, shown in Figure 4.4(b),
reaffirm our previous findings.
In our last experiment, given an AIL value 푙, we let BUREL determine, by
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binary search on its 훽 threshold, a value 훽푙, such that the data set 풟ℬ훽푙 gener-
ated by BUREL from 풟ℬ with 훽푙 as the likeness threshold achieves AIL equal
to (or smaller than) 푙. Similarly, we determine, by binary search, a value 푡푀푙
(푡푆푙 ), which, taken as the closeness threshold in algorithm tMondrian (SABRE),




) with AIL near 푙 too, allowing for a small dif-
ference 휖. Thus, we obtain three data sets 풟ℬ훽푙 , 풟ℬ푡푀푙 , and 풟ℬ푡푆푙 , generated by
BUREL, tMondrian, and SABRE, respectively, which all have information loss
near 푙; to ensure the comparison is not biased in favor of BUREL, we ensure
its AIL value is not greater than those of the other algorithms. We then com-
pare the privacy they achieve in terms of 훽-likeness. Figure 4.4(c) shows the
results. Not surprisingly, BUREL provides the highest privacy again, followed
by SABRE and tMondrian.
The above experiments testify that, with other relevant factors being equal,
state-of-the-art 푡-closeness schemes fail by a wide margin (as indicated by the
logarithmic y-axes) to achieve privacy good in terms of 훽-likeness. Thus, they
reaffirm that 훽-likeness is a privacy model raising substantially different require-
ments from those of 푡-closeness and requiring a different approach.
4.4.2 Performance evaluation
In this section we evaluate the performance of BUREL as a 훽-likeness algo-
rithm in its own field. As there is no previous work on 훽-likeness, we em-
ploy two comparison benchmarks adopting some suggestions of related work.
First, we devise an algorithm for 훽-likeness, following the conventional wis-
dom on designing algorithms for new privacy models: We adapt Mondrian
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[49, 50], a 푘-anonymization algorithm, to the purposes of 훽-likeness, as pre-
vious works have done for other privacy models [21, 52, 54, 57]. Our adap-
tation, LMondrian, splits an EC only if both resultant ECs satisfy 훽-likeness.
Second, in a similar way we extend Mondrian to a 훿-disclosure [21] scheme,
DMondrian. To render DMondrian comparable to BUREL and LMondrian, we
set the value of 훿 so that the data anonymized by DMondrian obey 훽-likeness.
As we have discussed, while 훽-likeness demands that an 풮풜 value’s distribu-
tion in an EC be 푞푖 ≤ (1+min{훽,−ln 푝푖}) ⋅푝푖, for a given 훽, 훿-disclosure re-
quires that 푒−훿 ⋅푝푖 < 푞푖 < 푒훿 ⋅푝푖, where 푝푖 is the overall distribution of 푣푖 in
the whole dataset. Thus, an algorithm for 훿-disclosure achieves 훽-likeness for











. We first compare the three schemes






















(a) information loss (b) time
Figure 4.5: Effect of varying 훽
First, we study performance as a function of the 훽 threshold. Figure 4.5
shows the results. As 훽 grows, the constraint on the relative difference of
each 풮풜 (i.e., salary) value frequency between an EC and the overall table is
relaxed, hence information quality rises (Figure 4.5(a)). BUREL outperforms
both LMondrian and DMondrian in information quality, showing the benefit of
a scheme tailored for 훽-likeness. This result reconfirms the finding of [21] that
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a 푘-anonymization algorithm, adapted to 훿-disclosure, yields unacceptably high
information loss; as we discussed, we aim at a positive result and propose a bet-
ter alternative. In addition, given that 훿-disclosure overprotects data by impos-
ing a constraint on negative information gain, LMondrian performs better than
its stricter sibling, DMondrian. More remarkably, BUREL also outpaces both
Mondrian-based schemes in time efficiency (Figure 4.5(b)). Overall, BUREL
achieves almost half the information loss of its Mondrian-based competitors in
























(a) information loss (b) time
Figure 4.6: Effect of varying QI
Next, we investigate the effect of QI dimensionality (size), varying it from 1
to 5. As QI dimensionality increases, the data become more sparse in QI space,
as more high-dimensional degrees of freedom are offered; thus, the formed ECs
are more likely to have large minimum bounding boxes, and information quality
degrades, as Figure 4.6(a) shows. The information loss of BUREL is again lower
than that of the Mondrian-based methods. In addition, BUREL is again the
fastest of the three (Figure 4.6(b)).
Our next experiment studies the effect of database size, varying the size of
the microdata table from 100K to 500K tuples. Figure 4.7 presents our results.
Interestingly, data size has no clear effect on information quality. This is due to

























(a) information loss (b) time
Figure 4.7: Effect of varying dataset
imposing their own requirements. The mere increase of data density does not
help, as it would with simpler models like 푘-anonymity. Still, the elapsed time
increases as the table size grows; BUREL is again found to be superior in both
respects.
We now study the utility of the anonymized data on aggregation queries,
which are the basis of real data analysis tasks such as statistical analysis and
data mining applications. We consider the following type of queries, as in [82]:
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM Anonymized-data
WHERE pred(퐴1) AND . . . AND pred(퐴휆)
AND pred(풮풜)
Each 퐴푖 is a QI attribute. The query has predicates on 휆 randomly selected QI
attributes and the 풮풜. For each of these 휆+1 attributes 퐴, 푝푟푒푑(퐴) has the
form of 퐴 ∈ 푅퐴, where 푅퐴 is an arbitrary interval in the domain of 퐴. The
expected selectivity over the table is 0 < 휃 < 1. Assuming data are uniformly
distributed, 휃 can be achieved if each attribute 퐴 selects records within a range
of length ∣퐴∣⋅휃퐴 of its domain, such that (휃퐴)휆+1 =휃. In effect, the length of 푅퐴
should be ∣퐴∣⋅휃 1휆+1 , where ∣퐴∣ is the domain length of attribute 퐴. Given a query,
the precise result 푝푟푒푐 is computed from the original table, and an estimated
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result 푒푠푡 is obtained from the anonymized table. To calculate 푒푠푡, we assume
that tuples in each EC are uniformly distributed, and consider the intersection
between the query and the EC. We define ∣푒푠푡−푝푟푒푐∣
푝푟푒푐
× 100% as the relative error.
Our workload consists of 10K queries, and we measure the workload error as
the median relative error. Relative error is undefined when 푝푟푒푐 is 0. If 푝푟푒푐 in













































Figure 4.8: Median relative error
In our first experiment, we use the first 5 attributes in Table 4.3 as the QI,
with expected selectivity 휃= 0.1, and vary the dimensionality of the query, i.e.
the number of QI attributes 휆 on which predicates are defined. These attributes
contribute to the error. Thus, the increase of 휆 exercises a negative effect on
error. However, as 휆 grows, the length of the query range 푅퐴 in the domain
of each queried attribute also grows (for constant 휃); thereby, the minimum
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bounding box of an EC becomes more likely to be entirely contained in the
query region. In effect, the error does not depend monotonically on 휆 (Figure
4.8(a)); it does not matter much how many attributes a given selectivity 휃 is
shared among. In the next experiment, we fix 휆 to 3, 휃 to 0.1, and vary 훽. Figure
4.8(b) shows the results. As 훽 grows, the privacy requirement is relaxed, hence
information quality rises and the error drops. Next, we set 휃 to 0.1, and vary the
QI size. As the QI size increases, the data tend to be more sparse in QI-space,
hence it is more likely that ECs with bigger bounding boxes are created. Thus,
in Figure 4.8(c) the workload error increases with QI size. Finally, Figure 4.8(d)
presents the results as a function of selectivity 휃. As 휃 grows, the length of the
range 푅퐴 for each attribute in a predicate increases. This makes the minimum
bounding box of an EC more likely to be entirely contained in the query region,
so the estimate becomes more accurate and the error smaller. In all experiments,
BUREL achieves consistently better utility.
4.4.3 Extension to range-based 훽-likeness
Now we evaluate the extension of BUREL to range-based 훽-likeness. For the
comparison, we adapted LMondrian (similarly for DMondrian), so that the split
of ECs it performs is allowed only when both resultant ECs satisfy range-based
훽-likeness.
Figure 4.9 presents our results. As 풮풜 Salary is a numerical sensitive at-
tribute, we employ a parameter 휀 that bounds the range of values by Definition
4.5. A bigger 휀 indicates that there are more salary values in a range, hence the
privacy constraint becomes stronger and information quality degrades. Figure
4.9(a) shows the result with varying 휀, with 푄퐼 size 3 and 훽 = 4. To show

























(a) varying 휀 (b) varying 훽
Figure 4.9: Range-based 훽-likeness
add three horizontal lines in the figure, which represent the information loss
of the same schemes when only enhanced 훽-likeness is applied. Information
loss grows slightly with 휀; the additional requirement of range-based 훽-likeness
incurs only marginally more information loss. This result reconfirms the ro-
bustness of 훽-likeness: an EC that satisfies 훽-likeness is usually likely to also
fulfill its range-based variant. Figure 4.9(b) shows our results with 휀 set to 6 and
varying 훽. Information quality grows with 훽, with three comparison lines added
again. The results reconfirm that range-based 훽-likeness imposes a minimal
premium on information quality.
4.5 Summary
This chapter has revisited the microdata anonymization problem, and made two
contributions. First, we propose 훽-likeness, a robust privacy model that provides
a comprehensible privacy guarantee, expressed as a limit on the relative positive
information gain on each single sensitive attribute value. Second, we devise
BUREL, an algorithm customized for that model itself. Our experimental results
testify that the problem raised by the 훽-likeness concept cannot be treated by
algorithms developed for other privacy models, and verify the effectiveness and
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efficiency of BUREL in the task it aims to accomplish, as opposed to approaches





So far, we have focused on static data sets. In this and the next chapters we
will concentrate on the privacy preservation of data streams. Compared with
traditional data sets, data streams are continuous and unbounded. Due to the
constraints on performance and storage, algorithms designed for streaming data
are permitted to make only one pass over the data; backtracking is not allowed.
These unique requirements arising in the context of data streams make the task
of anonymizing data streams a more challenging issue. Therefore, our work to
protect the privacy of streaming data will start with simple privacy model, i.e.,
푘-anonymity, then go on with more sophisticated ones, such as ℓ-diversity and
푡-closeness.
In this chapter, we will first extend the 푘-anonymity model to the context
of data streams. Then we will present CASTLE (Continuously 푘-Anonymizes
STreaming data via adaptive cLustEring), a cluster-based scheme that anonymizes
data on-the-fly and, at the same time, ensures the freshness of output data by
satisfying specified delay constraints. We further show how CASTLE can be
extended to support ℓ-diversity in a straightforward way.
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5.1 Introduction
Data streams are common to many application environments, such as, telecom-
munication, market-basket analysis, network monitoring, and sensor networks.
Mining these continuous data streams [36, 56, 85] helps companies (the owner
of data streams) to learn the behavior of their customers, thus bringing unique
opportunities. Many companies do not have the in-house expertise of data min-
ing, so it is beneficial to outsource the mining to a professional third party [62].
However, data streams may contain much private information that must be care-
fully protected. Consider Amazon.com. In a single day, it records hundreds of
thousands of online sales transactions, which are received in the form of stream-
ing data. Suppose that the sales transaction stream has the schema 풮(푡푖푑, 푐푖푑,
푔표표푑푠), where 푡푖푑 is transaction identifier, 푐푖푑 is customer identifier, and 푔표표푑푠
is a list of items bought by the corresponding customer. Suppose that a relation
ℛ containing the information about Amazon customers is stored on disk, with
schema ℛ(푐푖푑, 푛푎푚푒, 푠푒푥, 푎푔푒, 푧푖푝푐표푑푒, 푎푑푑푟푒푠푠, 푡푒푙푒푝ℎ표푛푒). Let 풮ℛ be the
stream generated by joining 풮 with ℛ on 푐푖푑. Suppose moreover that, to ana-
lyze customers’ buying behavior (e.g., building a decision tree), the mining is
on 풮ℛ1, and Amazon.com outsources it to a professional third-party. To protect
the privacy of customers, attributes that explicitly identify customers (such as
푛푎푚푒, 푎푑푑푟푒푠푠 and 푡푒푙푒푝ℎ표푛푒) are projected out of 풮ℛ. However, the remain-
ing data in 풮ℛmay still be vulnerable to linking attacks, as illustrated in Figure
5.1, by joining QI attributes (e.g., 푠푒푥, 푧푖푝푐표푑푒, and 푎푔푒) with external public
databases (e.g., a voter registration table). Therefore, the streaming transactions
1In real stream systems, typically customer information does not appear in the stream to
reduce redundancy. Mining, which needs customer information, requires joining the data stream
with local customer databases. In what follows, we consider mining and anonymization on joint
streams.
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in 풮ℛ need to be carefully anonymized before they are passed to the third-party.
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Figure 5.1: Linking attack on transactional data streams
A well-known technique to anonymize data is 푘-anonymity [67]. However,
most of previous 푘-anonymization algorithms are designed specifically for static
data sets. They cannot be directly applied on streaming data for the following
reasons. First, these techniques typically assume that an individual only has one
record for publishing. Under this assumption, once an equivalence class (EC)
contains 푘 tuples, it will hide the released information of one person among
a crowd of 푘 − 1 other persons. However, this assumption is not realistic for
streaming data and incurs the following attack. Consider that the QI size is
big enough and the QI values of two distinct persons are different with a high
probability. Consider again the example of Amazon.com and assume that one
customer has purchased 푛 ≥ 푘 items. After joining these transactions with
customer relationℛ, 푛 tuples with the same QI value will appear in the resultant
stream. According to traditional 푘-anonymity schemes these 푛 tuples can form
an EC and be output immediately without any generalization on their QI values.
However, the precise QI value can be linked to a single person in the voting list
with a high probability. Thus, the customer is re-identified and his/her privacy
is violated.
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A second reason that traditional 푘-anonymity schemes cannot be applied to
streaming data is the one-pass requirement imposed on algorithms designed for
data streams. Due to the constraints of performance and storage, an algorithm
is allowed to make only one-pass over the streaming data (backtracking over
data is not allowed). However, traditional anonymization schemes scan a data
set multiple times, contrary to the one-pass requirement. Furthermore, data
streams have a temporal dimension. Streaming tuples arrive at a certain rate,
they are dynamically processed, and the result is output with a certain delay. In
some applications, the output data are immediately used to trigger appropriate
procedures. For example, in a sensor network application the output stream can
be used to real-time react to some anomalous situations, thus the time to react
is very crucial. Therefore, a data stream anonymization scheme should ensure
strong guarantees on the maximum delay between the input of data and their
output.
Apart from traditional 푘-anonymity schemes, other alternative techniques,
such as weak 푘-anonymity [16], privacy preservation for table republication
[23, 61, 73, 81], and data stream clustering [9, 42], cannot be directly applied
to anonymize streaming data either. As we will further explain in Section 5.2,
these techniques either guarantee weaker privacy than 푘-anonymity, or target
goals very different from that of anonymizing streaming tuples.
To cope with all the above-discussed requirements, in this chapter, we present
CASTLE (Continuously Anonymizing STreaming data via adaptive cLustEring),
a cluster-based scheme that 푘-anonymizes streams on the fly and, at the same
time, ensures the freshness (i.e., the maximum delay between the arrival of a tu-
ple and its release to the third party) of anonymized data by satisfying specified
delay constraints. Moreover, we propose an extension of CASTLE to support
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ℓ-diversity [57] on data streams. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
reported work that considers 푘-anonymity and ℓ-diversity on data streams.
The basic idea of the proposed approach is to exploit quasi-identifier at-
tributes to define a metric space: tuples are modeled as points in this space.
CASTLE groups incoming tuples into clusters and releases all tuples belong-
ing to the same cluster with the same generalization. CASTLE supports the
anonymization of both numerical and categorical attributes, by generalizing the
latter through domain generalization hierarchies, and the first through intervals.
Clustering of tuples is further constrained by the need to have fresh anonymized
data. To cope with this requirement, CASTLE ensures that the delay between a
tuple’s input and its output is at most equal to a given parameter 훿. We refer to
this constraint as delay constraint. When a tuple is going to expire (i.e., its delay
is equal to 훿 − 1), CASTLE immediately releases it. Obviously, it could be the
case that an expiring tuple does not belong to a cluster with size at least 푘. To
manage this case, CASTLE implements a merge and split technique to obtain a
cluster with size at least 푘 and whose generalization minimizes the information
loss. Additionally, to reduce information loss, CASTLE exploits a strategy that
allows the reuse of clusters. When a cluster is anonymized and all its tuples have
been given in output, CASTLE still keeps it (a.k.a. the corresponding general-
ization) in memory to anonymize newly arriving tuples, if necessary. However,
we found that adopting a naive reuse strategy is flawed even if it strictly follows
the definition of 푘-anonymity on static data sets, since it is vulnerable to infer-
ence attacks that exploit the sequence of anonymized tuples returned as output.
In the chapter, we present the reuse strategy employed by CASTLE to avoid
such privacy breaches.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we
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discuss why the alternative techniques cannot be adopted to anonymize data
streams. Section 5.3 proposes our privacy model customized for the anonymi-
zation of streaming data. We present a general overview of CASTLE frame-
work in Section 5.4. The detailed algorithms including an extension to support
ℓ-diversity, and the security analysis, are presented in Section 5.5. After that,
Section 5.6 makes a formal analysis of the time/space complexity of CASTLE.
Finally, we report the experimental results on the effectiveness of CASTLE in
Section 5.7 and conclude this chapter in Section 5.8.
5.2 Alternative strategies
In this section we investigate related techniques. They are inadequate for data
streams, because they either offer weaker protection on data streams than 푘-
anonymity, or target goals different from that of anonymizing data streams.
The first strategy we will study is an extension of weak 푘-anonymity [16].
It achieves stream anonymity by joining data stream 풮 with a 푘-anonymized
version of customer relation ℛ. The first problem with this solution is that the
dimensions to be anonymized (i.e., QI attributes) may come from bothℛ and 풮.
Thus, anonymizing onlyℛ is inadequate, since the resultant joined stream need
be further anonymized. Furthermore, such a solution opens inference channels
for an attacker. Weak 푘-anonymity does not require that each equivalence class
has a size of at least 푘. It only requires that the QI value of each released tuple
can be linked to at least 푘 individuals in a public table. It is proven that once 푘-
anonymity is achieved, weak 푘-anonymity is automatically satisfied. However,
the reverse is not true. Therefore, weak 푘-anonymity is less secure than 푘-
anonymity. Furthermore, weak 푘-anonymity provides privacy only under the
assumption that an adversary does not know a priori whether an individual is in
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the released data or not, which appears too strong for most of the application
environments related to data streams.
As an example, assume Table 5.1 is a portion of the customer table, in which
quasi-identifier attributes are Sex, Zipcode and Age. Table 5.2 is a 3-anonymized
version of Table 5.1, where CID and Name are put outside of the table only for
row referencing. Suppose that Mike has bought something from a store and
there is an anonymized record in the output stream published by this store, i.e.,
푥¯(M, [53703-53708], [26-31], sex video). In addition, no other record with the
same generalized QI value is found. Suppose that Beth is an attacker, and that
she knows the detailed QI information of Mike. If Beth does not know that Mike
appears in the stream (the fact that Mike has made a purchase), by joining 푥¯with
Table 5.2 she will find that 푥¯ is linkable to 3 persons: Mike, John, and Mike.
This is weak 3-anonymity. The identity of the buyer of sex video is hidden.
However, once Beth knows that Mike has made a purchase, she is sure that 푥¯
refers to Mike, not to John or Mike, and knows that Mike bought sex video.
Mike’s privacy is therefore violated.
CID Name Sex Zipcode Age
C01 Mike M 53708 31
C02 Alice F 53715 21
C03 John M 53703 28
C04 Bob M 53706 26
C05 Beth F 53703 24
C06 Carol F 53706 22
Table 5.1: Customer table
CID Name Sex Zipcode Age
C01 Mike M [53703-53708] [26-31]
C03 John M [53703-53708] [26-31]
C04 Bob M [53703-53708] [26-31]
C02 Alice F [53703-53715] [21-24]
C05 Beth F [53703-53715] [21-24]
C06 Carol F [53703-53715] [21-24]
Table 5.2: 3-anonymized customer table
In addition, applying the above method requires a further anonymization
step if we want to support ℓ-diversity [57] principle. To satisfy this principle,
the tuples with the same generalized value should have at least ℓ distinct values
for each different sensitive attribute. Since the resultant joined stream only 푘-
anonymizes QI attributes from ℛ, it should be further processed to make the
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sensitive attributes from 풮 ℓ-diverse.
Recently, the problem of anonymizing dynamic datasets, which evolve with
tuple insertions and deletions, has started to be investigated [23,61,73,81]. Still,
such methods cannot be applied on data streams, since the inferences arising in
dynamic datasets are different from those existing in the context of data streams,
as the following discussion clarifies. Anonymizing dynamic datasets requires
to publish multiple 푘-anonymized releases of a table. As a consequence, an
attacker, by analyzing the multiple generalizations of a same tuple 푥 in the dif-
ferent releases, is able to calculate the intersection of all these generalizations,
thus having a better guess of 푥’s real QI value. In some cases, the attacker may
even find the exact QI value of 푥, and link it with a specific victim, as shown
in [23, 61, 81]. Anyway, such an inference does not occur when anonymiz-
ing data stream, since each streaming tuple is anonymized only once, instead of
multiple times. Actually, the possible inferences arising from the anonymization
of data stream are due to the fact that an attacker is able to inspect the sequence
of anonymized tuples in the output stream (as discussed in Section 5.5.3 below).
Lastly, we discuss the schemes of clustering data streams [9,42]. They focus
on finding 휑 centers in the streaming data so that the sum of distances from data
points to their closest centers is minimized. As a consequence, the principle
regulating clustering generation is to minimize the distance while the number
of total clusters is at most 휑. In contrast, in order to 푘-anonymize streaming
data, the proposed approaches have to follow another principle (i.e., the number
of tuples in each cluster has to be at least 푘), which requires to devise new
clustering algorithms.
Based on all the above discussion, we strongly believe that a solution for the
anonymization of data streams need to be specifically designed.
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5.3 The privacy model
We model data stream as an infinite append-only sequence of tuples. Each
streaming tuple contains, together with application-specific attributes, also a
time stamp that indicates its time of origin. Time stamp is usually modeled
as the time when the tuple is generated, or the position of the tuple inside the
stream. Without loss of generality, we will consider the tuple position through-
out the chapter. Thus, given a tuple 푥 in a stream 풮 , we denote with 푥.푝 the
attribute of 푥 storing the position of tuple 푥.
Definition 5.1 (푘-anonymity of data streams). Let 풮(푝, 푝푖푑, 푎1, . . . , 푎푗 , 퐴1, . . . ,
퐴푑) be a stream, where {퐴1,. . . ,퐴푑} is the QI, 푝푖푑 is the person’s identity, 푝 is
the tuple’s position, and 푎1, . . . , 푎푗 are the remaining attributes. Let 풮표푢푡 be the
anonymized stream generated from 풮 where 푝 and 푝푖푑 have been pruned. We
say that 풮표푢푡 is 푘-anonymized, if both the following conditions hold:
∙ For each tuple 푥 ∈ 풮, if it is not suppressed, there exists in 풮표푢푡 the
corresponding anonymized tuple 푥¯.
∙ Given a tuple 푥¯ ∈ 풮표푢푡, we define 풢푥¯ = {푥¯′ ∈ 풮표푢푡∣푥¯′.퐴푖 = 푥¯.퐴푖, 푖 ∈
[1, 푑]} as the EC containing the anonymized tuples with the same gen-
eralized QI value as 푥¯. Let DP(풢푥¯) be the set of distinct persons which
tuples in 풢푥¯ refer to. Then for each possible 풢푥¯ ⊂ 풮표푢푡, ∣DP(풢푥¯)∣ ≥ 푘.
Traditional 푘-anonymity schemes [19, 39, 43, 48, 67] assume that each indi-
vidual has only one tuple appearing in the data set, so they form ECs, each with
at least 푘 tuples only. However, such an assumption does not hold for streaming
data as discussed in the introduction. To address this, Definition 5.1 explicitly
requires that each EC in the context of data streams refer to at least 푘 distinct
persons (Example 5.1 in Section 5.4.1 illustrates a case when 푘 = 3).
111
A relevant feature that closely related to the anonymization of data streams
is the freshness of the output data. This can be considered as the maximum
allowed time of a tuple staying in the memory before it is output, which is
formally defined as follows.
Definition 5.2 (Delay constraint). Let 풜 be a 푘-anonymization scheme that
takes as input a data stream 풮 and generates in output a data stream 풮표푢푡,
and let 훿 be a positive integer. We say that 풜 satisfies the delay constraint 훿 if
and only if for each new arriving tuple 푥 ∈ 풮 with position 푥.푝, all tuples with
position less than 푥.푝− 훿 have already been output by 풜.
According to the above definition, when a new tuple 푥 arrives, the tuple 푥′
with position 푥′.푝 = 푥.푝 − 훿 can still stay in the memory. However, when
the next new tuple with position 푥.푝 + 1 comes, 푥′ should already have been
output. Therefore, once 푥 has arrived, 푥′ is expiring and needs to be output.
Note that the 훿 parameter can be tuned on the basis of the application domain,
the temporal requirements, and the desired information quality. Indeed, when 훿
increases, the maximum delay between the arrival of a tuple and its release to the
third party for data ming is increased. However, this allows CASTLE to buffer
more tuples, and the defined metric space (each QI attribute is one dimension)
becomes denser. So CASTLE is more likely to group similar tuples together
and reduces information loss. Therefore, it is possible to trade off between the
allowed delay and the obtained information quality. The experiments in Section
5.7 verify this relationship.
In the introduction, we have discussed the prior knowledge (capability) of
an attacker. We formalize it as follows.
Definition 5.3 (Adversary model). At any instant 횤, an attacker’s knowledge
includes:
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∙ The deployed generalization principle (that is, the algorithms according
to which tuples are generalized by CASTLE).
∙ The values of all the anonymized tuples released at instant 횤, and the val-
ues of all the others released earlier.
∙ The QI value of any victim, and whether a tuple related to the victim
appears in the output stream.
The above modelling shows the unique characteristics of the anonymization
of data streams. Therefore, in the following we denote 푘-anonymity of data
streams by 푘푠-anonymity to distinguish it from 푘-anonymity for static data sets.
The aim of CASTLE is continuously 푘푠-anonymizing data streams under the
delay constraint, so that the output streams are immune from adversarial attacks,
and at the same time, preserving as much information as possible (by GLM in
Section 2.3).
5.4 The CASTLE framework
We present the CASTLE framework in this section. Before that, we first intro-
duce the notion of clusters over data streams.
5.4.1 Clusters over data streams
The basic idea of CASTLE is to exploit QI attributes to define a metric space,
so that streaming tuples are considered as points in this space. According to this
strategy, a cluster can be seen as 푑-dimensional intervals, where 푑 is the number
of QI-attributes. The formal definition of cluster is given below.
Definition 5.4 (Cluster over a data stream). Let 풮(푝, 푝푖푑, 푎1, . . . , 푎푗 ,퐴1, . . . ,퐴푑)
be a stream where {퐴1, . . . , 퐴푑} are the QI attributes. Let 풮 ′ ⊂ 풮 be a subset of
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tuples. A cluster 풞 over 풮 ′ is defined as a set of intervals, called range intervals,
in the QI attribute domains. For each QI attribute 퐴푖, the corresponding range
interval 푟푖 is defined as follows:
∙ If 퐴푖 is a continuous attribute with domain [ℒ퐴푖 ,풰퐴푖 ], 푟푖 ⊂ [ℒ퐴푖 ,풰퐴푖 ] is
the minimal sub-interval that contains all values of 퐴푖 in 풮 ′.
∙ If 퐴푖 is a categorical attribute with domain hierarchy ℋ푖, let Leaves(ℋ푖)
be the set of leaves of ℋ푖 generated by a left-most traversal of all the
leaves in ℋ푖. Let 풮ℒ퐴푖 be the smallest subset of Leaves(ℋ푖) containing
all values of 퐴푖 in 풮 ′, 푟푖’s bounds are the left-most and the right-most
values of 풮ℒ퐴푖 , respectively.
Given a cluster 풞 we denote with 풞.푠푖푧푒 the number of distinct persons
which tuples in 풞 refer to. This can be easily calculated by considering the
number of distinct values of the 푝푖푑 attribute. Moreover, we denote with 풞.푟푖
the 푖-th range interval of 풞, and with 풞(푟1,. . . ,푟푛) the cluster together with its
range intervals.
Example 5.1. Consider the stream 풮(푝, 푝푖푑, 푎1, . . . , 푎푗 , Age, Edu), where {Age,
Edu} is the QI, and the domain hierarchy ℋ퐸푑푢 of categorical attribute Edu is
shown in Figure 5.2. Assume the following tuples2: (푝푖푑1, 25, Bachelor), (푝푖푑2,
26, Master), and (푝푖푑3, 30, Ph.D). According to Definition 5.4, cluster 풞 defined
over these three tuples has [25, 30] as Age range interval and [Bachelor, Ph.D]
as Edu range interval. Therefore, it is denoted as 풞([25, 30], [Bachelor, Ph.D])
with size equal to 3. If we further add the tuple (푝푖푑1, 25, Bachelor) to 풞, it does
not change its range intervals nor its size (which is still equal to 3).
2For simplicity here and in the following we only consider the 푝푖푑 and QI attributes. More-










Figure 5.2: Domain generalization hierarchy of education
Given a cluster 풞 with the size of at least 푘, if all its tuples are output by
sharing a same generalized QI value, then the properties of 푘푠-anonymity can
be satisfied (see Definition 5.1). The following defines the generalization related
to such an output.
Definition 5.5 (Cluster generalization). Let 풞(푟1,. . . ,푟푛) be a cluster. The cor-
responding cluster generalization (or simply generalization), denoted as 풞풢 =
(푔1, . . . , 푔푛), is so defined that, for each 푟푖, 푖 ∈ [1, 푛], 푔푖 is computed as follows:
∙ if 푟푖 is defined on a continuous attribute 퐴푖, 푔푖 = 푟푖;
∙ if 푟푖 is defined on a categorical attribute 퐴푖 with domain hierarchy ℋ푖,
then 푔푖 ∈ ℋ푖 is the lowest common ancestor of the bounds in 푟푖.
Moreover, we say that a tuple 푥 is output with 풞’s generalization, if each
QI attribute 퐴푖, 푖 ∈ [1, 푛], of 푥 is replaced by the corresponding value 푔푖 in the
generalization associated with 풞.
Example 5.2. Consider the cluster of Example 5.1, that is, 풞([25, 30], [Bach-
elor, Ph.D]). According to the domain generalization hierarchy presented in
Figure 5.2, the generalization associated with 풞 is ([25, 30], University), since
University is the lowest common ancestor of Bachelor and Ph.D.
After a cluster reaches the size of 푘 and outputs all its tuples, we may buffer
its generalization. Later when a tuple falling in this cluster is expiring, we can
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release the tuple by reusing buffered generalization (see Section 5.4.3 below
for details). Clearly, this output tuple together with other released tuples by
this cluster share a same QI value (i.e., the generalization), and form an EC
complying with 푘푠-anonymity. We call such a reused cluster 푘푠-anonymized
cluster, which is defined as follows.
Definition 5.6 (푘푠-anonymized cluster). Let 풞(푟1,. . . ,푟푛) be a cluster, and (푔1,. . . ,푔푛)
be the corresponding generalization. If at a given time instant 횤, 풞.푠푖푧푒 is
greater than or equal to 푘 and all tuples in 풞 are output with 풞’s generaliza-
tion (푔1,. . . ,푔푛), we say that, starting from 횤, 풞 is a 푘푠-anonymized cluster.
At the end of this subsection, we define the information loss metrics3 for the
clusters over data stream. Let {퐴1, 퐴2, . . . , 퐴푑} be the QI, and 풞(푔1, 푔2, . . . , 푔푑)
be a cluster and its generalization. We define the information loss with respect
to QI attribute 퐴푖 in cluster 풞 as ℐℒ퐴푖(푔푖, 풞). If 퐴푖 is numerical with domain






퐴푖 is categorical with the domain hierarchyℋ퐴푖 , and 푔푖 is a node inℋ퐴푖 , then
ℐℒ퐴푖(푔푖, 풞) =
⎧⎨⎩




where Leaves(푔푖) is the set of leaves under the subtree of ℋ퐴푖 rooted at 푔푖, and
Leaves(ℋ퐴푖) is the whole set of leaves in ℋ퐴푖 . Therefore, the information loss




Initially, no clusters are in memory. When CASTLE receives the first tuple, it
generates a cluster over it. Then, for every newly arriving tuple 푥, CASTLE
3Once we regard a cluster as an EC, these metrics will be the same as those in Section 2.3.
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selects, among all the existing clusters, the one that is closest to 푥. We intro-
duce a concept, cluster enlargement (defined as below), to evaluate the distance
between a tuple and a cluster. Given the selected cluster 풞 and the new tuple 푥,
풞 may need to enlarge its range intervals to accommodate 푥. As a consequence,
the enlargement implies an increase of information loss. To minimize informa-
tion loss, when selecting the cluster, CASTLE chooses the one that needs the
smallest enlargement.
Definition 5.7 (Cluster enlargement). Consider a data stream 풮(푝, 푝푖푑, 푎1, . . . , 푎푗,
퐴1, . . . , 퐴푑) with {퐴1, . . . , 퐴푑} as QI. Let 풞 be a cluster defined over tuples in
풮 ′ ⊂ 풮, and (푔1, 푔2, ..., 푔푛) be its generalization. Let 푥 be a tuple in 풮 ∖ 풮 ′, and
풞+푥(푔˜1, 푔˜2, ..., 푔˜푛) be another cluster and its generalization defined over tuples
in 풮 ′ ∪ {푥}. Then, the enlargement of 풞 with respect to 푥 is defined as follows:
Enlargement(퐶, 푥) = 1
푑
∑푑
푖=1 (ℐℒ퐴푖(푔˜푖, 풞+푥)− ℐℒ퐴푖(푔푖, 풞))
Note that in the case 풞 contains only one tuple 푥¯, we say that Enlargement(풞, 푥)











Figure 5.3: Cluster selection
Example 5.3. Consider clusters 풞1 and 풞2 in Figure 5.3. To enclose tuple 푥(24,
Bachelor) into cluster 풞1 its range intervals should be enlarged to [18, 24] and
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[Primary School, Bachelor], respectively, which implies that the new general-
ization associated with 풞1 is ([18, 24], Any). Assume that [18, 120] is the
domain of the Age attribute. Thus, the enlargement of 풞1 due to absorbing 푥 is
Enlargement(풞1, 푥) = 1/2 × (6/102 + 5/5) − 1/2 × (4/102 + 2/5) = 0.309.
In contrast, the range intervals of 풞2, enlarged to enclose 푥, are [24, 28] and
[Bachelor, Master], respectively, which correspond to the new generalization
associated with 풞2: ([24, 28], University). This implies that the enlargement of
풞2 due to absorbing 푥 is Enlargement(풞2, 푥) = 1/2 × (4/102 + 3/5) − 1/2 ×
(2/102 + 3/5) = 0.01. Thus, 푥 is pushed into 풞2.
However, always pushing a new tuple into an existing cluster may result in
clusters with big generalizations, thus implying poor information quality. There-
fore, to prevent clusters from becoming too big, if pushing a new tuple to any
existing cluster makes the information loss of that cluster greater than a thresh-
old 휏 , CASTLE generates a new cluster over the new tuple (see Section 5.4.2
for more details).
To satisfy delay constraints, when a new tuple arrives, CASTLE checks
whether a tuple in some cluster is going to expire. If this is true, the correspond-
ing tuple must be immediately output. Here, there are two main cases. The
first is when cluster 풞, hosting the expiring tuple, has already a size greater than
or equal to 푘. In this case CASTLE simply outputs all the tuples in 풞 with its
generalization, and starting from the instant of outputting, it considers 풞 as a 푘푠-
anonymized cluster. The second case is when the cluster 풞 hosting the expiring
tuple has size less than 푘. To immediately output the expiring tuple, CASTLE
merges 풞 with some of its neighboring clusters such that the size of the resultant
cluster is greater than or equal to 푘. More precisely, CASTLE selects those that
result in minimum enlargement to 풞. Then, all the tuples contained in the new
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cluster can be output with its generalization (see Section 5.5 for more details on
the merge operation).
In both cases, before outputting the cluster’s tuples, CASTLE verifies whether
the cluster can be split into smaller sub-clusters. Indeed, according to the adopted
information loss metric, the smaller the cluster is (i.e., its range intervals), the
smaller its information loss will be. Therefore, if 풞’s size is at least 2푘, before
outputting the tuples, CASTLE splits it into two or more sub-clusters, each with
size at least 푘 (see Section 5.5 for more details on the split operation).
5.4.3 Reuse of 푘푠-anonymized clusters
To increase the information quality of anonymized data, we have enhanced
CASTLE with a strategy that enables to reuse 푘푠-anonymized clusters (i.e.,
their generalizations). According to this approach, after a cluster becomes 푘푠-
anonymized, it is not deleted from memory. Instead, its generalization is kept,
and is used later on to output expiring tuples contained in it.
A 푘푠-anonymized cluster will be no more 푘푠-anonymized if its range inter-
vals are enlarged due to the insertion of new tuples. Therefore, when a new tuple
푥 arrives, CASTLE selects the cluster to absorb 푥 only among the set of non-푘푠-
anonymized clusters. This not only avoids the enlargement of 푘푠-anonymized
clusters, but also gives to the non-푘푠-anonymized clusters more possibilities to
become 푘푠-anonymized. It is relevant to note that this strategy leads to overlaps
between 푘푠-anonymized and non-푘푠-anonymized clusters. The main advantage
of overlaps is that the generalizations of 푘푠-anonymized clusters can be used for
anonymizing expiring tuples that have been absorbed by non-푘푠-anonymized
clusters but are also enclosed into 푘푠-anonymized clusters. Therefore, every
time a tuple 푥 inside a non-푘푠-anonymized cluster is going to expire, CASTLE
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verifies whether 푥 also falls in a 푘푠-anonymized cluster 풦풞. If this happens, 푥
is immediately output with 풦풞’s generalization. Thus, the reuse strategy avoids
some cluster merges and consequently improves information quality.
Example 5.4. Let us suppose that, at a given instant, cluster 풞2([26, 28], [Bach-
elor, Master]) becomes 푘푠-anonymized. Moreover, suppose that, after some
time, a new cluster 풞3([24, 27], [Bachelor, Master]) is generated (see Figure
5.4). In case a tuple 푥(26, Bachelor) of 풞3 is going to expire and 풞3 still has size




















Figure 5.4: Overlapping clusters
When a tuple 푥 is expiring, the best way to preserve information is to se-
lect from all the 푘푠-anonymized clusters the one which contains 푥 and has the
minimal information loss. However, this method allows an attacker to infer ad-
ditional knowledge about a tuple’s value or even guess its exact value, as the
following example shows.
Example 5.5. With reference to Figure 5.4, suppose that at a given instant 횤 both
clusters 풞2([26, 28], [Bachelor, Master]) and 풞3([24, 27], [Bachelor, Master])
are 푘푠-anonymized. Suppose moreover that a tuple 푥˜ (25, Master) arrives after
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instant 횤 and that, after some time, it is expiring. CASTLE outputs this tuple
with 풞3’s generalization, i.e., ([24, 27], University). However, by tracing the
output stream, an attacker is able to infer that 푥˜.퐴푔푒 is not [26, 27] (the age
overlap between 풞2 and 풞3), otherwise, 푥 would be in 풞2 and would have been
output with 풞2’s generalization, which preserves more information comparing
with 풞3’s generalization. Thus, an attacker can infer that 푥˜.퐴푔푒 belongs to
풞3.퐴푔푒 ∖ (퐶2.퐴푔푒 ∩ 퐶3.퐴푔푒) = [24, 25].
To overcome this attack, we employ the following reuse strategy: if an expir-
ing tuple falls into the overlap of two or more 푘푠-anonymized clusters, CASTLE
randomly selects one of them and anonymizes the tuple with its generalization.
This avoids the security flaw previously discussed (see Section 5.5.3 for a formal
proof).
Example 5.6. Consider again Example 5.5 and assume that the strategy dis-
cussed above is adopted. When an attacker sees the generalization of 푥˜ (the
generalization of 풞3), s/he knows that 푥˜ could be in 풞2∩풞3 (the overlap between
풞2 and 풞3) or 풞3 ∖ (풞2 ∩ 풞3). This inference tells that 푥˜ could be in any place of
(풞2 ∩ 풞3) ∪ (풞3 ∖ (풞2 ∩ 풞3)), which is exactly the generalization of 풞3.
5.4.4 Adaptability to data stream distribution
In order to adapt CASTLE to data stream distribution we introduce several
strategies. The first is related to the value of 휏 , i.e., the threshold determin-
ing whether an arriving tuple should be pushed to an existing cluster or a new
cluster should be created over it. To make CASTLE adaptive to the data stream
distribution, we do not consider a predefined and fixed 휏 . Instead, 휏 is set to the
average information loss of the 휇 most recent 푘푠-anonymized clusters (see Sec-
tion 5.7 for a description on how to set the number 휇). Let us see the benefits
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of this dynamically calculated 휏 . When a data stream contains well clustered
tuples, it is possible to generate over them small clusters with low information
loss. As a consequence, 휏 will assume a small value, and a new tuple will be
pushed into a cluster only if they are very close. This ensures that if tuples in
a stream are well clustered, only clusters with small range intervals are formed.
On the contrary, if a data stream contains sparsely distributed tuples, clusters
with big range intervals are generated. This implies a high value of 휏 , and also
allows an increased enlargement. Thus, a new tuple is more likely to be pushed
into an existing cluster. Accordingly, each cluster has improved possibility of
reaching the size of 푘, and the number of cluster merging operations is reduced.
Another adaptivity is obtained by constraining the maximum number of non-
푘푠-anonymized clusters that stay in memory, delimited by a parameter 휂. This
parameter co-operates with 휏 to handle the variation of data distribution. More
precisely, suppose that, at the beginning all tuples are well clustered, so 휏 has
a small value. If the newly arriving tuples are sparsely distributed, many small-
size clusters will be formed since the small 휏 only allows a small cluster en-
largement. The large number of clusters increases the overhead of searching for
the best cluster into which a new tuple should be pushed, and it also increases
the overhead of merging clusters when tuples expire. The introduction of 휂 pre-
vents the generation of a possibly large number of clusters and thus limit the
overhead discussed above. The value of 휂 can be set regarding the available
computational and storage resources. Hence, a new cluster is generated only if
the number of non-푘푠-anonymized clusters is fewer than 휂. Otherwise, a tuple
is pushed to the existing cluster, which still requires the minimum enlargement
to enclose it.
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5.5 CASTLE algorithms and security analysis
In the following, we present the algorithms implementing the techniques il-
lustrated in the previous section. Then, we show their extension to achieve
ℓ-diversity. Moreover, we analyze their security.
5.5.1 Algorithms
The main algorithm of our work is CASTLE, which continuously processes the
incoming data stream by producing in output a flow of 푘푠-anonymized tuples.
Algorithm: CASTLE (풮, 푘, 훿, 휂)
Let Γ be the set of non-푘푠-anonymized clusters, initialized to be empty;1
Let Ω be the list of 푘푠-anonymized clusters, set to be empty;2
휏 = 0;3
while new tuples still come from 풮 do4
Get the arriving tuple 푥 from 풮;5
풞 = bestSelection(푥);6
if 풞 = NULL then7
Create a new cluster over 푥 and insert the cluster into Γ;8
else9
Push 푥 into 풞;10
Suppose that 푥′ is the tuple so that 푥′.푝 = 푥.푝− 훿;11
if 푥′ has not yet been output then12
delayConstraint(푥′);13
Algorithm CASTLE takes as input the original data stream 풮 together with
other parameters: 푘, 훿 and 휂. At the beginning, the set of non-푘푠-anonymized
clusters (i.e., Γ) as well as the set of 푘푠-anonymized clusters (i.e., Ω) are empty.
Then, every time a tuple 푥 arrives (step 5), it calls function bestSelection (step
6), to select from Γ the best cluster into which 푥 is pushed (step 10). If such
a cluster does not exist, a new cluster over 푥 is created (steps 7-8). In addi-
tion, CASTLE verifies whether the arrival of the new tuple 푥 forces another
tuple 푥′ with position 푥.푝 − 훿 to expire (step 11). If this is the case, proce-
dure delayConstraint will be called (step 13). In the following, we illustrate the
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procedures/functions used by Algorithm CASTLE.
Function bestSelection(푥)
Initialize 퐸 to be an empty set;1
foreach 풞 ∈ Γ do2
Calculate 푒 = Enlargement(풞, 푥);3
Insert (푒, 풞) into 퐸;4
푒푚 = min∀푒
{푒 ∣ (푒, 풞) ∈ 퐸} ;5
푆푒푚 = {풞ˆ ∣ 풞ˆ ∈ Γ 푎푛푑 Enlargement(풞ˆ, 푥) = 푒푚};6
foreach 풞ˆ ∈ 푆푒푚 do7
Compute ℐℒ(풞ˆ ∪ {푥}), i.e., the information loss of 풞ˆ after absorbing 푥;8
if ℐℒ(풞ˆ ∪ {푥}) ≤ 휏 then9
Insert 풞ˆ into 푆퐶푥;10
if 푆퐶푥 is empty then11
if ∣Γ∣ ≥ 휂 then12




Return any cluster in 푆퐶푥 with minimum size;17
Function bestSelection. According to the reuse strategy, a new tuple is al-
ways pushed into a close non-푘푠-anonymized cluster. bestSelection first calcu-
lates the set of non-푘푠-anonymized clusters 푆푒푚 , which requires the minimum
enlargement to absorb incoming tuple 푥 (steps 1-6). To be adaptive to the data
stream distribution described in Section 5.4.4, we refine 푆푒푚 , thus only clus-
ters whose information loss after absorbing 푥 will not exceed 휏 are kept (steps
7-10). These remaining clusters are stored in 푆퐶푥 (step 10). If 푆퐶푥 is not
empty (the evaluation of step 11 is false), bestSelection returns the cluster with
the minimum size (step 17). Otherwise, it implies that a new cluster should be
created over 푥. Still, to avoid a large number of non-푘푠-anonymized clusters,
thus better adaptive to data stream distribution, the function verifies whether the
constraint on the maximum number of non-푘푠-anonymized clusters is satisfied.
When the number of non-푘푠-anonymized clusters is greater than or equal to 휂
(step 12), it is impossible to create a new cluster. In this case, among clusters
124
requiring the minimum enlargement, i.e., 푆푒푚 , the one with the minimum size
is returned (step 13). Otherwise, the function returns a NULL value (step 15),
which triggers in Algorithm CASTLE the generation of a new cluster over 푥.
Procedure delayConstraint(푥)
Find 풞 the non-푘푠-anonymized cluster holding the expiring tuple 푥;1
if 풞.푠푖푧푒 ≥ 푘 then2
outputCluster(풞);3
else4
Let 푆풦풞 be the set of 푘푠-anonymized clusters in Ω containing 푥;5
if ∣푆풦풞 ∣ > 0 then6
Randomly select a cluster 풞ˆ from 푆풦풞 ;7




푖=1 풞푖.푠푖푧푒 < 푘 then10
Suppress 푥;11
Return;12
푀퐶 = mergeClusters(풞,Γ ∖ 풞);13
outputCluster(푀퐶);14
Procedure delayConstraint. When a tuple 푥 is expiring, delayConstraint
takes the responsibility of outputting it. The anonymization of 푥 is achieved case
by case. First, delayConstraint checks the size of the non-푘푠-anonymized clus-
ter 풞, which contains 푥. If 풞 reaches the size of 푘, 푥 together with other tuples
in 풞 are output by 풞’s generalization (steps 1-3). Otherwise, delayConstraint
verifies whether it is possible to apply on the expiring tuple the reuse strategy
illustrated in Section 5.4.3 (steps 5-9). This is possible, if there exist one or
more 푘푠-anonymized clusters, i.e., 푆풦풞 , containing 푥. In addition, to overcome
the inference problem described in Section 5.4.3, a cluster is randomly selected
from 푆풦풞 , and 푥 is output by its generalization (steps 7-8). As the last alterna-
tive, procedure delayConstraint examines whether a merge of 풞 with some other
non-푘푠-anonymized clusters is possible. Note that, if the total size of all clusters
in Γ is fewer than 푘 (step 10), a merge operation would not produce a cluster
with the size at least 푘. Therefore, the only way to output the expiring tuple
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is suppressing it (step 11). Otherwise, the merge takes place (step 13), and the
resultant cluster is output (step 14).
The mergeClusters function receives as input the cluster to be merged, i.e.,
풞, and the set of non-푘푠-anonymized clusters excluding 풞 itself. For every non-
푘푠-anonymized cluster 풞푖, it calculates the enlargement of 풞 due to the potential
merge with 풞푖. Then, it selects the one, which incurs the minimum enlargement
to 풞, and merges 풞 with it. This process continues until 풞’s size is at least 푘.
Finally, the resultant cluster is returned.
Procedure outputCluster(풞)





foreach 풞푖 ∈ 푆푐 do5
Output all tuples in 풞푖 with its generalization;6
Update 휏 according to ℐℒ(풞푖);7
if ℐℒ(풞푖) < 휏 then8
Insert 풞푖 into Ω;9
else10
Delete 풞푖;11
Delete 풞푖 from Γ;12
Procedure outputCluster. At the moment of outputting, a cluster with size
no less than 2푘 will be split into sub-clusters, each with size at least 푘 (steps
1-2). Then all the tuples staying in a cluster are output by the corresponding
cluster generalization (steps 5-6). Meanwhile, 휏 is updated to be the average
information loss of the most recent 푘푠-anonymized clusters including the new
ones (step 7). Furthermore, we insert the newly created 푘푠-anonymized clusters
into Ω for later reuse. To minimize information loss, only those with good
information quality are preserved (steps 8-11).
Function splitk. CASTLE employs KNN search [10] to split a cluster 풞 of
size at least 2푘. It works as follows. First, a tuple 푥 is randomly selected from
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풞 and a sub-cluster 풞푛푒푤 is created over it. Then, 푥’s 푘-1 nearest neighbors in
풞 (푥 itself excluded) are inserted into 풞푛푒푤. To comply with the constraints of
푘푠-anonymity in Definition 5.1, no pair of tuples in 풞푛푒푤 share a 푝푖푑 value. 푥
together with the selected neighbors are deleted from 풞. This process repeats,
each time generating a new sub-cluster, until the size of 풞 is less than 푘. Finally,
the remaining tuples in 풞 are pushed into the above newly created sub-clusters.
Function splitk(풞)
Initialize 푆푐 to be an empty set;1
Let 휑 be the set of buckets created by grouping tuples in 풞 by 푝푖푑 attribute;2
while ∣휑∣ ≥ 푘 do3
Randomly select a bucket ℬ ∈ 휑, and pick one of its tuples 푥;4
Delete 푥 from ℬ and create a new subcluster 풞푛푒푤 over 푥;5
if ℬ is empty then6
delete ℬ from 휑;7
Let 퐻푘−1 be a heap with 푘 − 1 nodes, each set to be infinitely faraway from 푥;8
foreach bucket in 휑 ∖ ℬ do9
Pick one of its tuples 푥ˆ, and calculate the distance between 푥ˆ and 푥;10
if 푥ˆ is closer to 푥 than the root of 퐻푘−1 then11
푥ˆ replaces the root, and 퐻푘−1 is adjusted accordingly;12
foreach node in 퐻푘−1 do13
Assume that 푥′ is the tuple in the node;14
Insert 푥′ into 풞푛푒푤;15
Find ℬ′ the bucket containing 푥′;16
Delete 푥′ from ℬ′;17
if ℬ′ is empty then18
delete ℬ′ from 휑;19
Add 풞푛푒푤 to 푆푐;20
foreach bucket ℬ˜ ∈ 휑 do21
Pick a tuple 푥˜ ∈ ℬ˜;22
Find 푥˜’s nearest cluster in 푆푐, and add all the tuples from ℬ˜ to the cluster;23
Delete ℬ˜;24
return 푆푐;25
Let us see in more details how splitk works. First, the function groups all
tuples in 풞 by their 푝푖푑 values, creating a set of buckets 휑 (step 2), each one
containing only tuples with the same value for attribute 푝푖푑. Then, it randomly
selects a tuple 푥 and creates a new cluster 풞푛푒푤 over it (steps 4-5). To speed up
the process of finding the 푘-1 nearest neighbors of 푥, we adopt a heap with
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푘-1 nodes (step 8). From each bucket, we select a representative tuple and
calculate its distance from 푥 (step 10). Note that all the tuples in a bucket have
the same distance from 푥, because they all share a single QI value. The heap
is so maintained that only the 푘-1 nearest representatives are stored in it (steps
11-12). All the nodes in the heap are pushed to the new sub-cluster 풞푛푒푤 (steps
13-19). Since each node in the heap is from a different bucket, it is sure that
the 푘 tuples in 풞푛푒푤 refer to 푘 distinct persons. Thus, 풞푛푒푤 strictly follows 푘푠-
anonymity. All the tuples in the new sub-cluster are deleted from the buckets
they hail from (steps 5, 17). The above process continues to create new sub-
clusters, until the number of buckets is less than 푘 (steps 3-19). Finally, each
of the remaining tuples is added to its nearest sub-cluster created above (steps
21-24).
5.5.2 Extension to ℓ-diversity
Recently, Machanavajjhala et al. [57] proposed the ℓ-diversity principle to pro-
vide defence against the attacks based on the distribution of non-QI sensitive at-
tribute (풮풜). In this section we illustrate how CASTLE can be straightforwardly
extended to support ℓ-diversity on data streams. ℓ-diversity postulates that each
EC contain at least ℓ “well represented” 풮풜 values. It can be instantiated in
multiple ways, such as distinct ℓ-diversity, entropy ℓ-diversity, and recursive (푐,
ℓ)-diversity. Here we consider distinct ℓ-diversity, which requires that each EC
contains ℓ distinct 풮풜 values. Given a cluster 풞, we denote with 풞.푑푖푣푒푟푠푖푡푦
the number of distinct 풮풜 values for tuples in 풞. In order to ensure that the
output data by CASTLE comply with also ℓ-diversity besides 푘푠-anonymity, we
slightly modify the definition of 푘푠-anonymized cluster as follows.
Definition 5.8 (푘푠-anonymized and ℓ-diversified cluster). Let 풞(푟1,. . . ,푟푛) be a
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cluster, and (푔1,. . . ,푔푛) be the corresponding generalization. If, at a given time
instant 횤: (1) 풞.푠푖푧푒 is greater than or equal to 푘, (2) 풞.푑푖푣푒푟푠푖푡푦 is greater
than or equal to ℓ, and (3) all tuples in 풞 are output with 풞’s generalization
(푔1,. . . ,푔푛), we say that, starting from 횤, 풞 is a 푘푠-anonymized and ℓ-diversified
cluster.
After the alteration of the 푘푠-anonymized cluster, accordingly we need to ad-
just the algorithms of CASTLE. The overall CASTLE framework is the same;
it is only necessary to customize algorithms delayConstraint and splitk according
to the extra requirements enforced by ℓ-diversity. Now, Procedure delayConstraint
outputs a whole non-푘푠-anonymized cluster 풞 (line 2 of delayConstraint), only
if the following two conditions hold at the same time: 1) 풞.푠푖푧푒 ≥ 푘, and 2)
풞.푑푖푣푒푟푠푖푡푦 ≥ ℓ. Moreover, it gives up the merge operation and chooses to sup-
press a tuple (lines 10-11 of delayConstraint), if
∑Γ
푖=1퐶푖.푠푖푧푒 < 푘 or there does
not exist at least ℓ distinct 풮풜 values among all clusters in Γ. Function splitk
conforms to the cluster size constraint only. In the following, we redefine it so
that it will also follow the diversity requirement.
Function splitℓ. The basic idea of splitting a cluster 풞 works as follows. It
first partitions the set of tuples from 풞 into buckets by grouping by their 풮풜
values. Then, it selects a portion of tuples from each bucket, altogether 푘 tuples,
and creates a sub-cluster 풞푠푢푏 over them. Since each bucket contributes tuples
to 퐶푠푢푏 and the number of buckets is at least ℓ, the constraint of ℓ is satisfied
automatically. However, one person may have multiple tuples in the stream, so
the buckets grouped by 풮풜 may overlap on 푝푖푑 values. Likewise, the set of
푘 tuples selected from the buckets may also overlap on 푝푖푑, thus they refer to
less than 푘 distinct persons and violate the property of 푘-anonymity. Therefore,
to assist the process of selecting 푘 tuples each with a different 푝푖푑 value, we
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consider buckets without overlap on 푝푖푑 and turn to the following strategy. It is
done by selecting only one tuple from 풞 for each distinct 푝푖푑 value, and grouping
only these selected tuples into buckets according to their 풮풜 values. Avoiding
overlaps ensures that the 푘 tuples selected from buckets have different 푝푖푑s, thus
ensuring the size of the new generated subcluster 풞푠푢푏 to be 푘 exactly. After
creating all the possible sub-clusters, each tuple 푥 previously not selected from
풞 is inserted into one of the new sub-clusters. In particular, tuple 푥 is inserted
into the unique sub-cluster that contains a tuple with the same 푝푖푑 of 푥.
Function splitℓ(풞, 풮풜)
Let 휑 be the set of disjoint buckets generated by generateBuckets(퐶,풮풜);1
Initialize 푆푐 to be an empty set;2
while ∣휑∣ ≥ ℓ and 푠푢푚 = ∑ℬ푖∈휑 ℬ푖.푠푖푧푒 ≥ 푘 do3
Select a tuple 푥 from a randomly selected bucket ℬ ∈ 휑;4
Delete 푥 from ℬ and generate a subcluster 풞푠푢푏 over it;5
foreach bucket ℬˆ ∈ 휑 do6
foreach tuple 푥ˆ ∈ ℬˆ do7
Calculate 푒ˆ = Enlargement(퐶푠푢푏, 푥ˆ);8
Sort tuples in ℬˆ by the ascending order of their enlargement 푒ˆ;9
Assume that 푇ˆ is the set of the first 푘 × ℬˆ.푠푖푧푒푠푢푚 tuples in ℬˆ;10
Insert 푇ˆ into 풞푠푢푏 and delete it from ℬˆ;11
if ℬˆ.푠푖푧푒 = 0 then12
Delete ℬˆ from 휑;13
Add 풞푠푢푏 to 푆푐;14
foreach ℬ′ ∈ 휑 do15
foreach tuple 푥′ ∈ ℬ′ do16
Find the nearest subcluster 풞푛푒푎푟 ∈ 푆푐 to 푥′;17
Insert 푥′ into 풞푛푒푎푟;18
Delete ℬ′;19
foreach subcluster 풞푠푢푏 ∈ 푆푐 do20
foreach tuple 푥˜ ∈ 퐶푠푢푏 do21
Let 퐸푥˜ be the set of tuples in 풞, such that 퐸푥˜ = {푥 ∈ 풞∣푥.푝푖푑 = 푥˜.푝푖푑};22
Insert 퐸푥˜ into 풞푠푢푏;23
Return 푆푐;24
Let us see now in more details how splitℓ works. In the first step, it calls
Function generateBuckets to create the set of buckets 휑 without overlaps. Once
the number of buckets is greater than ℓ and the number of tuples in 휑 is greater
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than 푘, a new 푘푠-anonymized and ℓ-diversified subcluster 풞푠푢푏 is formed (lines
3-13). In particular, the function selects, from each bucket ℬˆ ∈ 휑, a subset of
tuples 푇ˆ proportional to the bucket size (lines 6-11). To reduce the information
loss, 푇ˆ are only tuples from ℬˆ which require the minimum enlargement to 풞푠푢푏
(lines 7-10). These tuples are then inserted into 풞푠푢푏 (line 11). Finally, when one
or both the conditions of the while loop are no more satisfied (the evaluation of
line 3 is false), remaining tuples are accommodated into the new created sub-
clusters (lines 15-23).
5.5.3 Formal results
In this sub-section, we analyze the security of CASTLE. We start by proving
that CASTLE generates 푘푠-anonymized data streams.
Theorem 5.1. Let 풮(푝, 푝푖푑, 푎1, . . . , 푎푗 , 퐴1, . . . , 퐴푑) be the input stream with
{퐴1, . . . , 퐴푑} as QI, and 풮표푢푡 be the stream output by CASTLE. Then 풮표푢푡 is
푘푠-anonymized.
Proof. According to the definition of 푘푠-anonymity (Definition 5.1), the theo-
rem holds if the following two conditions are satisfied:
1. For each tuple 푥 in the input stream 풮, if it is not suppressed, there exists
in output stream 풮표푢푡 the corresponding anonymized tuple 푥¯.
2. For any possible EC 풢푥¯ ⊂ 풮표푢푡 that contains all the tuples with the same
generalized QI value as 푥¯, the number of distinct individuals which tuples
in 풢푥¯ refer to is greater than or equal to 푘, that is, ∣DP(풢푥¯)∣ ≥ 푘.
Let us first consider point 1. When tuple 푥 is expiring, it is passed to
procedure delayConstraint. We prove that this procedure always outputs an
anonymized tuple corresponding to 푥, if 푥 is not suppressed. Different cases
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may arise. The first is when the non-푘푠-anonymized cluster hosting 푥 has the
size greater than or equal to 푘. In this case, the procedure calls outputCluster
(step 3 of delayConstraint), which gives in output a generalized tuple for 푥,
thus the thesis holds. If the non-푘푠-anonymized cluster hosting 푥 has size less
than 푘, procedure delayConstraint verifies whether the reuse strategy can be ap-
plied. If this is the case, 푥 is given in output with the generalization of one
of the 푘푠-anonymized clusters enclosing it, thus the thesis also holds (step 8 of
delayConstraint). Finally, delayConstraint tests if it is possible to merge clusters.
If this is impossible, 푥 is suppressed (step 11 of delayConstraint). Otherwise, all
the tuples in the cluster resulting from the merge operation are given in output
(step 14 of delayConstraint). In both the cases, the thesis holds.
Let us consider now point 2. To prove it, we discuss all the three possible
ways of outputting a tuple one by one. Case 1: Tuple 푥 is contained in a cluster
풞 with the size at least 푘; 푥 is output together with all the other tuples in 풞 by the
generalization of 풞. Obviously, the output tuples from 풞 belong to a same EC 풢푥¯.
Since 풞 has the size at least 푘, the number of distinct individuals which tuples
in 풢푥¯ refer to is greater or equal to 푘, that is, ∣DP(풢푥¯)∣ ≥ 푘. Case 2: Tuple 푥 is
output individually by the reuse strategy. Let 풦풞 be the 푘푠-anonymized cluster
selected by the reuse strategy to output 푥. Since 풦풞 is 푘푠-anonymized, at some
instant before the output of 푥, 풦풞 must have the size at least 푘 and all its tuples
are output with its generalization. Let 풢푥¯ be the EC that contains all the output
tuples from 풦풞. Then the anonymized tuple 푥¯ of tuple 푥 belongs to 풢푥¯, and
∣DP(풢푥¯)∣ ≥ 푘. Case 3: Furthermore, a tuple can be also suppressed. In this
case, the k푠-anonymity definition does not require that ∣DP(풢푥¯)∣ ≥ 푘.
To show that CASTLE generates 푘푠-anonymized data streams is not enough.
As shown by Example 5.5, reuse of 푘푠-anonymized clusters should be carefully
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managed, otherwise, a potential attacker may infer additional knowledge about
a tuple’s value, or even guess its exact value. We have therefore to prove that
the reuse strategy adopted by CASTLE is secure. Before the formal proof, we
first introduce some notions, and investigate the underlying factors that enable
this inference attack.
Given a cluster 풞 and its generalization (푔1, . . . , 푔푑), the generalization 푔푗
of the QI attribute 퐴푗 shows the range in which the real values of 퐴푗 for tuples
in 풞 falls. For instance, given QI attribute Edu and its domain hierarchy shown
in Figure 5.2, if the generalized value for Edu is University, we can infer that
the corresponding original tuple can have as value for this attribute one of the
elements in the set {Bachelor,Master, Ph.D.}. Similarly, if the value given in
output by CASTLE for QI attribute Age is [25-30], then the Age attribute of
the corresponding non-anonymized tuple has a value in the interval [25,30]. In
what follows, given a cluster and its generalization 풞(푔1, . . . , 푔푑), we denote
with 푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞.푔푖) the set of values implied by the generalization 푔푖 for attribute
퐴푖. More precisely, if 퐴푖 is a continuous attribute, 푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞.푔푖) contains all the
values in the interval corresponding to 풞.푔푖. In contrast, if 퐴푖 is a categorical
attribute, 푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞.푔푖) contains all the leaves of the subtree inℋ푖 rooted at 풞.푔푖,
whereℋ푖 denotes the domain hierarchy for attribute 퐴푖.
Now let us consider Example 5.5 once more. Without a careful reuse man-
agement, given a tuple 푥¯ output by cluster generalization 풞(푔1, . . . , 푔푑), an at-
tacker may, by tracing the sequence of anonymized tuples, may infer that the
possible real values of 푥¯ on attribute 퐴푖 (푖 = 1, . . . , 푑) stay in a subset of
푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞.푔푖), instead of 푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞.푔푖) itself. Such an inference enables an at-
tacker to link tuple 푥¯ to less than 푘 individuals, thus violating 푘-anonymity. The
next example better clarifies this.
133
Example 5.7. Recall Example 5.5. Suppose that 푘 = 4 and QI is {Age, Edu}.
Assume 4 persons 푃1, 푃2, 푃3, and 푃4, with QI values (24, Bachelor), (25, Mas-
ter), (26, Bachelor), and (27, Master), respectively. Suppose that at instant 횤,
each of the 4 persons has at least one tuple in 풞3, and 풞3 becomes 푘푠-anonymized
after outputting all its tuples by its generalization. Moreover, suppose that after
some time, 푥˜=(25, Master, Video on sex) is expiring, and is output by reusing
풞3’s generalization ([24, 27], University). As shown in Example 5.5, if the reuse
strategy always tries to minimize information loss, then an attacker can learn
that the original values of 푥˜ on Age is [24, 25], instead of 풞3.퐴푔푒 = [24, 27].
By linking ([24, 25], University) to the QI values of the discussed 4 persons, we
know only 푃1 or 푃2 (excluding 푃3 and 푃4) can be the owner of 푥˜. Consequently,
the privacy of 푃1 and 푃2 is weaken.
To avoid this possible inference attack, CASTLE adopts the cluster reuse
strategy introduced in Section 5.4.3. As the following theorem states, this strat-
egy ensures that under the adversary model presented in Definition 5.3 an at-
tacker cannot infer any additional knowledge on a tuple 푥 other than the set of
real values associated with the generalization according to which it has been
given in output.
Theorem 5.2. Let 풮(푝, 푝푖푑, 푎1, . . . , 푎푗 , 퐴1, . . . , 퐴푑) be a stream with {퐴1, . . . ,
퐴푑} as QI, and 풮표푢푡 be the stream output by CASTLE. Suppose that 풞1, . . . , 풞푚
is the sequence of 푘푠-anonymized clusters appearing in 풮표푢푡, and that 푥 is a
tuple output by the cluster generalization of 풞푟, 1 ≤ 푟 ≤ 푚. Then, for each QI
attribute 퐴푖, 푖 = 1, . . . , 푑, an attacker is unable to infer that the real value of
푥.퐴푖 belongs to a subset of 푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞푟.퐴푖).
Proof. For the simplicity of discussion, let us consider a data stream 풮 with a
single QI attribute 푞. Consider a tuple 푥 푘푠-anonymized with generalization 풞푟.
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In this case, an attacker could infer a set of possible values 휒 ⊂ 푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞푟.푞)
for attribute 푞, only if there exists a set of tuples 푇 ⊆ 풮표푢푡 ∖ {푥} 푘푠-anonymized
with a generalization 풞푠 (1 ≤ 푠 ≤ 푚) that overlaps 풞푟. Two generalizations
풞푟 and 풞푠 overlap if 푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞푟.푞) ∩ 푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞푠.푞) ∕= ∅. Let us assume that an
attacker infers a set of possible values 휒 ⊂ 푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞푟.푞) for attribute 푞, and
prove that a contradiction arises. We first consider the case that 푞 is a continu-
ous attribute. 휒 can be inferred by analyzing the overlap between 풞푟 and 풞푠, and
can be formalized as follows: 휒= 푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞푟.푞) ∖ 푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞푠.푞). Thus, 휒 consists
of the values in 푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞푟.푞) which are not in 푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞푠.푞). However, if there
exists an overlap between 푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞푟.푞) and 푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞푠.푞), it implies that CAS-
TLE anonymizes 푥.푞 by randomly selecting between 풞푟.푞 and 풞푠.푞 (see line 7,
procedure delayConstraint). Hence, the possible real values of 푥.푞 that can be
inferred are, in addition to those in 휒, also those in 푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞푟.푞)∩푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞푠.푞).
Therefore, 휒= (푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞푟.푞) ∖ 푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞푠.푞)) ∪ (푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞푟.푞) ∩ 푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞푠.푞)),
that is, 휒 = 푣푎푙푢푒푠(풞푟.푞), and a contradiction arises. We omit the proof when 푞
is a categorical attribute, since it is very similar to the proof given for continuous
attributes.
It is important to note that above theorem holds only under the setting (Defi-
nition 5.3), where the adversary does not have any extra background knowledge
(e.g., temporal background knowledge: the attacker may know that Mike buys
an item at time 10). Considering further background knowledge is a challenging
issue, that we plan to investigate in the future, and that may require the definition
of alternative techniques to achieve 푘푠-anonymity.
Furthermore, CASTLE may output some tuples before their expiration. Con-
sequenlty, the ordering of the output stream may be different from that of the in-
put. Formally, we say that input stream 풮 and output stream 풮표푢푡 share the same
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ordering, if the following condition holds: Given any two tuples 푥1, 푥2 ∈ 풮,
and their corresponding output versions 푥¯1, 푥¯2 ∈ 풮표푢푡, if 푥1.푝 < 푥2.푝, then 푥¯1
is output earlier than 푥¯2. Some data mining applications may be sensitive to
the tuple ordering. If this is the case, we reorder output streams with regard to
input streams, by releasing a tuple 푥¯ anonymized from 푥 only after all the tuples
with position less than 푥.푝 have already been output. The reordering strategy
ensures the same ordering, but also incurs extra time delay. Now the total buffer
time of a tuple 푥 before its output is composed of two parts: 1) the time interval
between its arrival and its anonymization, and 2) the buffer time for reordering.
Anyway, the next theorem proves that even with the reordering the total buffer
time is still upper bounded by 훿, hence the delay constraint (Definition 5.2) still
holds.
Theorem 5.3. Let 풮 be an input stream, and 풮표푢푡 be its output stream generated
and reordered by CASTLE. Assume that 훿 is an integer representing the maxi-
mum allowed delay between a tuple’s input and its output. Then, the total buffer
time of any tuple 푥 ∈ 풮 before its output is upper bounded by 훿, and the delay
constraint is still guaranteed.
Proof. Let 푥 and 푥¯ be an input tuple and its anonymized one, respectively. When
tuple 푥1 with position 푥1.푝 = 푥.푝+훿 comes, all tuples (denote them by퐸푇 ) with
position less than 푥.푝 = 푥1.푝 − 훿 have already expired and been anonymized.
At the instant of 푥1.푝, 푥 is expiring and is already anonymized to 푥¯ (푥 can be
anonymized at any time in [푥.푝, 푥1.푝] and buffered). We release 푥¯ following
the output of all the tuples in 퐸푇 . According to the above buffer and release
procedure, it is obvious that for any tuple 푥′ ∈ 풮 with the position 푥′.푝 < 푥.푝,
푥′ is output earlier than 푥. Therefore, the input and output streams have the same
ordering. Furthermore, when 푥1 comes, 푥 and all the tuples with position less
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than 푥.푝 = 푥1.푝− 훿 are output, so the total buffering time of 푥 is upper bounded
by 훿, and delay constraint is satisfied.
Note that, if an attacker has the knowledge of the ordering of the input
stream, the reordering will enable him/her to link released tuples to their own-
ers. For the simplicity of discussion, we assume that tuple positions start from
1 and are consecutive. Suppose that Mike buys an item. Let 푥 be the record
for Mike’s purchase. If an attacker knows the ordering of input tuples, that is
to say, s/he knows that Mike buys the item at time 푥.푝, then s/he can infer that
푥.푝-th tuple in the output stream belongs to Mike. Mike’s privacy is violated.
Therefore, if an attacker has the ordering knowledge, to protect the privacy, we
need to add some randomness to the output ordering.
5.6 CASTLE complexity
We study the efficiency of the proposed approach by a formal analysis of the
time/space complexity of the CASTLE algorithms. The parameters involved
in the analysis have been summarized in Table 5.3. The third column in the
table shows the typical values for the corresponding parameter; these values are
obtained through the tuning process in the experiments presented in Section 5.7
below.
5.6.1 Time complexity
The time complexity of CASTLE is up to the main operations it carries out,
that is: (1) Function bestSelection, selecting the best cluster where pushing a
new tuple; (2) Function mergeClusters, merging clusters to generate a new 푘푠-
anonymized cluster; (3)Function splitk, splitting a cluster to into 푘푠-anonymized
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Parameter Description Typical values
푘 value of 푘 in 푘푠-anonymity 100∼1,000
푑 number of quasi-identifier attributes 6∼10
훿 delay constraint 5,000∼30,000
휂 maximum number of non-푘푠-anonymized clusters 50
푁푘푠 maximum number of 푘푠-anonymized clusters
퐶푒 time required to enlarge a single dimension of a cluster
퐶ℎ time required to replace the root of a heap log(푘)
푆푔
space required to store the generalization of a QI at-
tribute
푆푥 space required to store in memory a tuple
Table 5.3: Parameters used in the complexity analysis
sub-clusters. Next, let us see them one by one in more details.
Function bestSelection. Given an arriving tuple 푥, Function bestSelection
places it into its nearest non-푘푠-anonymized cluster. The distance between 푥 and
a non-푘푠-anonymized cluster 풞 ∈ Γ is computed by Enlargement(풞, 푥). In the
worst case, cluster 풞 need to enlarge over all its dimensions to enclose 푥. Thus,
assuming the cost of calculating the enlargement over a dimension is 퐶푒, then
the time of Enlargement(풞, 푥) is 퐶푒 ⋅푑. Moreover, since Γ contains at maximum
휂 non-푘푠-anonymized clusters, we can estimate the worst case time complexity
of bestSelection as:
퐶푤bestSelection = 퐶푒 ⋅ 푑 ⋅ 휂 (5.1)
Function mergeClusters. Given a cluster 풞, the merge operation is done re-
peatedly, each time combing 풞 with its selected nearest neighbor. In each round,
Function mergeClusters scans the whole list of non-푘푠-anonymized clusters in Γ
(excluding 풞 itself), the one that incurs the minimum enlargement to 풞 is chosen
as the nearest neighbor. This alone requires time complexity of (∣Γ∣−1)⋅(퐶푒 ⋅푑).
The merge runs continuously, until 풞 reaches the size of 푘. In the worst case,
Γ contains 휂 clusters, and all of them are merged into 풞. Moreover, at each
iteration the size of Γ is decremented by one. Therefore, the upper bound time
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(퐶푒 ⋅ 푑)(휂 − 푖) = 휂 ⋅ (휂 − 1)
2
⋅ (퐶푒 ⋅ 푑) (5.2)
Function splitk. Recall lines 4-19 of Function splitk, we know that separat-
ing a sub-cluster from cluster 풞 is done by randomly selecting a tuple 푥 ∈ 풞
and finding its 푘-1 nearest neighbors. Let 휑 be the set of buckets grouped by
푝푖푑. In each bucket, a representative tuple is selected, and its distance from 푥 is
calculated. If the representative is closer to 푥 than the root in the heap, it will
replace the root and the heap will be adjusted accordingly. Therefore, to create
a sub-cluster, the required time is ∣휑∣ ⋅ (퐶푒 ⋅ 푑 + 퐶ℎ), where 퐶푒 ⋅ 푑 is the time
to calculate the distance between two tuples, and 퐶ℎ is the time to adjust the
heap. This cost reaches the maximum when each tuple in 풞 assumes a different
푝푖푑 value. Let 푛 be the number of tuples in 풞. Then the time to generate one
sub-cluster is at most 푛 ⋅ (퐶푒 ⋅ 푑+퐶ℎ). The above process repeatedly runs until
all the possible sub-clusters are created. Since the number of sub-clusters is at
most ⌊푛/푘⌋ and in each iteration the size of 풞 is decreased by 푘, the total cost of
generating sub-clusters is no more than
∑⌊푛/푘⌋−1
푖=0 (푛− 푖 ⋅푘)(퐶푒 ⋅푑+퐶ℎ). Finally,
the remaining tuples in 풞 are inserted into the new sub-clusters generated above.
For each of the remaining 푛− 푘 ⋅ ⌊푛/푘⌋ tuples, it is calculated the enlargement
of each sub-cluster (the cost is ⌊푛/푘⌋ ⋅ (퐶푒 ⋅ 푑)). Therefore, the upper bound of




(푛− 푖 ⋅ 푘)(퐶푒 ⋅ 푑+ 퐶ℎ)
⎤⎦+




(퐶푒 ⋅ 푑) (5.3)
Note that 퐶ℎ is upper bounded by log(푘) (the hight of heap) comparisons,
so it is much smaller than 퐶푒 ⋅ 푑, and the total cost of splitk is roughly 푛22푘 (퐶푒 ⋅
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푑). If tuples are uniformly distributed among non-푘푠-anonymized clusters, then
cluster 풞 assumes 푛 = 훿/푘 tuples and the cost will be 훿2
2푘3
(퐶푒 ⋅ 푑). However,
with highly skew distribution, cluster 풞 may contain almost all the 훿 tuples. In




Let us now discuss the overall time complexity of CASTLE. In doing that,
we estimate how many times bestSelection, mergeClusters, and splitk are called
by CASTLE. Let 풮 be the stream given in input to CASTLE, where with ∣풮∣ we
denote the number of tuples in 풮.
bestSelection is called for each of the ∣풮∣ tuples, thus its overall time com-
plexity is:
퐶푇표푇 bestSelection = ∣풮∣ ⋅ 퐶푤bestSelection = ∣풮∣ ⋅ 퐶푒 ⋅ 푑 ⋅ 휂 (5.4)
Moreover, since 휂 is a predefined value, and will not exceed 100 in the experi-
ments according to Table 5.3, we can estimate this cost as 푂(∣풮∣).
Recall that a merge is performed when a tuple is expiring and no other way
to output it is possible. Thus, we can say that in the worst case mergeClusters
is called for each one of the ∣풮∣ tuples. However, every time a merge is per-
formed the number of tuples in 풮 that still have to be evaluated by CASTLE
decreases by at least 푘. Therefore, the upper bound of the total number of pos-
sible merge operations is ∣풮∣
푘









⋅ 휂 ⋅ (휂 − 1)
2
⋅ (퐶푒 ⋅ 푑) (5.5)
Moreover, using the same reasoning we have made before regarding the 휂 pa-




Finally, the splitk function is called when an expiring tuple is contained in
a non-푘푠-anonymized with size at least 2푘. In the worst case, we can say that
this happens for all tuples in 풮. However, similarly to the merge operation,
every time a split is performed the number of tuples decreases by at least 2k.
Therefore, the number of possible split over ∣풮∣ tuples is at most ∣풮∣
2푘
, which

















⋅ (퐶푒 ⋅ 푑) (5.6)
Therefore, the overall time complexity of CASTLE is bounded by the time
complexity of splitk, i.e., 푂( ∣풮∣⋅훿
2
푘2
). However, since ∣풮∣ is much more greater
than both 푘 and 훿, we can conclude that the overall time complexity of CASTLE
is 푂(풮).
5.6.2 Space complexity
To estimate the space complexity we need to consider the information stored in
memory when executing CASTLE. This consists of two main components: (1)
the data stream tuples (i.e., tuples in the non-푘푠-anonymized clusters), (2) the
information about non-푘푠-anonymized and 푘푠-anonymized clusters.
Regarding the first component, it is important to note that delay constraint
ensures that, at any instant, there are at most 훿 tuples in memory. Thus, let 푆푥
be the space required to store a single tuple, the first component requires 훿 ⋅ 푆푥
space.
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Let us consider the second component. For each cluster, either non-푘푠-
anonymized or 푘푠-anonymized cluster, CASTLE stores the corresponding gen-
eralization. Thus, let 푆푔 be the space required to store the generalization for a
QI attribute, storing the generalization of a cluster requires 푑 ⋅ 푆푔 space. Since
the number of non-푘푠-anonymized clusters is upper bounded by 휂, and that of
푘푠-anonymized clusters is assumed no more than 푁푘푠4, the space required by
the second component will be at most (휂 +푁푘푠) ⋅ 푑 ⋅ 푆푔.
Put it all together, the total space required by CASTLE is:
푆푐표푠푡 = 훿 ⋅ 푆푥 + (휂 +푁푘푠)(푑 ⋅ 푆푔). (5.7)
5.7 Performance evaluation
We have implemented CASTLE and have conducted several experiments. Our
experiments have been designed with two objectives in mind. First we would
like to verify that the proposed method is able to continuously anonymize a
data stream while keeping the data useful. Second, to illustrate the effectiveness
of CASTLE, we compare it with the approach presented in [10], which is the
one comparable to our approach since it 푘-anonymizes the data set by a single
pass on them. For these experiments, we used both synthetic and real world
data. In particular, we have adopted the Adult data set from UC Irvine Machine
Learning Repository [4], UCI-Adult, which has become a standard for studying
푘-anonymity. Moreover, in order to have a better simulation of a data stream,
we have also considered the data set used in [39]. We refer to this as SFU-
Adult [1]. We configure UCI-Adult5 by removing tuples with missing values.
Thus it contains 30,162 tuples. SFU-Adult contains 45,222 tuples after adding
4푁푘푠 is a threshold that can be determined based on the available memory.
5Both UCI-Adult and SFU-Adult contain only one tuple for each person. In Section 5.7.1
we will generate a stream with multiple tuples belonging to a same individual.
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15,060 extra tuples to UCI-Adult. Of the 14 attributes in the two datasets, we
choose 10 as the potential QI-attributes. Their characteristics are shown in Table
5.4.
Attribute Type Numerical range# Leaves # Levels
Age Numerical 17 - 90
Final-weight Numerical 13492 - 1490400
Education-num Numerical 1 - 16
Capital-gain Numerical 0 - 99999
Capital-loss Numerical 0 - 4356
Hours-per-week Numerical 1 - 99
Education Categorical 16 5
Martial-status Categorical 7 4
Occupation Categorical 14 3
Native-country Categorical 40 5
Table 5.4: Characteristics of the attributes
The algorithms were implemented by Microsoft visual C++ and the experi-
ments were conducted on an Intel Pentium IV 2.4GHz with 1 GB RAM, running
windows XP. In the following, we evaluate CASTLE using the metric described
in Section 2.3.
5.7.1 Tuning CASTLE
The parameters that affect the performance of CASTLE are: 훿, 푘, the number of
QI attributes, 휇, 휂, and the data distribution.
Effects of 휂 and 휇. CASTLE’s adaptability to data distribution is controlled
by two parameters: 휇, the number of most recent 푘푠-anonymized clusters on
which 휏 is calculated, and 휂, the threshold for controlling the maximum number
of non-푘푠-anonymized clusters in the memory. Figure 5.5 presents the average








































(a) SFU-Adult (b) UCI-Adult
Figure 5.5: Varying 휂 and 휇
We have set 푘 = 100, 훿 = 10000 and have used 10 QI attributes. We run
the experiments on both the SFU-Adult (Figure 5.5(a)) and UCI-Adult (Figure
5.5(b)) data sets. In both data sets 휂 = 50 minimizes the information loss. In
the experiment of SFU-Adult, 휇 = 100 and 휇 = 150 yield the best information
quality; in the experiment of UCI-Adult, 휇 = 100 outperforms 휇 = 150. In the
following experiments, we shall use 휂 = 50 and 휇 = 100 as the default values.
Effects of quasi-identifiers. A further experiment measures how the size of QI
affects the average information loss. The experiment has been conducted on the
UCI-Adult and SFU-Adult data sets with 푘 = 100 and 훿 = 10000. Figure 5.6(a)
reports how the average information loss varies by increasing the size of QI. The
exploited metric space is defined based on QI attributes (i.e., each QI attribute is
one dimension). When the size of QI increases, the data become more sparse in
the defined space, and clusters are more likely to have ‘big’ minimum bounding
boxes. This is related to the curse of dimensionality [8]. Therefore, as expected,
the information loss increases when increasing the number of QI attributes.
Effects of 푘. Figure 5.6(b) shows how the average information loss increases
by increasing the value of 푘. In this experiment we have considered 10 QI
attributes, 훿 = 10000, and both UCI-Adult and SFU-Adult data sets. The results






















(a) varying QI (b) varying 푘
Figure 5.6: Varying QI and 푘
data — this translates to bigger loss in information.
Effects of data distribution. We have conducted several experiments to inves-
tigate how CASTLE scales with different data distributions. In order to do that,
we have evaluated CASTLE on synthetic data sets following power law distribu-
tion generated by means of genzipf [2]. More precisely, a value 푣 generated by
genzipf has the following probability property: 푝(푣) = 푐
푣훼
, 푣 ∈ {1, . . . , 푁} and∑푁
푣=1 푝(푣) = 1, where 푐 is the normalization constant automatically initialized
and 푁 is the biggest possible integer value in generation. Figure 5.7 reports the
average information loss with different 훼 values. The experiments have been
conducted with fixed 푘 and by varying 훿. We have evaluated the behavior of
CASTLE with respect to data distribution with different 푘 values (cfr. Figures
5.7(a), . . . 5.7(d)). From the results, it is clear that CASTLE is very effective for
clustered data. This is promising as real data are typically clustered.
Effect of multiple tuples referring to the same person. In the previous experi-
ments we have considered the UCI-Adult and SFU-Adult datasets, by assuming
that each tuple refers to a distinct person, that is, each tuple has a different
푝푖푑. However, in a data stream multiple tuples may refer to a same person,























































(c) 푘 = 700 (d) 푘 = 1000
Figure 5.7: Information loss on power-law synthetic data
affect the information quality. In particular, we exploit the IBM Quest Syn-
thetic Data Generation Code [14] to generate a set of tuples 푇푡푟푎푛 with schema
(푝푖푑, 푡푖푑, 푙푖푠푡 표푓 푖푡푒푚푠), where 푝푖푑 is a customer’s id, 푡푖푑 represents transaction
id, and list of items are the items a customer has bought. Then, we join 푇푡푟푎푛
with UCI-Adult on their 푝푖푑 to produce the data stream. Since 푇푡푟푎푛 is bigger
than UCI-Adult, which contains 30,162 tuples only, we join tuples in 푇푡푟푎푛 with
푝푖푑 > 30, 162 with randomly selected tuples in UCI-Adult. As a result, the
streaming tuples have the schema (푝푖푑, 푡푖푑,푄퐼, 푙푖푠푡 표푓 푖푡푒푚푠). Moreover, to
simulate the presence of more transactions referring to the same person, when a
streaming tuple 푥 is pushed into a cluster, CASTLE splits it into multiple tuples
with schema (푝푖푑, 푡푖푑,푄퐼, 푖푡푒푚), one for each distinct item contained in 푥. Ac-
cording to this approach, we have generated three different synthetic datasets,
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(a) varying QI (b) varying K
Figure 5.8: Information loss on transaction stream
The experiments are carried out by setting 훿 = 10000, and varying 푘 and the
size of QI. In particular, in Figure 5.8(a) we set 푘 = 100 and vary the size of
QI, where 푑푢푝 = 5, 푑푢푝 = 10, and 푑푢푝 = 15 indicates the synthetic dataset on
average with 5, 10, and 15 items in the 푙푖푠푡 표푓 푖푡푒푚푠, respectively. In general,
when the size of QI increases, the information quality degrades. In Figure 5.8(b)
we set the size of QI to be 4, and vary 푘. We find that information loss uniformly
increases as a function of 푘.
5.7.2 Utility
In this section, we study the utility of the anonymized stream. We consider
aggregated queries as they are the basis of statistical analysis and many mining
applications (e.g., decision tree and association rule mining), and exploit the
metric [82] to evaluate the query accuracy:
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM Anonymized-stream
WHERE pred(퐴1) AND . . . AND pred(퐴휆) AND pred(풮풜)
Each 퐴푖 is a QI attribute. 풮풜 is a sensitive attribute. The query has predicates
on 휆 randomly selected QI attributes and 풮풜. For each of those 휆+ 1 attributes
퐴, 푝푟푒푑(퐴) has the form of 퐴 ∈ 푅퐴, where 푅퐴 is an arbitrary interval in the
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domain of 퐴. The expected selectivity over the table is 0<휃<1. Assuming data
are uniformly distributed, 휃 can be achieved if each attribute 퐴 selects records
within a range of length ∣퐴∣ ⋅ 휃퐴 of its domain, such that (휃퐴)휆+1 = 휃. In effect,
the length of푅퐴 should be ∣퐴∣ ⋅휃 1휆+1 , where ∣퐴∣ is the domain length of attribute
퐴.
We evaluate the same queries on both output and input streams, i.e.. 풮표푢푡
and 풮. Given a query 푄, if its result in 푖푡ℎ window of 풮표푢푡 is 푒푠푡, and if its
result in 푖푡ℎ window of 풮 is 푎푐푡, then the relative error of this query is defined
as ∣푎푐푡− 푒푠푡∣/∣푎푐푡∣. Given a window 푊 in a data stream, we run 5,000 queries
on 푊 , and take the median relative error of these queries as the window error.
As 푊 advances, a sequence of windows are generated. We calculate all the
window errors, and take their average as the workload error. Furthermore, the
metric [82] assumes a uniform distribution of tuples in each EC, so attributes
with a skewed distribution of values will not be included in the experiments.
Among all the 30,162 tuples in UCI-Adult dataset, 27,624 ones have the value
of 0 on attribute capital-gain, which has a range [0,99999]. Similarly, attribute
capital-loss has the value of 0 in 28,735 tuples, even though its range is [0,4356].
Therefore, neither capital-gain nor capital-loss is involved in the evaluation.
Figure 5.9 reports the experiment results. We set the window size ∣푊 ∣ as
large as 훿. In Figure 5.9(a) we set ∣푄퐼∣ = 4, 푘 = 100 and 휃 = 0.1, and vary
훿. When 훿 increases, CASTLE can select nearest neighbors among more tuples,
thus the formed clusters are more likely to have smaller minimum bounding
boxes. Hence, the utility increases as a function of 훿. In Figure 5.9(b) we
consider 4 QI attributes, set 훿 = 10000 and 휃 = 0.1, and vary 푘. When 푘
increases, utility degrades since a larger 푘 requires a cluster containing more














































(c) varying QI (d) varying selectivity
Figure 5.9: Workload error
of varying QI when 푘 = 100, 훿 = 10000, and 휃 = 0.1; the workload error does
not change uniformly as the size of QI increases. However, in general utility
is reduced when QI has a higher dimensionality. Figure 5.9(d) is the result by
varying selectivity 휃 with 4 QI attributes, 푘 = 100, and 훿 = 10000. Bigger 휃
yields a higher accuracy since a bigger 휃 indicates bigger 푅퐴, thus allowing a
larger generalization of attribute 퐴. In all these experiments, the workload error
of CASTLE is less than 13%, indicating high utility of anonymized streams.
5.7.3 Comparative study
As there is no previous work of continuously anonymizing data streams, we em-
ploy a comparison benchmark presented in [10], hereafter called dynamicGroup.
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dynamicGroup outputs the anonymized data only after the whole process is com-
plete (i.e., after scanning the entire data set). To create a level playing field,
CASTLE anonymizes the stream data up to its end as follows: after the last
tuple from the stream is pushed to a cluster, CASTLE outputs all the clusters
with sizes not less than 푘. Then CASTLE generalizes all the tuples which fall
in 푘푠-anonymized clusters. Finally, CASTLE merges all the remaining non-
anonymized tuples to form a cluster and outputs it. dynamicGroup uses histori-
cal data to build the first set of clusters in the memory. We take the first 푛 tuples
in UCI-Adult as the historical data, and all the remaining ones as the streaming











































(c) 푘 = 200 (d) 푘 = 400
Figure 5.10: A comparison with dynamicGroup on information loss
The first experiment is on average information loss, with UCI-Adult as the
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test dataset, and its 6 continuous attributes as QI. Note that dynamicGroup can
process continuous attribute only. Figure 5.10 reports the results by varying 훿.
We have studied several values of 푘 (see Figures 5.10(a), (b), (c), and (d)). It
is important to note that dynamicGroup does not consider the delay constraint.
Thus, it retains tuples till the end of the process, which obviously influences the
information loss. For a fair comparison between CASTLE and dynamicGroup
we must consider only the average information loss of CASTLE with 훿 set to
infinity. As shown in Figure 5.10, the information quality of CASTLE increases

























(a) varying 푘 (b) varying selectivity
Figure 5.11: A comparison with dynamicGroup on median relative error
We also compare CASTLE with dynamicGroup with respect to the utility. In
Figure 5.11 we consider 4 continuous QI attributes (excluding capital-gain and
capital-loss since they are not uniformly distributed), and set 훿 = 20, 000. In
Figure 5.11(a) we vary 푘, by setting 휃 = 0.1, whereas in Figure 5.11(b) we vary
the selectivity 휃, by setting 푘 = 200. In both experiments CASTLE outperforms
dynamicGroup clearly.
5.7.4 푘푠-anonymity and ℓ-diversity
In our last experiment, we extend CASTLE to support ℓ-diversity. Figure 5.12
and Figure 5.13 report the results on the UCI-Adult data set, while setting
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훿 = 10000, 푘 = 100, and ∣푄퐼∣ = 5. In Figure 5.12 the sensitive attribute is age,
whereas in Figure 5.13 occupation is used as the sensitive attribute. When the
diversity increases, a cluster should contain potentially more tuples, thus both
information quality and utility decrease. However, when 푘 increases and/or di-
versity ℓ increases, the security of the anonymized data stream is higher. There-
fore, based on all the above experiments, we can conclude that the information
loss/utility and the security is a trade-off: to better preserve the privacy we may
need to degrade information quality/utility; to preserve more information/utility,























(a) information loss (b) utility






















(a) information loss (b) utility
Figure 5.13: 푘푠-anonymity and ℓ-diversity: Occupation
152
5.8 Summary
In this chapter we have presented CASTLE a cluster-based framework to 푘-
anonymize data streams. Relevant features of CASTLE are the enforcement
of delay constraints, its adaptability to data distributions, and the cluster reuse
strategy that improves the performance without compromising security. Perfor-





푡-CLOSENESS ON DATA STREAMS
In this chapter we study the notion of 푡-closeness for streaming data, thus serv-
ing anonymized tuples with stronger privacy than what CASTLE (Chapter 5)
ensures. Since data streams are continuous and unbounded, the existing 푡-
closeness concept is not directly applicable. Thus, we revise the definition of
푡-closeness, by restricting closeness constraint in each window only, instead of
the whole data stream. In particular, we propose (휔, 푡)-closeness: for any EC,
there exists a window that has a size of 휔 and contains the EC, so that the dif-
ference of the 풮풜 distribution between the EC and the window is no more than
a threshold 푡. At the same time, we design a customized algorithm to ensure (휔,
푡)-closeness.
6.1 Introduction
As far as we know, CASTE, presented in Chapter 5, is the first scheme proposed
up to now that is able to continuously anonymize streaming data, while ensur-
ing the maximum delay between any tuple’s input and its output not more than a
threshold 훿. The anonymized data output by CASTLE are served with a privacy
guarantee enabled by 푘-anonymity and/or ℓ-diversity. However, 푘-anonymity
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suffers from homogeneous attack, when most tuples in an EC share a same 풮풜
value (Section 1.1.1). ℓ-diversity copes with this limitation with a diversity re-
quirement on the 풮풜 values in the EC. Nevertheless, it is susceptible to skewness
and similarity attacks (Section 1.1.2), since it pays no attention to the unavoid-
able adversarial knowledge on the global 풮풜 distribution in the whole table.
CASTLE is developed according to 푘-anonymity and/or ℓ-diversity. Therefore,
it inevitably shares the same drawbacks with its underlying privacy models.
Among all the solutions to strengthen the security of streaming tuples, a
possible one is applying an enhanced privacy model on the data. Such a solu-
tion is straightforward but effective, since the extent to which the anonymized
data are immune from attacks is up to their supporting privacy model. Here, we
make use of 푡-closeness [52], a successor of 푘-anonymity and ℓ-diversity with
improved security. 푡-closeness is originally proposed for static microdata, with
an assumption that all the data involved are available before any anonymiza-
tion. It takes the global 풮풜 distribution of the whole data set as the baseline
of the prior knowledge, and constrains the extra information an attacker gains
after seeing an EC. However, data streams are continuous and unbounded. Con-
sequently, such a global distribution is unavailable. Therefore, the 푡-closeness
model cannot be applied in the context of streaming data directly.
In this chapter we first revise the definition of 푡-closeness with respect to the
unique characteristics of data streams. We restrict the closeness constraints in
each window instead of the whole data stream by (휔, 푡)-closeness — for any
EC, there exists a window that has a size of 휔 and contains the EC, so that
the difference of the 풮풜 distribution between the EC and the window is no more
than a threshold 푡. As discussed in Section 5.1, the output stream may be used to
real-time react to some anomalies. Therefore, we enforce expiring constraint on
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the anonymization procedure to make sure the freshness of output data. Given
the window size 휔 and ℐ, the time interval of window advance, the delay be-
tween the input of a tuple and its output is at most 휔 + ℐ. With (휔, 푡)-closeness
principle and expiring constraint as the underlying model requirements, we put
forward SABREW, a window-based 푡-closeness scheme, which reuses static 푡-
closeness framework SABRE (see Chapter 3) as a building block to anonymize
streaming tuples. Coming along with the algorithm is a solid theory foundation,
proving that SABREW strictly follows the stated model constraints. We compare
SABREW with schemes extended from 푘-anonymity algorithms; the evaluation
results show that SABREW outperforms them in terms of both information qual-
ity and time efficiency.
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section intro-
duces a window-based 푡-closeness-resembling model. We develop an algorithm
tailored for the model in Section 6.3, and prove its soundness by a solid theory
foundation in Section 6.4. After that, Section 6.5 reports the results of an ex-
perimental evaluation. Finally, we discuss how to reuse the algorithm to adapt
훽-likeness to data streams in Section 6.6, and conclude this chapter in Section
6.7.
6.2 The privacy modeling
In this section we present the privacy model underlying our anonymization
scheme. It preserves the privacy of streaming tuples and ensures their fresh-
ness through two concepts: (휔,푡)-closeness and expiring constraint. Table 6.1
lists some symbols that will be used throughout the chapter; some notations and
the relationship among them will be later clarified.
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Notation Denotation
풮푖푛 The input data stream
풮표푢푡 The output data stream generated from 풮푖푛
풲 A window in 풮푖푛
ℐ Time interval of window advance
휔 Window size; 휔 = 푗 ⋅ ℐ, where 푗 > 0 is an integer
ℛ(풲) All the tuples in풲
ℛ(풲, 표) All the already output tuples of풲
ℛ(풲, 표¯) All the not-yet-output tuples in풲 ,
ℛ(풲) = ℛ(풲, 표) ∪ℛ(풲, 표¯)
ℛ(풲, 푒표¯) Expiring and not-yet-output tuples in풲
풮풜(풲) 풮풜 distribution inℛ(풲)
풮풜(풲, 표¯) 풮풜 distribution inℛ(풲, 표¯)
풟풲 표¯ EMD(풮풜(풲), 풮풜(풲, 표¯))
Table 6.1: Streaming notations
Definition 6.1 ((휔,푡)-closeness). Let 풮푖푛 be an input stream, 풮풜 its sensitive
attribute, and 풮표푢푡 the output stream generated from 풮푖푛. We monitor 풮푖푛 on a
window of size 휔. We say that 풮표푢푡 follows the (휔, 푡)-closeness, if and only if the
following conditions hold:
∙ For each tuple 푥 ∈ 풮푖푛, there exists in 풮표푢푡 an equivalence class, which
contains the corresponding anonymized tuple of 푥.
∙ For each equivalence class 풢 ∈ 풮표푢푡, there exists a window 풲 in 풮푖푛,
such that 풢 is generated from the tuples in 풲 , and the 풮풜 distribution
in 풢 does not differ from that of all tuples in 풲 by more than a given
threshold 푡.
(휔, 푡)-closeness considers the 풮풜 distribution of all the tuples in a window
of size 휔 as the prior knowledge, and the 풮풜 distribution in an output EC as the
posterior knowledge. It limits the information gain from the prior knowledge
to the posterior one, by requiring that the difference of the two mentioned 풮풜
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distributions be at most 푡, a threshold. (휔, 푡)-closeness assumes that the 풮풜
distribution in a window of size 휔 is non-sensitive, thus publishable. How to
better determine a non-sensitive prior knowledge of 풮풜 distribution by allowing
flexible window size is a future work.
We have discussed in Section 5.1 a feature that distinguishes data streams
from static datasets, that is, multiple tuples belonging to a single person may
appear in the streaming data. Thus, without a careful management there does
exist the possibility, no matter how small it is, that all the tuples in a single
EC belong to a same person. In this case, the QI value of this person will
remaining unchanged even after generalization. Consequently, he/she will be
re-identified through linking attack. To address this arising issue, we combine
(휔,푡)-closeness with 푘-anonymity in the experiments (Section 6.5), requiring
that the set of persons referred to by all the tuples in an EC has a cardinality of
at least 푘.
Definition 6.2 (Expiring constraint). Assume an (휔, 푡)-closeness scheme 푇 ,
which takes as input a data stream 풮푖푛 and generates an output data stream
풮표푢푡. Let ℐ be a positive integer, and 휔 = 푗 ⋅ ℐ, where 푗 > 0 is an integer.
Assume that each window in 풮푖푛 advances by ℐ tuples. 푇 satisfies the expiring
constraint if and only if, each time a window in 풮푖푛 advances its first ℐ tuples
expire and are output.
The above concept synchronizes the output of tuples with the window ad-
vance. Each time a window slides forwards, the tuples outside it will be output.
Such a synchronization controls the delay of tuples (i.e., also their freshness)
with regard to window size and the time interval of window sliding.
CASTLE in Section 5.3 has already defined delay constraint, requiring the
delay between the input of a tuple and its output below a threshold 훿. The above
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Definition 6.2 introduces another time constraint, confining the upper bound of
the delay by two parameters, i.e., 휔 and ℐ (Lemma 6.1 below will prove that
the upper bound is 휔 + ℐ). Such a constraint synchronizes the tuple output
with window sliding. In addition, it allows for more flexibility in the anonymi-
zation process: Users can tune 휔 and ℐ based on the requirements of specific
applications. Anyway, the two concepts are related. On the one hand, expiring
constraint can be reduced to delay constraint by setting ℐ = 1 and 휔 = 훿 − 1.
On the other hand, delay constraint can also be seen as a special case of expiring
constraint.
Lemma 6.1. Assume a (휔, 푡)-closeness on input stream 풮푖푛, which advances by
time interval ℐ. Then the delay time between the arrival of a tuple and its output
will not exceed 휔 + ℐ.
The proof of the lemma is trivial. So it is omitted.
As the window slides, a sequence of windows풲1, 풲2, . . ., 풲푖, 풲푖+1, . . .
are generated. When window풲푖 advances by ℐ tuples, a new window풲푖+1 is
generated. The first (oldest) ℐ tuples in풲푖, which are left outside풲푖+1, should
be output. We call these expiring tuples. Thus, in Figure 6.1, as the window
slides from 풲1 to 풲2, the tuples in 풲1 ∖ 풲2 (the first ℐ tuples in 풲1), are




Figure 6.1: Windows and their advances
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Assume that 풮푖푛 is an input (original) stream, and an (휔,푡)-closeness scheme
is applied on it. As tuples arrive from 풮푖푛, they are first buffered in memory.
When the window advances from 풲푖 to 풲푖+1, we create ECs for the expiring
tuples in풲푖. Still, the expiring tuples on their own may not satisfy 푡-closeness
to the 풮풜 distribution of all tuples in 풲푖; thus, the created ECs may contain
both expiring and non-expiring tuples. As an example, let풲푖 be the advancing
window and take ℐ = 1. With high probability, the single expiring tuple (the first
tuple in풲푖) is not t-close to the distribution of all the tuples in풲푖. Therefore,
we need to accompany the single expiring tuple with some non-expiring tuple(s)
in 풲푖 to form an EC. After the ECs for the expiring tuples are generated, we
output all these ECs.
As the window advances continuously, an output stream 풮표푢푡 is generated.
Given that the output ECs may contain non-expired tuples, when the window
slides to풲푖+1, some tuples in풲푖+1 may have already been output. For instance,
in Figure 6.1, as the window slides from풲1 to풲2, the first ℐ tuples in풲1 are
expiring. ECs are created for the expiring tuples, and contain both the expiring
tuples and non-expiring ones; assume ECs are composed of the tuples in the
shaded segments in풲1. These ECs are output. Thus, by the time the window








Figure 6.2: The classification of tuples
Based on the above distinctions, we define the following classes of tuples,
illustrated in Figure 6.2 (also listed in Table 6.1):
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1. ℛ(풲), all tuples in window풲;
2. ℛ(풲 , 표), the already output tuples from풲;
3. ℛ(풲 , 표¯), the not-yet-output tuples in풲 ,ℛ(풲 , 표) ∪ℛ(풲 , 표¯) = ℛ(풲);
4. ℛ(풲 , 푒), the expiring tuples of풲 when it advances (i.e., the first ℐ tuples
of풲), and
5. ℛ(풲 , 푒표¯), the expiring and not-yet-output tuples of풲 .
6.3 The algorithm
Now we are ready to present SABREW, our window-based 푡-closeness scheme
in the context of data streams. SABREW is extended from our static 푡-closeness
framework SABRE (see Chapter 3), in particular, we reuse SABRE to anonymize
a window of tuples (i.e., the set of tuples staying in a same window). Before














Figure 6.3: An example for Algorithm SABREW
Example 6.1. Assume that 풮푖푛 is the original input stream of SABREW. Figure
6.3 illustrates the sequence of windows, as the window advances in 풮푖푛. When
풲1 is sliding at instant 횤1,ℛ(풲1) = ℛ(풲1, 표¯); i..e, none of its tuples is yet out-
put. We partition tuples in풲1 into 푆1풢 , a list of ECs, so that the 풮풜 distribution
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of each EC in 푆1풢 is t-close to that of all the tuples in풲1. ECs that contain ex-
piring tuples are output and deleted from 푆1풢 . After that풲1 slides to풲2. When
풲2 begins to advance at instant 횤2, assume that ℛ(풲2, 표¯) and ℛ(풲2) have
similar 풮풜 distributions (i.e., the 풮풜 distribution of not-yet-output tuples in풲2
is similar to that of all tuples in 풲2). Like what we did for 풲1, we partition
ℛ(풲2, 표¯) into a set of ECs, 푆2풢 (more in Case 2 of SABREW below). All the ECs
with expiring tuples are output and removed from 푆2풢 . Then, 풲2 slides to 풲3.
When 풲3 slides at instant 횤3, assume that ℛ(풲3, 푒표¯) is empty (i.e., all expir-
ing tuples have already been output). Under this circumstance, we do not have
to anonymize any tuple, and 풲3 simply slides to 풲4 (see Case 1 of SABREW
below). When 풲4 advances at instant 횤4, assume that the 풮풜 distribution of
ℛ(풲4, 표¯) is very ‘different’ from that of ℛ(풲4). If we partition ℛ(풲4, 표¯) into
a set of ECs, some of them (containing expiring tuples) may also be very ‘differ-
ent’ from ℛ(풲4) with respect to 풮풜 distribution, and (휔, 푡)-closeness cannot
be guaranteed any more. However, ℛ(풲4, 푒표¯) (i.e., the expiring and not-yet-
output tuples in풲4) falls in풲2, i.e. ℛ(풲4, 푒표¯) ⊂ ℛ(풲2, 표¯)1. Sinceℛ(풲2, 표¯)
is already partitioned into 푆2풢 , each tuple in ℛ(풲4, 푒표¯) must belong to an EC
of 푆2풢 (see Case 3 of SABREW below). Thus, we output all the ECs in 푆
2
풢 and
delete them. Hence, we ensure that all tuples in ℛ(풲4, 푒표¯) are output, while
now all the tuples in 풲2 have also been output. Then, as 풲5 slides at instant
횤5, all its expiring tuples have already been output because they fall in풲2. So
풲5 simply slides to풲6. When풲6 enters, none of its tuples is output, and the
anonymization of SABREW starts from scratch.
Algorithm SABREW anonymizes an input stream 풮푖푛 into an output stream
풮표푢푡 to attain the (휔,푡)-closeness and expiring constraint. Window 풲 buffers
1ℛ(풲2, 표¯) is not the set of not-yet-output tuples of풲2 at instant 횤4; it is the set of not-yet-
output tuples of풲2 at instant 횤2 when풲2 is advancing.
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Algorithm: SABREW(풮푖푛, 푡, 휔, ℐ)
Let 풮푖푛 and 풮표푢푡 be the input and output streams respectively;1
Let풲 be a window in 풮푖푛;2
풲 buffers the first 휔 tuples from 풮푖푛;3
Let 푆풢 be a set of ECs, initialized to be empty;4
while ℐ new tuples have arrived from 풮푖푛 do5
Case 1:6
if ∣ℛ(풲, 푒표¯)∣ = 0 then7
Update풲 by advancing ℐ tuples;8
Continue;9
Let 풮풜(풲, 표¯) be the 풮풜 distribution ofℛ(풲, 표¯);10
Let 풮풜(풲) be the 풮풜 distribution ofℛ(풲);11
Let 풟풲표¯ = 퐸푀퐷(풮풜(풲, 표¯),풮풜(풲));12
Case 2:13
if 풟풲표¯ < 푡 then /* DIRECT begins */14
푆풢 = SABRE (ℛ(풲, 표¯), 풮풜, 푡−풟풲표¯);15
foreach 푥 ∈ ℛ(풲, 푒표¯) do16
Find 풢 ∈ 푆풢 , which contains 푥;17
Put 풢 to 풮표푢푡;18
Delete 풢 from 푆풢 /* DIRECT end */19
Case 3:20
else /* INDIRECT begins */21
foreach 풢 ∈ 푆풢 do22
Add 풢 to 풮표푢푡;23
Delete 풢 from 푆풢 /* INDIRECT ends */24
Update풲 by advancing ℐ tuples;25
the first 휔 tuples from input stream 풮푖푛 (steps 2-3). When ℐ new tuples have
arrived from 풮푖푛 (step 5), the first ℐ tuples in풲 expire and need to be output.
ℛ(풲 , 푒표¯) is the set of expiring and not-yet-output tuples in 풲 at the moment
of its advance. We distinguish the following cases.
∙ Case 1 (steps 7-9): ∣ℛ(풲 , 푒표¯)∣ = 0. All expiring tuples in 풲 have
already been output (when a window advanced in a previous iteration), so
we do not need to anonymize any tuple. 풲 simply slides by ℐ tuples (step
8) and SABREW goes back to step 5 (step 9).
∙ Case 2 (steps 14-19): ∣ℛ(풲 , 푒표¯)∣ > 0 and 풟풲 표¯ < 푡. In this case the
not-yet-output tuples in풲 and all the tuples in풲 have similar 풮풜 distri-
butions. We partition ℛ(풲 , 표¯), the not-yet-output tuples in풲 , into a set
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of ECs and output those containing expiring tuples. Algorithm SABRE is
called and ℛ(풲 , 표¯) is anonymized into 푆풢 , a set of ECs (step 15). For
each equivalence class 풢 ∈ 푆풢 , EMD(풮풜(풢),풮풜(풲 , 표¯)) ≤ 푡 − 풟풲 표¯,
where 풮풜(풢) is the 풮풜 distribution in 풢. Since EMD(풮풜(풢),풮풜(풲 , 표¯))
+ EMD(풮풜(풲 , 표¯),풮풜(풲)) ≤ 푡 − 풟풲 표¯ + 풟풲 표¯ = 푡, i.e. the EMD of
transforming 풮풜(풢) to 풮풜(풲) via 풮풜(풲 , 표¯) is at most 푡, we conclude
that EMD(풮풜(풢),풮풜(풲)) ≤ 푡 (the proof is similar to that of Theorem
3.4). Therefore, 풢 is t-close to ℛ(풲). Then, ECs that contain expiring
tuples are output and deleted from 푆풢 (steps 16-19). We denote the pro-
cedure of Case 2 by DIRECT, which means that ECs for ℛ(풲 , 푒표¯) are
obtained directly from a partition of not-yet-output tuples in풲 .
∙ Case 3 (steps 21-24): ∣ℛ(풲 , 푒표¯)∣ > 0 and 풟풲 표¯ ≥ 푡. In this case the
풮풜 distribution of ℛ(풲 , 표¯) and that of ℛ(풲) are very ‘different’. If we
partition ℛ(풲 , 표¯) into a set of ECs (as Case 2), some ECs containing
expiring tuples may also be very ‘different’ from ℛ(풲) in terms of 풮풜
distribution, and (휔,푡)-closeness may not be guaranteed. However, each
tuple of ℛ(풲 , 푒표¯) is contained in one EC of 푆풢 (see Theorem 6.1 below
for a formal proof). To anonymize and outputℛ(풲 , 푒표¯) we output all the
ECs in 푆풢 and clear it (steps 22-24). We denote the procedure of Case
3 by INDIRECT, which means that ECs for ℛ(풲 , 푒표¯) are not obtained
directly from a partition of not-yet-output tuples in풲 .
After the anonymization ofℛ(풲 , 푒표¯), window풲 advances (step 25).
Now the presentation of Algorithm SABREW has completed. In the next
section we will prove that the algorithm strictly conforms to the defined privacy
model requirements, i.e., (휔, 푡)-closeness, and expiring constraint.
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6.4 Formal analysis
The correctness of SABREW depends on the three cases discussed above in its
algorithm. Case 1 is trivial. The proof for Case 2 has already been given in its
description. Therefore, we only need to focus on Case 3. In the following we
will first propose four fundamental lemmas. Based on them, we present Theo-
rem 6.1, proving that Case 3 also follows (휔, 푡)-closeness. After that, we will
show that SABREW conforms to both (휔, 푡)-closeness and expiring constraint in
Theorem 6.2.
In Algorithm SABREW, each time ℐ new tuples arrive (step 5), window풲
will advance by ℐ tuples (steps 8, 25). Therefore, as풲 continuously advances,
a sequence of windows is generated. We use 풲 to represent each generated
window, but, for the sake of clarity, in the following formal proof we will use
different notations to represent different windows. For example, we use 풲 to
represent the window at instant 횤 and 풲 ′ to represent the window at instant
횤′. We also note that DIRECT or INDIRECT is applied only when a window is
advancing.
Lemma 6.2. Assume that 휔 is the window size of input stream, each window
slides by ℐ tuples, and 휔 = 푗 ⋅ ℐ, where 푗 > 0 is an integer. Then, for two
overlapping windows풲 ′ and풲 , with풲 ′ generated before풲 , the first ℐ tuples
in풲 also fall in풲 ′.
Proof. Since window size 휔 is a multiple of advance size ℐ, once two windows
overlap, their overlapping area contains at least ℐ tuples. Furthermore, since풲 ′
is generated before풲 , the first ℐ tuples in풲 are in the overlapping area, i.e.,
the first ℐ tuples in풲 also fall in풲 ′.
Lemma 6.2 shows the overlap relationship between two windows. The next
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lemma says that once procedure INDIRECT is applied, that is, Case 3 occurs,
parameter 푗 must be larger than 1.
Lemma 6.3. Assume that 휔 is the window size of input stream, each window
advances by ℐ tuples, and 휔 = 푗 ⋅ ℐ, where 푗 > 0 is an integer. If INDIRECT is
applied in Algorithm SABREW, then 푗 > 1.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. For 푗 = 1 (휔 = ℐ), whenever a win-
dow advances, all its tuples are expiring and will be output. This makes the
anonymizations in all the windows independent. Therefore, when a window
풲 advances, ℛ(풲 , 표¯) = ℛ(풲) and 풟풲 표¯ = 0. Hence the precondition for
INDIRECT to be applied does not hold.
The next two lemmas clarify the sequential relationship between the two
procedures —DIRECT and INDIRECT. Lemma 6.4 indicates that one appli-
cation of INDIRECT cannot be followed immediately by another application
of INDIRECT. There must be at least one application of DIRECT between
them. Lemma 6.5 says that there must exist at least one DIRECT before any
INDIRECT.
Lemma 6.4. Given a window 풲 , assume that INDIRECT is applied when it
advances at instant 횤. Suppose that at instant 횤′, 횤′ < 횤, there is an application
of DIRECT and no further application of DIRECT between 횤′ and 횤. Then there
is no application of INDIRECT between 횤′ and 횤 either.
Proof. The advance of풲 incurs the call of INDIRECT, so ∣ℛ(풲 , 푒표¯)∣ > 0 and
풟풲 표¯ ≥ 푡 at instant 횤 (the preconditions of Case 3). Assume that there is 퐴퐼 ,
an application of INDIRECT, between 횤′ and 횤. Let 풲 ′ be the window, whose
advance at instant 횤′ incurs the application of DIRECT. Suppose that DIRECT
partitions ℛ(풲 ′, 표¯) (not-yet-output tuples of 풲 ′ at instant 횤′) into 푆풢 , a list of
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ECs. 퐴퐼 releases those and only those ECs that are in 푆풢 to the output stream
(steps 22-24). We make two points: First, all tuples in풲 ′ have been output after
퐴퐼; Second, 퐴퐼 outputs tuples only in 풲 ′. There are two possibilities for an
overlapping relationship between 풲 ′ and 풲 . Possibility 1: 풲 ′ overlaps with
풲 . By Lemma 6.2, ℛ(풲 , 푒표¯), a subset of the first ℐ tuples of풲 , falls in풲 ′.
All the tuples in풲 ′ are already output after 퐴퐼 (point 1), so ∣ℛ(풲 , 푒표¯)∣ = 0 at
instant 횤. This conclusion contradicts the fact that ∣ℛ(풲 , 푒표¯)∣ > 0. Possibility
2: 풲 ′ does not overlap with 풲 . In SABREW only DIRECT and INDIRECT
output tuples. During the period between 횤′ and 횤 there is no further application
of DIRECT, hence only퐴퐼 outputs tuples in this period. Since퐴퐼 outputs tuples
only in풲 ′ (point 2), none of the tuples in풲 has been output when풲 begins to
slide. Therefore, at instant 횤, ℛ(풲 , 표¯) = ℛ(풲) and 풟풲 표¯ = 0; this conclusion
contradicts the fact that풟풲 표¯ ≥ 푡. In conclusion, under the assumption that there
is an application of INDIRECT between 횤′ and 횤, none of the two possibilities is
borne. By reductio ad absurdum, we conclude that there is no application of
INDIRECT between 횤′ and 횤.
Lemma 6.5. Given a window 풲 , assume that INDIRECT is applied when it
advances at instant 횤. Then there is at least one application of DIRECT before
instant 횤.
Proof. We prove this also by contradiction. Assume that there is no application
of DIRECT before instant 횤. Let the list of generated windows be풲1,풲2, . . . ,
풲푖,풲푖+1, . . .. When풲1 begins to advance, all its tuples are not-yet-output (i.e.,
ℛ(풲1, 표¯) = ℛ(풲1)). Thus, DIRECT is applied. Therefore, for any window풲푖
(푖 > 1), if풲푖 advances at instant 횤푖, there is at least one application of DIRECT
before instant 횤푖. Since there is no application of DIRECT before instant 횤 at
the advancing moment of 풲 , then 풲 must be 풲1. However, this conclusion
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contradicts the precondition that INDIRECT is applied when풲 slides. By con-
tradiction, the assumption is incorrect, and there is at least one application of
DIRECT before instant 횤.
Putting the above four lemmas together, the following theorem proves that
Case 3 (i.e., procedure INDIRECT), anonymizes data strictly complying with
the principle of (휔, 푡)-closeness.
Theorem 6.1. In Algorithm SABREW, given a window풲 , assume that INDIRECT
is applied when it advances at instant 횤. Let ℛ(풲 , 푒표¯) be the expiring and not-
yet-output tuples in풲 at instant 횤. Then each tuple inℛ(풲 , 푒표¯) is contained in
one EC of 푆풢 .
Proof. The advance of풲 incurs the call of INDIRECT, so ∣ℛ(풲 , 푒표¯)∣ > 0 and
풟풲 표¯ ≥ 푡 at instant 횤 (the preconditions of Case 3). Assume that 퐿퐷, the last
application of DIRECT before instant 횤, occurs at instant 횤′, 횤′ < 횤 (there is no
further application of DIRECT between 횤′ and 횤). By Lemma 6.5, it follows that
퐿퐷 exists. Let풲 ′ be the window whose advance at instant 횤′ incurs 퐿퐷. Since
푆풢 records the list of ECs generated by the last application of DIRECT, we know
that 퐿퐷 partitions ℛ(풲 ′, 표¯) (not-yet-output tuples of풲 ′ at instant 횤′) into 푆풢 ,
a list of ECs (step 15).
Assume that풲 ′ does not overlap with풲 . During the period between 횤′ and
횤, there is neither an application of INDIRECT (Lemma 6.4) nor an application of
DIRECT. Still, only DIRECT and INDIRECT output tuples. In effect, there is no
tuple output between 횤′ and 횤. In addition, at instant 횤′ only ECs containing tuples
in풲 ′ have been released to the output stream (steps 16-19). We conclude that
none of tuples in풲 has been output when풲 slides. So at instant 횤,ℛ(풲 , 표¯) =
ℛ(풲) and풟풲 표¯ = 0, which contradicts the fact that풟풲 표¯ ≥ 푡. By contradiction,
it follows that 풲 ′ overlaps with 풲 . By Lemma 6.2 we know that ℛ(풲 , 푒표¯),
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a subset of the first ℐ tuples in 풲 , falls in 풲 ′, i.e., ℛ(풲 , 푒표¯) ⊂ ℛ(풲 ′, 표¯).
Therefore, each tuple in ℛ(풲 , 푒표¯) is contained in one EC of 푆풢 . In addition,
each EC of 푆풢 is t-close to풲 ′ with respect to its 풮풜 distribution.
So far, the closeness proof for Case 3 has completed. The next theorem
based on Theorem 6.1 will show that SABREW follows the privacy model de-
fined in Section 6.2.
Theorem 6.2. Algorithm SABREW follows the (휔, 푡)-closeness and expiring
constraint.
Proof. Given an input stream 풮푖푛, SABREW anonymizes it into an output stream
풮표푢푡 by the three cases we have presented. We discuss these three cases one by
one.
Case 1 (steps 7-9). Since all the expiring tuples are already output, the
expiring constraint is met. This case does not anonymize and output any tuple,
so the satisfaction of (휔, 푡)-closeness depends on the remaining two cases.
Case 2 (steps 14-19). Given an advancing window풲 at instant 횤, for each
expiring and not-yet-output tuple, an EC is formed and released to 풮표푢푡. As
each expiring tuple is output, the expiring constraint is met. Besides, since each
output EC is t-close to풲 , (휔, 푡)-closeness is satisfied.
Case 3 (steps 21-24). Given an advancing window풲 at instant 횤, by The-
orem 6.1, each expiring and not-yet-output tuple is contained in an EC formed
by tuples from another window 풲 ′, generated before 풲 . All ECs containing
expiring tuples are output, hence the expiring constraint is met. Each output EC
is t-close to풲 ′, so this case attains (휔, 푡)-closeness as well.




In this section we evaluate the performance of SABREW, our window-based
푡-closeness scheme, on streaming data. We reuse Algorithm SABRE-AK as a
building block to anonymize a window of tuples (step 15 of Algorithm SABREW).
In a similar way, we extend tIncognito [52] and tMondrian [53] to the context
of data streams, thus, obtain tIncognitoW and tMondrianW, respectively. In Sec-
tion 3.5 we have already made a comparison among SABRE-AK, tIncognito,
and tMondrian, and found that SABRE-AK is most efficient with respect to both
information quality and elapsed time. In the experiments carried out in this
section, we discover the similar trends for the three extended window-based
푡-closeness schemes, that is, SABREW is the most effective and efficient, fol-
lowed by tMondrianW, and tIncognitoW. Therefore, in the following we will
briefly present the experiment results, by only comparing the three algorithms
with regard to General Information Loss metrics (see Section 2.3) and elapsed
time.
Attribute Cardinality Type
age 79 numerical (4)
sex 2 categorical (1)
education 17 numerical (4)
marital status 6 categorical (2)
race 9 categorical (1)
work class 10 categorical (3)
birth place 83 categorical (2)
salary 50 numerical
Table 6.2: The CENSUS dataset
The prototypes were implemented in Java and the experiments were run
on a core-2 duo 2.33GHz CPU machine, with 4GB RAM, running windows
XP. We simulate the data stream by the CENSUS dataset [3], which contains
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500,000 tuples, and has 8 attributes as shown in Table 6.2; the value following
the type is the height of the corresponding attribute hierarchy. For instance,
attribute marital status is categorical and has a hierarchy of height 2. The first
7 attributes are used by default as the QI, and the last one (i.e., salary) as the
sensitive attribute. To provide defence against the attack arising when all the
tuples in an EC belong to a single person (Section 6.2), we combine (휔, 푡)-
closeness and 푘푠-anonymity. Hence, the anonymized data are protected against
both 풮풜 disclosure and identity disclosure. By default we set 푘 to be 6 (i.e., the
number of distinct persons referred to by all the tuples in an EC is at least 6).

























Figure 6.4: Effect of varying ℐ
We first set window size 휔 to 20,000, and study the effect of the value of
ℐ, the time interval of window advance. Figure 6.4 (a) illustrates the result on
information loss. Algorithms tIncognitoW and tMondrianW are extended from
푘-anonymity algorithms, hence lacking a customization towards the features of
(휔, 푡)-closeness. On the contrary, SABREW has been specially designed for (휔,
푡)-closeness. Therefore, as expected, SABREW achieves the best information
quality, followed by tMondrianW and tIncognitoW. Figure 6.4 (b) is the result
on the elapsed time. Let ∣푆∣ (∣푆∣ >> 휔) be the size of stream, then the number
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of times to advance the window is ∣푆∣−휔ℐ ≈ ∣푆∣ℐ . Every time the window advances
there is one occurrence of anonymization. So when ℐ approaches 휔, the anony-
mization process is invoked fewer times, hence the elapsed time decreases. Still,
SABREW is the fastest method, and SABREW and tMondrianW are two orders
of magnitude faster than tIncognitoW.
In our next experiment, we set ℐ at 5000, and investigate the effect of the
window size 휔. As the value of 휔 grows, more tuples are involved in each
occurrence of anonymization (step 15 of algorithm SABREW). Therefore, the
possibility of grouping tuples with similar QI values is improved, and the in-
formation loss of the output ECs is reduced. Figure 6.5 (a) presents the results
consistent with our expectation; SABREW retains its superiority, outperforming
tIncognitoW and tMondrianW by a wide margin in information quality. Figure
6.5 (b) shows the time efficiency of the three algorithms. After ℐ is fixed, the
number of times of window advance will be closely approximate to ∣푆∣ℐ , thus also
fixed. However, the increase of window size 휔 also indicates an increment of the
number of tuples participating in an anonymization. Therefore, the total elapsed
time grows as a result of the increase of the time spent in each anonymization
triggered by a window sliding. Similarly, SABREW and, to a certain extent,



















































Figure 6.6: Effect of varying closeness threshold
Figure 6.6 shows the results of varying closeness threshold 푡 from 0.15 to
0.55, where window size 휔 is set to 20,000 and window advance size ℐ is set to
5,000. As expected, when the 푡 value increases, the constraint on the similarity
between the 풮풜 distribution in any EC and that in a window containing the EC is


























Figure 6.7: Effect of varying QI
Finally, we vary the QI size from 3 to 7 to examine its effect on anonymized
data. Again window size is set to 20,000 and window advance size is fixed to
5,000. Figure 6.7 (a) is the information loss of the anonymized streaming data
by the three involved approaches. As the QI dimensionality grows, the data
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is more sparse in the QI space2, thus the formed ECs are more likely to have
bigger minimum bounding boxes. As a result, the information quality degrades
as a function of the QI size. Figure 6.7 (b) records the time complexity. When
the QI dimensionality increases, the number of generalization hierarchies3 to
be searched by tIncognitoW grows exponentially. So its elapsed time increases
exponentially as displayed in the graph. Likewise, the other two methods, i.e.,
SABREW and tMondrian, also spend more time in anonymizing the data stream
as QI size grows. However, different from tIncognitoW, their increased cost
is mainly due to the calculation of the minimum bounding boxes with higher
dimensionality. In addition, they are more scalable.
6.6 A discussion on the extension to 훽-likeness
We have extended SABRE to the context of data streams in the above. The
strategy to achieve this goal is general, and can be reused to adapt other methods,
which consider global 풮풜 distribution as background knowledge, to streaming
data. BUREL, the 훽-likeness approach in Chapter 4, falls in the category of
such methods, and its extension towards streams can be done as follows. At
the beginning, we will constrain the 훽-likeness requirements within windows,
just as we define 푡-closeness in windows in Section 6.2. After that, we can
also propose a tailored scheme for the window-based 훽-likeness principle. The
steps of the scheme will be similar to those of Algorithm SABREW. However,
instead of checking the closeness (steps 12, 14 of Algorithm SABREW), we will
measure the likeness between the ECs and the windows containing them. In
2One QI attribute is one dimension in the QI space, and each streaming tuple is modelled as
one point in the space.
3A generalization hierarchy can be a subtree of the domain hierarchy of a related QI attribute
or the combined tree of two or more generalization hierarchies [48].
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addition, instead of using SABRE to anonymize a window of tuples (step 15
of Algorithm SABREW), we will reuse BUREL as a building block to process
the tuples staying in a window, so that their output conforms to the window-
based 훽-likeness requirements. As such, the solid theory foundation to prove
the correctness of the tailored scheme will also be like that in Section 6.4.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter we presented a 푡-closeness-resembling privacy model in the con-
text of streaming data. We have proposed an algorithm customized for the
model, together with a solid theory foundation proving the soundness of the
algorithm. Experimental evaluation has been conducted; the extensive results
show that our tailored algorithm outperforms those approaches extended from




CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this chapter we will first summarize the contributions of our work, then we
will discuss some research topics as future work.
7.1 Thesis summary
This thesis concentrates on the anonymization of microdata, with two goals in
mind: protecting individuals from being linked to specific tuples and/or sensitive
values, and at the same time, maximizing the utility of released data. To achieve
such targets, we first proposed SABRE, a sophisticated framework that achieves
푡-closeness in an elegant and efficient manner. A solid theory foundation has
been provided to ensure that the two particular phases of SABRE, namely buck-
etization and redistribution, as a whole strictly follow 푡-closeness constraints.
We have shown the applicability of our scheme on both categorical and numer-
ical attributes. The extensive experimental results have demonstrated that our
two SABRE instantiations, SABRE-AK and SABRE-KNN, clearly outperform
previous schemes with respect to information quality, while SABRE-AK also
improves over them in terms of elapsed time. In conclusion, SABRE provides
the best known resolution of the tradeoff between privacy, information quality,
and computational efficiency, as far as 푡-closeness guarantee is concerned.
So far, all privacy preserving schemes that guarantee 푡-closeness [52,53,63]
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including SABRE do not consider an adversary’s information gain on each sin-
gle 푆퐴 value. Therefore, even though 푡-closeness is an improved model beyond
푘-anonymity [71] and ℓ-diversity [57], it still fails to translate 푡, the threshold,
into a human-understandable privacy guarantee. To cope with this limitation,
we proposed 훽-likeness, a robust privacy model for microdata anonymization.
It requires that the relative difference of each 풮풜 value frequency between an
EC and the whole table should not be more than a threshold 훽, thus precisely
interpreting the parameter to a comprehensible privacy guarantee. Furthermore,
we designed an algorithm BUREL, tailored for 훽-likeness model. A compari-
son with 푡-closeness schemes demonstrates that BUREL provides effective pri-
vacy guarantees in a way that state-of-the-art 푡-closeness schemes cannot, even
when set to achieve the same information accuracy or privacy measured by the
criterion of 푡-closeness. In the experiments, we have also shown that BUREL
is more effective and efficient than a 훽-likeness algorithm extended from 푘-
anonymization method [49].
There is a need of data publication for both static and streaming data. How-
ever, most of the developed privacy techniques, including SABRE and BUREL,
are designed for static data sets. They are inapplicable to streaming data. There-
fore, we proposed CASTLE, a cluster-based framework that continuously 푘-
anonymizes arriving tuples. CASTLE ensures the freshness of released data,
by imposing a delay constraint, so that the maximum delay between any tuple’s
input and its output is smaller than a threshold 훿. Other features of CASTLE in-
clude its adaptivity to data distributions, and its cluster reuse strategy to improve
the information quality without compromising security. The conducted perfor-
mance evaluation has shown that CASTLE is efficient and effective with regard
to the quality of the output data. We have further demonstrated that CASTLE
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can be extended to support ℓ-diversity in a straightforward way.
Besides 푘-anonymity and ℓ-diversity, we have also revised 푡-closeness and
applied it on data streams. We proposed (휔, 푡)-closeness, which requires that
for any output EC, there exists a window, which has a size of 휔 and contains the
EC, so that the difference of 풮풜 distribution between the EC and the window
is no more than a threshold 푡. In this way, we restrict the closeness constraints
within each window instead of the whole dataset, following the conventional
wisdom that streaming tuples are processed in windows. Furthermore, an algo-
rithm customized for (휔, 푡)-closeness has been introduced; its soundness is well
supported with a solid theory foundation. The experimental study has shown
that our tailored scheme outperforms methods extended from algorithms devel-
oped for 푘-anonymity model, in terms of both information quality and elapsed
time.
7.2 Future work
In this section we bring forward three topics on the agenda of our future re-
search.
7.2.1 Access control over data streams
Privacy-protection data publication treats each potential recipient (i.e., the user
of the data) equally. However, there are applications, such as battlefield, net-
work monitoring, and stock market, where users are classified into roles and
each role is permitted to see only a part of the data based on pre-defined poli-
cies. For example, stock prices are delivered to paying clients based on their
subscriptions. The concept of role base access control [68] was introduced with
such security requirements in mind. We have proposed a general framework to
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protect against unauthorized access to data streams [29]1. Given a submitted
query, we rewrite it according to its related role based access control policies
in such a way that only authorized tuples/attributes will be returned to the user.
In addition, we have implemented the framework in StreamBase (i.e., a popu-
lar commercial data stream engine), and demonstrated it [25]. The extension
of our framework includes but not limited to the following directions: the op-
timization of rewritten queries, updates of queries and access control policies,
and the support of sharing a common sub-query among users. It is important
to remark that our access control model is discretionary, just like most models
adopted in commercial data management systems. As such, it leaves the respon-
sibility of correctly defining control policies to the security administrator. As a
result, potential conflicts among policies exist, thus providing inference chan-
nels for the attackers. Therefore, another interesting direction for future work
is investigating how our framework can be complemented by inference control
techniques [20, 64].
7.2.2 Anonymization of transaction dataset
Transaction data have a wide range of applications, such as association rule
mining [13, 14], query expansion [35], and predicting user behavior [7]. How-
ever, the publication of such data may put the privacy of individuals at risk—an
attacker with the partial knowledge of transactions may associate individuals
with sensitive information. As a result, a careful anonymization of the data be-
fore their release is indispensable. Transaction data are set-valued; each entry
is a set of items, e.g., purchased items, query items, user preferences, chosen
from a universal domain. Consequently, anonymization methods developed on
1A paper invited and accepted by TISSEC.
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microdata, which has a fixed schema, cannot be applied directly on them. We
have proposed 휌-uncertainty [28], an inference-proof privacy principle. Given a
transaction dataset 풟ℬ, for any transaction 푥 ∈ 풟ℬ, any subset of items 휒 ⊂ 푥,
and any sensitive item 훼 /∈ 휒, 휌-uncertainty requires that the confidence of the
sensitive association rule2 휒 → 훼 be at most 휌. Obviously, 휌-uncertainty lim-
its the sensitive inference arising from prior knowledge 휒. We have designed
an algorithm, which solves the problem of 휌-uncertainty in a non-trivial way
by combining both generalization and suppression. Still, rendering a dataset
휌-uncertain is a challenging task, due to the huge amount of sensitive associa-
tion rules existing in the data. Till now our algorithm can process only small
transactions. Therefore, a new approach, which can process longer transactions
and better preserve information, will be an item on our research agenda. Fur-
thermore, we are interested in applying 휌-uncertainty to the cognate problem of
anonymizing functional dependencies in a relational dataset.
7.2.3 Algorithm-based attacks
Like most other privacy approaches, the methods in this thesis assume random
worlds model [18], i.e., given an anonymized dataset, its possible inputs can be
many, and an attacker treats each of these “possible worlds” as equally likely.
As an example, suppose that tuple 푥 appears in an anonymized dataset 풟ℬ′. To
determine the probability that 푥.풮풜 is diabetes, an attacker will examine all the
input instances, each with an output equal to 퐷퐵′, and compute the fractions of
those inputs consistent with 푥.풮풜 = 푑푖푎푏푒푡푒푠. Without further information, an
attacker can only treat each input instance equally. However, using the knowl-
edge of specific anonymization algorithms, an attacker can eliminate some input
2An association rule is sensitive, if its consequent contains at least one sensitive item.
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instances, and his/her belief in certain event can be raised, thus some desired pri-
vacy requirements may possibly be broken. Minimality attack [77] is one case
of such attacks; it is based on the observation that most anonymization methods
try to minimize information loss and such an attempt enables the attack. Re-
cently, Cormode et al. [33] have determined the scope of the effectiveness of
this attack. Therefore, another interesting topic for future research can be ex-
amining the internal workings of our proposed mechanisms with regard to the
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